1/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 59#include <stdio.h> 60#include <time.h> 61#include <errno.h> 62 63#include "cryptlib.h" 64#include <openssl/crypto.h> 65#include <openssl/lhash.h> 66#include <openssl/buffer.h> 67#include <openssl/evp.h> 68#include <openssl/asn1.h> 69#include <openssl/x509.h> 70#include <openssl/x509v3.h> 71#include <openssl/objects.h> 72 73/* CRL score values */ 74 75/* No unhandled critical extensions */ 76 77#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 78 79/* certificate is within CRL scope */ 80 81#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 82 83/* CRL times valid */ 84 85#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 86 87/* Issuer name matches certificate */ 88 89#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 90 91/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ 92 93#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) 94 95/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ 96 97#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 98 99/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ 100 101#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 102 103/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ 104 105#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 106 107/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ 108 109#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 110 111static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e); 112static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); 113static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); 114static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 115static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 116static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 117static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 118static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 119static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 120 121static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, 122 unsigned int *preasons, 123 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); 124static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 125 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); 126static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score, 127 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); 128static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, 129 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score); 130static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, 131 unsigned int *preasons); 132static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); 133static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 134 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, 135 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); 136 137static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 138const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 139 140 141static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) 142 { 143 return ok; 144 } 145 146#if 0 147static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) 148 { 149 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b); 150 } 151#endif 152 153int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 154 { 155 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL; 156 X509_NAME *xn; 157 int bad_chain = 0; 158 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; 159 int depth,i,ok=0; 160 int num; 161 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 162 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL; 163 if (ctx->cert == NULL) 164 { 165 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); 166 return -1; 167 } 168 169 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 170 171 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is 172 * present and that the first entry is in place */ 173 if (ctx->chain == NULL) 174 { 175 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || 176 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert))) 177 { 178 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 179 goto end; 180 } 181 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 182 ctx->last_untrusted=1; 183 } 184 185 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ 186 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL 187 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) 188 { 189 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 190 goto end; 191 } 192 193 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 194 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); 195 depth=param->depth; 196 197 198 for (;;) 199 { 200 /* If we have enough, we break */ 201 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take 202 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the 203 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error 204 * code later. 205 */ 206 207 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 208 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); 209 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break; 210 211 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ 212 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) 213 { 214 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x); 215 if (xtmp != NULL) 216 { 217 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp)) 218 { 219 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 220 goto end; 221 } 222 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 223 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp); 224 ctx->last_untrusted++; 225 x=xtmp; 226 num++; 227 /* reparse the full chain for 228 * the next one */ 229 continue; 230 } 231 } 232 break; 233 } 234 235 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted 236 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one, 237 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */ 238 239 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it 240 * is self signed. 241 */ 242 243 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 244 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1); 245 xn = X509_get_subject_name(x); 246 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) 247 { 248 /* we have a self signed certificate */ 249 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) 250 { 251 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if 252 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact 253 * match to avoid possible impersonation. 254 */ 255 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 256 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) 257 { 258 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; 259 ctx->current_cert=x; 260 ctx->error_depth=i-1; 261 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp); 262 bad_chain = 1; 263 ok=cb(0,ctx); 264 if (!ok) goto end; 265 } 266 else 267 { 268 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version 269 * so we get any trust settings. 