1/* ssl/d1_both.c */ 2/* 3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu 4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. 5 */ 6/* ==================================================================== 7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 8 * 9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 11 * are met: 12 * 13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 15 * 16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 19 * distribution. 20 * 21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 22 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 25 * 26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 29 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 30 * 31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 34 * 35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 36 * acknowledgment: 37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 39 * 40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * ==================================================================== 53 * 54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 57 * 58 */ 59/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 60 * All rights reserved. 61 * 62 * This package is an SSL implementation written 63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 65 * 66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 72 * 73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 74 * the code are not to be removed. 75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 76 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 79 * 80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 82 * are met: 83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 89 * must display the following acknowledgement: 90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 97 * 98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 108 * SUCH DAMAGE. 109 * 110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 112 * copied and put under another distribution licence 113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 114 */ 115 116#include <limits.h> 117#include <string.h> 118#include <stdio.h> 119#include "ssl_locl.h" 120#include <openssl/buffer.h> 121#include <openssl/rand.h> 122#include <openssl/objects.h> 123#include <openssl/evp.h> 124#include <openssl/x509.h> 125 126 127/* XDTLS: figure out the right values */ 128static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28}; 129 130static unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void); 131static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu); 132static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, 133 unsigned long frag_len); 134static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, 135 unsigned char *p); 136static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt, 137 unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off, 138 unsigned long frag_len); 139static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, 140 long max, int *ok); 141 142static hm_fragment * 143dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len) 144 { 145 hm_fragment *frag = NULL; 146 unsigned char *buf = NULL; 147 148 frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment)); 149 if ( frag == NULL) 150 return NULL; 151 152 if (frag_len) 153 { 154 buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len); 155 if ( buf == NULL) 156 { 157 OPENSSL_free(frag); 158 return NULL; 159 } 160 } 161 162 /* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */ 163 frag->fragment = buf; 164 165 return frag; 166 } 167 168static void 169dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag) 170 { 171 if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment); 172 OPENSSL_free(frag); 173 } 174 175/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */ 176int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) 177 { 178 int ret; 179 int curr_mtu; 180 unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize; 181 182 /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */ 183 if ( ! (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) 184 { 185 s->d1->mtu = 186 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL); 187 188 /* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know 189 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */ 190 if ( s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu()) 191 { 192 s->d1->mtu = 0; 193 s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu); 194 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU, 195 s->d1->mtu, NULL); 196 } 197 } 198#if 0 199 mtu = s->d1->mtu; 200 201 fprintf(stderr, "using MTU = %d\n", mtu); 202 203 mtu -= (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); 204 205 curr_mtu = mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)); 206 207 if ( curr_mtu > 0) 208 mtu = curr_mtu; 209 else if ( ( ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s))) <= 0) 210 return ret; 211 212 if ( BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + s->init_num >= mtu) 213 { 214 ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s)); 215 if ( ret <= 0) 216 return ret; 217 mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); 218 } 219 220 OPENSSL_assert(mtu > 0); /* should have something reasonable now */ 221 222#endif 223 224 if ( s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) 225 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 226 (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); 227 228 if (s->write_hash) 229 mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash); 230 else 231 mac_size = 0; 232 233 if (s->enc_write_ctx && 234 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)) 235 blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher); 236 else 237 blocksize = 0; 238 239 frag_off = 0; 240 while( s->init_num) 241 { 242 curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) - 243 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - mac_size - blocksize; 244 245 if ( curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) 246 { 247 /* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong */ 248 ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s)); 249 if ( ret <= 0) 250 return ret; 251 curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 252 mac_size - blocksize; 253 } 254 255 if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu) 256 len = curr_mtu; 257 else 258 len = s->init_num; 259 260 261 /* XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part */ 262 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) 263 { 264 if ( s->init_off != 0) 265 { 266 