270 */ 271 X509_free(x); 272 x = xtmp; 273 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); 274 ctx->last_untrusted=0; 275 } 276 } 277 else 278 { 279 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */ 280 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); 281 ctx->last_untrusted--; 282 num--; 283 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); 284 } 285 } 286 287 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ 288 for (;;) 289 { 290 /* If we have enough, we break */ 291 if (depth < num) break; 292 293 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 294 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); 295 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break; 296 297 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 298 299 if (ok < 0) return ok; 300 if (ok == 0) break; 301 302 x = xtmp; 303 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x)) 304 { 305 X509_free(xtmp); 306 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 307 return 0; 308 } 309 num++; 310 } 311 312 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ 313 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); 314 315 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ 316 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) 317 { 318 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) 319 { 320 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) 321 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; 322 else 323 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; 324 ctx->current_cert=x; 325 } 326 else 327 { 328 329 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss); 330 num++; 331 ctx->last_untrusted=num; 332 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss; 333 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; 334 chain_ss=NULL; 335 } 336 337 ctx->error_depth=num-1; 338 bad_chain = 1; 339 ok=cb(0,ctx); 340 if (!ok) goto end; 341 } 342 343 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ 344 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); 345 346 if (!ok) goto end; 347 348 /* Check name constraints */ 349 350 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); 351 352 if (!ok) goto end; 353 354 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ 355 356 if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx); 357 358 if (!ok) goto end; 359 360 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ 361 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); 362 363 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters 364 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification. 365 */ 366 367 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); 368 if(!ok) goto end; 369 370 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ 371 if (ctx->verify != NULL) 372 ok=ctx->verify(ctx); 373 else 374 ok=internal_verify(ctx); 375 if(!ok) goto end; 376 377#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 378 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ 379 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); 380 if (!ok) goto end; 381 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); 382 if (!ok) goto end; 383#endif 384 385 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ 386 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) 387 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); 388 if(!ok) goto end; 389 if (0) 390 { 391end: 392 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); 393 } 394 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp); 395 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); 396 return ok; 397 } 398 399 400/* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) 401 */ 402 403static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) 404{ 405 int i; 406 X509 *issuer; 407 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) 408 { 409 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 410 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) 411 return issuer; 412 } 413 return NULL; 414} 415 416/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ 417 418static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) 419{ 420 int ret; 421 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); 422 if (ret == X509_V_OK) 423 return 1; 424 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ 425 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) 426 return 0; 427 428 ctx->error = ret; 429 ctx->current_cert = x; 430 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 431 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 432 return 0; 433} 434 435/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ 436 437static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 438{ 439 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); 440 if (*issuer) 441 { 442 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 443 return 1; 444 } 445 else 446 return 0; 447} 448 449 450/* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency 451 * with the supplied purpose 452 */ 453 454static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 455{ 456#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY 457 return 1; 458#else 459 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; 460 X509 *x; 461 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 462 int proxy_path_length = 0; 463 int purpose; 464 int allow_proxy_certs; 465 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 466 467 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: 468 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct 469 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). 470 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not 471 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. 472 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for 473 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. 474 */ 475 must_be_ca = -1; 476 477 /* CRL path validation */ 478 if (ctx->parent) 479 { 480 allow_proxy_certs = 0; 481 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; 482 } 483 else 484 { 485 allow_proxy_certs = 486 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); 487 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their 488 software happy */ 489 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) 490 allow_proxy_certs = 1; 491 purpose = ctx->param->purpose; 492 } 493 494 /* Check all untrusted certificates */ 495 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) 496 { 497 int ret; 498 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 499 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 500 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) 501 { 502 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; 503 ctx->error_depth = i; 504 ctx->current_cert = x; 505 ok=cb(0,ctx); 506 if (!ok) goto end; 507 } 508 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) 509 { 510 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; 511 ctx->error_depth = i; 512 ctx->current_cert = x; 513 ok=cb(0,ctx); 514 if (!ok) goto end; 515 } 516 ret = X509_check_ca(x); 517 switch(must_be_ca) 518 { 519 case -1: 520 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 521 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) 522 { 523 ret = 0; 524 