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); 267 s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; 268 s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; 269 270 /* write atleast DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes */ 271 if ( len <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) 272 len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; 273 } 274 275 dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, 276 len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); 277 278 dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]); 279 280 OPENSSL_assert(len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); 281 } 282 283 ret=dtls1_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], 284 len); 285 if (ret < 0) 286 { 287 /* might need to update MTU here, but we don't know 288 * which previous packet caused the failure -- so can't 289 * really retransmit anything. continue as if everything 290 * is fine and wait for an alert to handle the 291 * retransmit 292 */ 293 if ( BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), 294 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0 ) 295 s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), 296 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL); 297 else 298 return(-1); 299 } 300 else 301 { 302 303 /* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake 304 * message got sent. but why would this happen? */ 305 OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret); 306 307 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting) 308 { 309 /* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case 310 * we'll ignore the result anyway */ 311 unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]; 312 const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; 313 int xlen; 314 315 if (frag_off == 0 && s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 316 { 317 /* reconstruct message header is if it 318 * is being sent in single fragment */ 319 *p++ = msg_hdr->type; 320 l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p); 321 s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p); 322 l2n3(0,p); 323 l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p); 324 p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; 325 xlen = ret; 326 } 327 else 328 { 329 p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; 330 xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; 331 } 332 333 ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen); 334 } 335 336 if (ret == s->init_num) 337 { 338 if (s->msg_callback) 339 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, 340 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, 341 s->msg_callback_arg); 342 343 s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */ 344 s->init_num = 0; 345 346 return(1); 347 } 348 s->init_off+=ret; 349 s->init_num-=ret; 350 frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); 351 } 352 } 353 return(0); 354 } 355 356 357/* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1), 358 * maximum acceptable body length 'max'. 359 * Read an entire handshake message. Handshake messages arrive in 360 * fragments. 361 */ 362long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok) 363 { 364 int i, al; 365 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr; 366 367 /* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused 368 * by the absence of an optional handshake message */ 369 if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) 370 { 371 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0; 372 if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt)) 373 { 374 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 375 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 376 goto f_err; 377 } 378 *ok=1; 379 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; 380 s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size; 381 return s->init_num; 382 } 383 384 msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr; 385 do 386 { 387 if ( msg_hdr->frag_off == 0) 388 { 389 /* s->d1->r_message_header.msg_len = 0; */ 390 memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); 391 } 392 393 i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok); 394 if ( i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT || 395 i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) /* bad fragment received */ 396 continue; 397 else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok) 398 return i; 399 400 /* Note that s->init_sum is used as a counter summing 401 * up fragments' lengths: as soon as they sum up to 402 * handshake packet length, we assume we have got all 403 * the fragments. Overlapping fragments would cause 404 * premature termination, so we don't expect overlaps. 405 * Well, handling overlaps would require something more 406 * drastic. Indeed, as it is now there is no way to 407 * tell if out-of-order fragment from the middle was 408 * the last. '>=' is the best/least we can do to control 409 * the potential damage caused by malformed overlaps. */ 410 if ((unsigned int)s->init_num >= msg_hdr->msg_len) 411 { 412 unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 413 unsigned long msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len; 414 415 /* reconstruct message header as if it was 416 * sent in single fragment */ 417 *(p++) = msg_hdr->type; 418 l2n3(msg_len,p); 419 s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p); 420 l2n3(0,p); 421 l2n3(msg_len,p); 422 if (s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 423 p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 424 msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; 425 426 ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len); 427 if (s->msg_callback) 428 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, 429 p, msg_len, 430 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 431 432 memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); 433 434 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; 435 /* we just read a handshake message from the other side: 436 * this means that we don't need to retransmit of the 437 * buffered messages. 438 * XDTLS: may be able clear out this 439 * buffer a little sooner (i.e if an out-of-order 440 * handshake message/record is received at the record 441 * layer. 