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 525 } 526 else 527 ret = 1; 528 break; 529 case 0: 530 if (ret != 0) 531 { 532 ret = 0; 533 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; 534 } 535 else 536 ret = 1; 537 break; 538 default: 539 if ((ret == 0) 540 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 541 && (ret != 1))) 542 { 543 ret = 0; 544 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 545 } 546 else 547 ret = 1; 548 break; 549 } 550 if (ret == 0) 551 { 552 ctx->error_depth = i; 553 ctx->current_cert = x; 554 ok=cb(0,ctx); 555 if (!ok) goto end; 556 } 557 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) 558 { 559 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); 560 if ((ret == 0) 561 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 562 && (ret != 1))) 563 { 564 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; 565 ctx->error_depth = i; 566 ctx->current_cert = x; 567 ok=cb(0,ctx); 568 if (!ok) goto end; 569 } 570 } 571 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ 572 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) 573 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) 574 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) 575 { 576 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 577 ctx->error_depth = i; 578 ctx->current_cert = x; 579 ok=cb(0,ctx); 580 if (!ok) goto end; 581 } 582 /* Increment path length if not self issued */ 583 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 584 plen++; 585 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next 586 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE 587 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a 588 CA certificate. */ 589 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) 590 { 591 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) 592 { 593 ctx->error = 594 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 595 ctx->error_depth = i; 596 ctx->current_cert = x; 597 ok=cb(0,ctx); 598 if (!ok) goto end; 599 } 600 proxy_path_length++; 601 must_be_ca = 0; 602 } 603 else 604 must_be_ca = 1; 605 } 606 ok = 1; 607 end: 608 return ok; 609#endif 610} 611 612static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 613 { 614 X509 *x; 615 int i, j, rv; 616 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ 617 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) 618 { 619 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 620 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ 621 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 622 continue; 623 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in 624 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly 625 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be 626 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed. 627 */ 628 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) 629 { 630 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; 631 if (nc) 632 { 633 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); 634 if (rv != X509_V_OK) 635 { 636 ctx->error = rv; 637 ctx->error_depth = i; 638 ctx->current_cert = x; 639 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx)) 640 return 0; 641 } 642 } 643 } 644 } 645 return 1; 646 } 647 648static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 649{ 650#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY 651 return 1; 652#else 653 int i, ok; 654 X509 *x; 655 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 656 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 657/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ 658 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 659 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 660 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); 661 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) 662 return 1; 663 ctx->error_depth = i; 664 ctx->current_cert = x; 665 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) 666 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; 667 else 668 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; 669 ok = cb(0, ctx); 670 return ok; 671#endif 672} 673 674static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 675 { 676 int i, last, ok; 677 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) 678 return 1; 679 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) 680 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 681 else 682 { 683 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ 684 if (ctx->parent) 685 return 1; 686 last = 0; 687 } 688 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++) 689 { 690 ctx->error_depth = i; 691 ok = check_cert(ctx); 692 if (!ok) return ok; 693 } 694 return 1; 695 } 696 697static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 698 { 699 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; 700 X509 *x; 701 int ok, cnum; 702 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 703 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); 704 ctx->current_cert = x; 705 ctx->current_issuer = NULL; 706 ctx->current_crl_score = 0; 707 ctx->current_reasons = 0; 708 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) 709 { 710 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ 711 if (ctx->get_crl) 712 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); 713 else 714 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); 715 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except 716 * notify callback 717 */ 718 if(!ok) 719 { 720 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; 721 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 722 goto err; 723 } 724 ctx->current_crl = crl; 725 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); 726 if (!ok) 727 goto err; 728 729 if (dcrl) 730 { 731 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); 732 if (!ok) 733 goto err; 734 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); 735 if (!ok) 736 goto err; 737 } 738 else 739 ok = 1; 740 741 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ 742 if (ok != 2) 743 { 744 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); 745 if (!ok) 746 goto err; 747 } 748 749 X509_CRL_free(crl); 750 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); 751 crl = NULL; 752 dcrl = NULL; 753 } 754 err: 755 X509_CRL_free(crl); 756 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); 757 758 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 759 return ok; 760 761 } 762 763/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ 764 765static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) 766 { 767 time_t *ptime; 768 int i; 769 if (notify) 770 ctx->current_crl = crl; 771 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 772 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 773 else 774 ptime = NULL; 775 776 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); 777 if (i == 0) 778 { 779 if (!notify) 780 return 0; 781 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; 782 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 783 return 0; 784 } 785 786 if (i > 0) 787 { 788 if (!notify) 789 return 0; 790 