442 * XDTLS: exception is that the server needs to 443 * know that change cipher spec and finished messages 444 * have been received by the client before clearing this 445 * buffer. this can simply be done by waiting for the 446 * first data segment, but is there a better way? */ 447 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s); 448 449 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; 450 return s->init_num; 451 } 452 else 453 msg_hdr->frag_off = i; 454 } while(1) ; 455 456f_err: 457 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 458 *ok = 0; 459 return -1; 460 } 461 462 463static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s,struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,int max) 464 { 465 size_t frag_off,frag_len,msg_len; 466 467 msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len; 468 frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off; 469 frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; 470 471 /* sanity checking */ 472 if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > msg_len) 473 { 474 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); 475 return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 476 } 477 478 if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > (unsigned long)max) 479 { 480 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); 481 return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 482 } 483 484 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */ 485 { 486 /* msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked 487 * against max above */ 488 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,(int)msg_len+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) 489 { 490 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 491 return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 492 } 493 494 s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len; 495 s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len; 496 s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type; 497 s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type; 498 s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq; 499 } 500 else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len) 501 { 502 /* They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce 503 * upper limit would open possibility for buffer overrun. */ 504 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); 505 return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 506 } 507 508 return 0; /* no error */ 509 } 510 511 512static int 513dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok) 514 { 515 /* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available 516 * if so: 517 * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[] 518 * (2) update s->init_num 519 */ 520 pitem *item; 521 hm_fragment *frag; 522 int al; 523 524 *ok = 0; 525 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages); 526 if ( item == NULL) 527 return 0; 528 529 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; 530 531 if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq) 532 { 533 unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len; 534 pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages); 535 536 al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&frag->msg_header,max); 537 538 if (al==0) /* no alert */ 539 { 540 unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; 541 memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off], 542 frag->fragment,frag->msg_header.frag_len); 543 } 544 545 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); 546 pitem_free(item); 547 548 if (al==0) 549 { 550 *ok = 1; 551 return frag_len; 552 } 553 554 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 555 s->init_num = 0; 556 *ok = 0; 557 return -1; 558 } 559 else 560 return 0; 561 } 562 563 564static int 565dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) 566{ 567 int i=-1; 568 hm_fragment *frag = NULL; 569 pitem *item = NULL; 570 PQ_64BIT seq64; 571 unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; 572 573 if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len) 574 goto err; 575 576 /* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */ 577 pq_64bit_init(&seq64); 578 pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, msg_hdr->seq); 579 item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64); 580 pq_64bit_free(&seq64); 581 582 /* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is 583 * too far in the future, already in the queue or if we received 584 * a FINISHED before the SERVER_HELLO, which then must be a stale 585 * retransmit. 586 */ 587 if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq || 588 msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL || 589 (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) 590 { 591 unsigned char devnull [256]; 592 593 while (frag_len) 594 { 595 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, 596 devnull, 597 frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0); 598 if (i<=0) goto err; 599 frag_len -= i; 600 } 601 } 602 603 if (frag_len) 604 { 605 frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len); 606 if ( frag == NULL) 607 goto err; 608 609 memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); 610 611 /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read) */ 612 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, 613 frag->fragment,frag_len,0); 614 if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len) 615 goto err; 616 617 pq_64bit_init(&seq64); 618 pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, msg_hdr->seq); 619 620 item = pitem_new(seq64, frag); 621 pq_64bit_free(&seq64); 622 if ( item == NULL) 623 goto err; 624 625 pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); 626 } 627 628 return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; 629 630err: 631 if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); 632 if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item); 633 *ok = 0; 634 return i; 635 } 636 637 638static long 639dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) 640 { 641 unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; 642 unsigned long l, frag_off, frag_len; 643 int i,al; 644 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; 645 646 /* see if we have the required fragment already */ 647 if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok) 648 { 649 if (*ok) s->init_num += frag_len; 650 return frag_len; 651 } 652 653 /* read handshake message header */ 654 i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,wire, 655 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0); 656 if (i <= 0) /* nbio, or an error */ 657 { 658 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; 659 *ok = 0; 660 return i; 661 } 662 OPENSSL_assert(i == DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); 663 664 /* parse the message fragment header */ 665 dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr); 666 667 /* 668 * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered 669 * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time 670 */ 671 if ( msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq) 672 return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok); 673 674 l = msg_hdr.msg_len; 675 frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off; 676 frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len; 677 678 if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 && 679 wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) 680 { 681 /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- 682 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them 683 * if their format is correct. Does not count for 684 * 'Finished' MAC. */ 685 if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0) 686 { 687 if (s->msg_callback) 688 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, 689 wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, 690 s->msg_callback_arg); 691 692 s->init_num = 0; 693 return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, 694 max, ok); 695 } 696 else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */ 697 { 698 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 699 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 700 goto f_err; 701 } 702 } 703 704 if ((al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&msg_hdr,max))) 705 goto f_err; 706 707 /* XDTLS: ressurect this when restart is in place */ 708 s->state=stn; 709 710 if ( frag_len > 0) 711 { 712 unsigned char *p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; 713 714 i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, 715 &p[frag_off],frag_len,0); 716 /* XDTLS: fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets */ 717 if (i <= 0) 718 { 719 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; 720 *ok = 0; 721 return i; 722 } 723 } 724 else 725 i = 0; 726 727 /* XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the 728 * handshake to fail */ 729 OPENSSL_assert(i == (int)frag_len); 730 731 *ok = 1; 732 733 /* Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in 734 * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments' 735 * lengths: as soon as they sum up to handshake packet 736 * length, we assume we have got all the fragments. */ 737 s->init_num += frag_len; 738 return frag_len; 739 740f_err: 741 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 742 s->init_num = 0; 743 744 *ok=0; 745 return(-1); 746 } 747 748int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen) 749 { 750 unsigned char *p,*d; 751 int i; 752 unsigned long l; 753 754 if (s->state == a) 755 { 756 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 757 p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); 758 759 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, 760 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1), 761 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2), 762 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md); 763 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i; 764 memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); 765 p+=i; 766 l=i; 767 768 /* Copy the finished so we can use it for 769 * renegotiation checks 770 */ 771 if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) 772 { 773 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); 774 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, 775 s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); 776 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i; 777 } 778 else 779 { 780 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); 781 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, 782 s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); 783 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i; 784 } 785 786#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16 787 /* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless 788 * I do this. 789 */ 790 l&=0xffff; 791#endif 792 793 d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l, 0, l); 794 s->init_num=(int)l+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; 795 s->init_off=0; 796 797 /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ 798 dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); 799 800 s->state=b; 801 } 802 803 /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */ 804 return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 805 } 806 807/* for these 2 messages, we need to 808 * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init 809 * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero 810 * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init 811 * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign 812 * ssl->session->read_compression assign 813 * ssl->session->read_hash assign 814 */ 815int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b) 816 { 817 unsigned char *p; 818 819 if (s->state == a) 820 { 821 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 822 *p++=SSL3_MT_CCS; 823 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq; 824 s->init_num=DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; 825 826 if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 827 { 828 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++; 829 s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,p); 830 s->init_num+=2; 831 } 832 833 s->init_off=0; 834 835 dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0, 836 s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0); 837 838 /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ 839 dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1); 840 841 s->state=b; 842 } 843 844 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */ 845 return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)); 846 } 847 848static int dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x) 849 { 850 int n; 851 unsigned char *p; 852 853 n=i2d_X509(x,NULL); 854 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3))) 855 { 856 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 857 return 0; 858 } 859 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]); 860 l2n3(n,p); 861 i2d_X509(x,&p); 862 *l+=n+3; 863 864 return 1; 865 } 866unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x) 867 { 868 unsigned char *p; 869 int i; 870 unsigned long l= 3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; 871 BUF_MEM *buf; 872 873 /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */ 874 buf=s->init_buf; 