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; 791 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 792 return 0; 793 } 794 795 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) 796 { 797 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); 798 799 if (i == 0) 800 { 801 if (!notify) 802 return 0; 803 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; 804 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 805 return 0; 806 } 807 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ 808 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) 809 { 810 if (!notify) 811 return 0; 812 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; 813 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 814 return 0; 815 } 816 } 817 818 if (notify) 819 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 820 821 return 1; 822 } 823 824static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, 825 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, 826 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 827 { 828 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; 829 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; 830 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; 831 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; 832 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; 833 834 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) 835 { 836 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 837 reasons = *preasons; 838 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); 839 840 if (crl_score > best_score) 841 { 842 best_crl = crl; 843 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; 844 best_score = crl_score; 845 best_reasons = reasons; 846 } 847 } 848 849 if (best_crl) 850 { 851 if (*pcrl) 852 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); 853 *pcrl = best_crl; 854 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; 855 *pscore = best_score; 856 *preasons = best_reasons; 857 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); 858 if (*pdcrl) 859 { 860 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); 861 *pdcrl = NULL; 862 } 863 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); 864 } 865 866 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) 867 return 1; 868 869 return 0; 870 } 871 872/* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be 873 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. 874 */ 875 876static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) 877 { 878 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; 879 int i; 880 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, 0); 881 if (i >= 0) 882 { 883 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ 884 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) 885 return 0; 886 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); 887 } 888 else 889 exta = NULL; 890 891 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, 0); 892 893 if (i >= 0) 894 { 895 896 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) 897 return 0; 898 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); 899 } 900 else 901 extb = NULL; 902 903 if (!exta && !extb) 904 return 1; 905 906 if (!exta || !extb) 907 return 0; 908 909 910 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) 911 return 0; 912 913 return 1; 914 } 915 916/* See if a base and delta are compatible */ 917 918static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) 919 { 920 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ 921 if (!delta->base_crl_number) 922 return 0; 923 /* Base must have a CRL number */ 924 if (!base->crl_number) 925 return 0; 926 /* Issuer names must match */ 927 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), 928 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) 929 return 0; 930 /* AKID and IDP must match */ 931 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) 932 return 0; 933 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) 934 return 0; 935 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ 936 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) 937 return 0; 938 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ 939 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) 940 return 1; 941 return 0; 942 } 943 944/* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring 945 * or retrieve a chain of deltas... 946 */ 947 948static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, 949 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 950 { 951 X509_CRL *delta; 952 int i; 953 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) 954 return; 955 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) 956 return; 957 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) 958 { 959 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 960 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) 961 { 962 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) 963 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; 964 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); 965 *dcrl = delta; 966 return; 967 } 968 } 969 *dcrl = NULL; 970 } 971 972/* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'. 973 * The return value is a mask of several criteria. 974 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. 975 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if 976 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. 977 */ 978 979static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, 980 unsigned int *preasons, 981 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 982 { 983 984 int crl_score = 0; 985 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; 986 987 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ 988 989 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ 990 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) 991 return 0; 992 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ 993 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) 994 { 995 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) 996 return 0; 997 } 998 else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) 999 { 1000 /* If no new reasons reject */ 1001 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) 1002 return 0; 1003 } 1004 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ 1005 else if (crl->base_crl_number) 1006 return 0; 1007 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ 1008 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) 1009 { 1010 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) 1011 return 0; 1012 } 1013 else 1014 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; 1015 1016 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) 1017 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; 1018 1019 /* Check expiry */ 1020 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) 1021 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; 1022 1023 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ 1024 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); 1025 1026 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ 1027 1028 