875 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10)) 876 { 877 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 878 return(0); 879 } 880 if (x != NULL) 881 { 882 X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx; 883 884 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,NULL)) 885 { 886 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB); 887 return(0); 888 } 889 890 X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx); 891 for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) 892 { 893 x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i); 894 895 if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x)) 896 { 897 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); 898 return 0; 899 } 900 } 901 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); 902 } 903 /* Thawte special :-) */ 904 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++) 905 { 906 x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i); 907 if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x)) 908 return 0; 909 } 910 911 l-= (3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); 912 913 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); 914 l2n3(l,p); 915 l+=3; 916 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]); 917 p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l, 0, l); 918 919 l+=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; 920 return(l); 921 } 922 923int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code) 924 { 925 if ( code > 0) 926 { 927 fprintf( stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__); 928 return 1; 929 } 930 931 if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) 932 { 933 /* not a timeout, none of our business, 934 let higher layers handle this. in fact it's probably an error */ 935 return code; 936 } 937 938 if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* done, no need to send a retransmit */ 939 { 940 BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ); 941 return code; 942 } 943 944#if 0 /* for now, each alert contains only one record number */ 945 item = pqueue_peek(state->rcvd_records); 946 if ( item ) 947 { 948 /* send an alert immediately for all the missing records */ 949 } 950 else 951#endif 952 953#if 0 /* no more alert sending, just retransmit the last set of messages */ 954 if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts >= DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT) 955 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, 956 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); 957#endif 958 959 return dtls1_handle_timeout(s); 960 } 961 962int 963dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs) 964 { 965 /* The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message sequence number, 966 * since the queue only contains messages of a single handshake. However, the 967 * ChangeCipherSpec has no message sequence number and so using only the sequence 968 * will result in the CCS and Finished having the same index. To prevent this, 969 * the sequence number is multiplied by 2. In case of a CCS 1 is subtracted. 970 * This does not only differ CSS and Finished, it also maintains the order of the 971 * index (important for priority queues) and fits in the unsigned short variable. 972 */ 973 return seq * 2 - is_ccs; 974 } 975 976int 977dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s) 978 { 979 pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages; 980 piterator iter; 981 pitem *item; 982 hm_fragment *frag; 983 int found = 0; 984 985 iter = pqueue_iterator(sent); 986 987 for ( item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter)) 988 { 989 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; 990 if ( dtls1_retransmit_message(s, 991 (unsigned short)dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs), 992 0, &found) <= 0 && found) 993 { 994 fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n"); 995 return -1; 996 } 997 } 998 999 return 1; 1000 } 1001 1002int 1003dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs) 1004 { 1005 pitem *item; 1006 hm_fragment *frag; 1007 PQ_64BIT seq64; 1008 1009 /* this function is called immediately after a message has 1010 * been serialized */ 1011 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0); 1012 1013 frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num); 1014 1015 memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num); 1016 1017 if ( is_ccs) 1018 { 1019 OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + 1020 DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH <= (unsigned int)s->init_num); 1021 } 1022 else 1023 { 1024 OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + 1025 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num); 1026 } 1027 1028 frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len; 1029 frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq; 1030 frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type; 1031 frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0; 1032 frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len; 1033 frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs; 1034 1035 /* save current state*/ 1036 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx; 1037 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash; 1038 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress = s->compress; 1039 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session; 1040 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch; 1041 1042 pq_64bit_init(&seq64); 1043 1044 pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, 1045 dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 1046 frag->msg_header.is_ccs)); 1047 1048 item = pitem_new(seq64, frag); 1049 pq_64bit_free(&seq64); 1050 if ( item == NULL) 1051 { 1052 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); 1053 return 0; 1054 } 1055 1056#if 0 1057 fprintf( stderr, "buffered messge: \ttype = %xx\n", msg_buf->type); 1058 fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tlen = %d\n", msg_buf->len); 1059 fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tseq_num = %d\n", msg_buf->seq_num); 1060#endif 1061 1062 pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item); 1063 return 1; 1064 } 1065 1066int 1067dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off, 1068 int *found) 1069 { 1070 int ret; 1071 /* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */ 1072 pitem *item; 1073 hm_fragment *frag ; 1074 unsigned long header_length; 1075 PQ_64BIT seq64; 1076 struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state; 