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) 1029 return 0; 1030 1031 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ 1032 1033 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) 1034 { 1035 /* If no new reasons reject */ 1036 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) 1037 return 0; 1038 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; 1039 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; 1040 } 1041 1042 *preasons = tmp_reasons; 1043 1044 return crl_score; 1045 1046 } 1047 1048static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, 1049 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) 1050 { 1051 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; 1052 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); 1053 int cidx = ctx->error_depth; 1054 int i; 1055 1056 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) 1057 cidx++; 1058 1059 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); 1060 1061 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) 1062 { 1063 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) 1064 { 1065 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; 1066 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1067 return; 1068 } 1069 } 1070 1071 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) 1072 { 1073 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); 1074 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1075 continue; 1076 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) 1077 { 1078 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; 1079 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1080 return; 1081 } 1082 } 1083 1084 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ 1085 1086 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) 1087 return; 1088 1089 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the 1090 * set of untrusted certificates. 1091 */ 1092 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) 1093 { 1094 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); 1095 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1096 continue; 1097 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) 1098 { 1099 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1100 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; 1101 return; 1102 } 1103 } 1104 } 1105 1106/* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new 1107 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the 1108 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking 1109 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in 1110 * practice. 1111 */ 1112 1113static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1114 { 1115 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; 1116 int ret; 1117 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ 1118 if (ctx->parent) 1119 return 0; 1120 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) 1121 return -1; 1122 1123 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; 1124 /* Copy verify params across */ 1125 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); 1126 1127 crl_ctx.parent = ctx; 1128 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; 1129 1130 /* Verify CRL issuer */ 1131 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); 1132 1133 if (ret <= 0) 1134 goto err; 1135 1136 /* Check chain is acceptable */ 1137 1138 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); 1139 err: 1140 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); 1141 return ret; 1142 } 1143 1144/* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path 1145 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a 1146 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised 1147 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must 1148 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain... 1149 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version 1150 */ 1151 1152static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1153 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, 1154 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) 1155 { 1156 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; 1157 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); 1158 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); 1159 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) 1160 return 1; 1161 return 0; 1162 } 1163 1164/* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1165 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 1166 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 1167 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 1168 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. 1169 */ 1170 1171 1172static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) 1173 { 1174 X509_NAME *nm = NULL; 1175 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; 1176 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; 1177 int i, j; 1178 if (!a || !b) 1179 return 1; 1180 if (a->type == 1) 1181 { 1182 if (!a->dpname) 1183 return 0; 1184 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ 1185 if (b->type == 1) 1186 { 1187 if (!b->dpname) 1188 return 0; 1189 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) 1190 return 1; 1191 else 1192 return 0; 1193 } 1194 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ 1195 nm = a->dpname; 1196 gens = b->name.fullname; 1197 } 1198 else if (b->type == 1) 1199 { 1200 if (!b->dpname) 1201 return 0; 1202 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ 1203 gens = a->name.fullname; 1204 nm = b->dpname; 1205 } 1206 1207 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ 1208 if (nm) 1209 { 1210 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) 1211 { 1212 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); 1213 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) 1214 continue; 1215 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) 1216 return 1; 1217 } 1218 return 0; 1219 } 1220 1221 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ 1222 1223 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) 1224 { 1225 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); 1226 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) 1227 { 1228 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); 1229 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) 1230 return 1; 1231 } 1232 } 1233 1234 return 0; 1235 1236 } 1237 1238static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) 1239 { 1240 int i; 1241 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); 1242 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ 1243 if (!dp->CRLissuer) 1244 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); 1245 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) 1246 { 1247 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); 1248 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) 1249 continue; 1250 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) 1251 return 1; 1252 } 1253 return 0; 1254 } 1255 1256/* Check CRLDP and IDP */ 1257 1258static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, 1259 unsigned int *preasons) 1260 { 1261 int i; 1262 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) 1263 return 0; 1264 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) 1265 { 1266 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) 1267 return 0; 1268 } 1269 else 1270 { 1271 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) 1272 return 0; 1273 } 1274 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; 1275 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) 1276 { 1277 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); 1278 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) 1279 { 1280 if (!crl->idp || 1281 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) 1282 { 1283 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; 1284 return 1; 1285 } 1286 } 1287 } 1288 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) 1289 return 1; 1290 return 0; 1291 } 1292 1293/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. 