1077 unsigned char save_write_sequence[8]; 1078 1079 /* 1080 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0); 1081 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0); 1082 */ 1083 1084 /* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */ 1085 pq_64bit_init(&seq64); 1086 pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, seq); 1087 1088 item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64); 1089 pq_64bit_free(&seq64); 1090 if ( item == NULL) 1091 { 1092 fprintf(stderr, "retransmit: message %d non-existant\n", seq); 1093 *found = 0; 1094 return 0; 1095 } 1096 1097 *found = 1; 1098 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; 1099 1100 if ( frag->msg_header.is_ccs) 1101 header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; 1102 else 1103 header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; 1104 1105 memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment, 1106 frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length); 1107 s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length; 1108 1109 dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type, 1110 frag->msg_header.msg_len, frag->msg_header.seq, 0, 1111 frag->msg_header.frag_len); 1112 1113 /* save current state */ 1114 saved_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx; 1115 saved_state.write_hash = s->write_hash; 1116 saved_state.compress = s->compress; 1117 saved_state.session = s->session; 1118 saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch; 1119 saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch; 1120 1121 s->d1->retransmitting = 1; 1122 1123 /* restore state in which the message was originally sent */ 1124 s->enc_write_ctx = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx; 1125 s->write_hash = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash; 1126 s->compress = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress; 1127 s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session; 1128 s->d1->w_epoch = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch; 1129 1130 if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1) 1131 { 1132 memcpy(save_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); 1133 memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->d1->last_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); 1134 } 1135 1136 ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ? 1137 SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); 1138 1139 /* restore current state */ 1140 s->enc_write_ctx = saved_state.enc_write_ctx; 1141 s->write_hash = saved_state.write_hash; 1142 s->compress = saved_state.compress; 1143 s->session = saved_state.session; 1144 s->d1->w_epoch = saved_state.epoch; 1145 1146 if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1) 1147 { 1148 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); 1149 memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, save_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); 1150 } 1151 1152 s->d1->retransmitting = 0; 1153 1154 (void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s)); 1155 return ret; 1156 } 1157 1158/* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */ 1159void 1160dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s) 1161 { 1162 pitem *item; 1163 1164 for(item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages); 1165 item != NULL; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) 1166 { 1167 dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data); 1168 pitem_free(item); 1169 } 1170 } 1171 1172 1173unsigned char * 1174dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt, 1175 unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len) 1176 { 1177 if ( frag_off == 0) 1178 { 1179 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq; 1180 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++; 1181 } 1182 1183 dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 1184 frag_off, frag_len); 1185 1186 return p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; 1187 } 1188 1189 1190/* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */ 1191static void 1192dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt, 1193 unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off, 1194 unsigned long frag_len) 1195 { 1196 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; 1197 1198 msg_hdr->type = mt; 1199 msg_hdr->msg_len = len; 1200 msg_hdr->seq = seq_num; 1201 msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off; 1202 msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len; 1203 } 1204 1205static void 1206dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, 1207 unsigned long frag_len) 1208 { 1209 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; 1210 1211 msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off; 1212 msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len; 1213 } 1214 1215static unsigned char * 1216dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) 1217 { 1218 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; 1219 1220 *p++ = msg_hdr->type; 1221 l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p); 1222 1223 s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p); 1224 l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p); 1225 l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p); 1226 1227 return p; 1228 } 1229 1230static unsigned int 1231dtls1_min_mtu(void) 1232 { 1233 return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) / 1234 sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]); 1235 } 1236 1237static unsigned int 1238dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu) 1239 { 1240 size_t i; 1241 1242 if ( curr_mtu == 0 ) 1243 return g_probable_mtu[0] ; 1244 1245 for ( i = 0; i < sizeof(g_probable_mtu)/sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0]); i++) 1246 if ( curr_mtu > g_probable_mtu[i]) 1247 return g_probable_mtu[i]; 1248 1249 return curr_mtu; 1250 } 1251 1252void 1253dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) 1254 { 1255 memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); 1256 msg_hdr->type = *(data++); 1257 n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len); 1258 1259 n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq); 1260 n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off); 1261 n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len); 1262 } 1263 1264void 1265dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr) 1266 { 1267 memset(ccs_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct ccs_header_st)); 1268 1269 ccs_hdr->type = *(data++); 1270 } 1271