1294 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too 1295 */ 1296 1297static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1298 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) 1299 { 1300 int ok; 1301 X509 *issuer = NULL; 1302 int crl_score = 0; 1303 unsigned int reasons; 1304 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; 1305 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; 1306 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); 1307 reasons = ctx->current_reasons; 1308 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, 1309 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); 1310 1311 if (ok) 1312 goto done; 1313 1314 /* Lookup CRLs from store */ 1315 1316 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); 1317 1318 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ 1319 if (!skcrl && crl) 1320 goto done; 1321 1322 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); 1323 1324 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); 1325 1326 done: 1327 1328 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ 1329 if (crl) 1330 { 1331 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 1332 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; 1333 ctx->current_reasons = reasons; 1334 *pcrl = crl; 1335 *pdcrl = dcrl; 1336 return 1; 1337 } 1338 1339 return 0; 1340 } 1341 1342/* Check CRL validity */ 1343static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) 1344 { 1345 X509 *issuer = NULL; 1346 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; 1347 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; 1348 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 1349 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 1350 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ 1351 if (ctx->current_issuer) 1352 issuer = ctx->current_issuer; 1353 1354 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer 1355 * is next certificate in chain. 1356 */ 1357 else if (cnum < chnum) 1358 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); 1359 else 1360 { 1361 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); 1362 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ 1363 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) 1364 { 1365 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; 1366 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1367 if(!ok) goto err; 1368 } 1369 } 1370 1371 if(issuer) 1372 { 1373 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already 1374 * been done 1375 */ 1376 if (!crl->base_crl_number) 1377 { 1378 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ 1379 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && 1380 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) 1381 { 1382 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; 1383 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1384 if(!ok) goto err; 1385 } 1386 1387 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) 1388 { 1389 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; 1390 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1391 if(!ok) goto err; 1392 } 1393 1394 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) 1395 { 1396 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) 1397 { 1398 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; 1399 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1400 if(!ok) goto err; 1401 } 1402 } 1403 1404 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) 1405 { 1406 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; 1407 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1408 if(!ok) goto err; 1409 } 1410 1411 1412 } 1413 1414 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) 1415 { 1416 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); 1417 if (!ok) 1418 goto err; 1419 } 1420 1421 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ 1422 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); 1423 1424 if(!ikey) 1425 { 1426 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 1427 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1428 if (!ok) goto err; 1429 } 1430 else 1431 { 1432 /* Verify CRL signature */ 1433 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) 1434 { 1435 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1436 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1437 if (!ok) goto err; 1438 } 1439 } 1440 } 1441 1442 ok = 1; 1443 1444 err: 1445 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); 1446 return ok; 1447 } 1448 1449/* Check certificate against CRL */ 1450static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 1451 { 1452 int ok; 1453 X509_REVOKED *rev; 1454 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained 1455 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate 1456 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since 1457 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries. 1458 */ 1459 if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) 1460 { 1461 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 1462 return 1; 1463 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; 1464 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1465 if(!ok) 1466 return 0; 1467 } 1468 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL 1469 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL. 1470 */ 1471 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) 1472 { 1473 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) 1474 return 2; 1475 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; 1476 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1477 if (!ok) 1478 return 0; 1479 } 1480 1481 return 1; 1482 } 1483 1484static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1485 { 1486 int ret; 1487 if (ctx->parent) 1488 return 1; 1489 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, 1490 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); 1491 if (ret == 0) 1492 { 1493 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1494 return 0; 1495 } 1496 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ 1497 if (ret == -1) 1498 { 1499 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify 1500 * callback. 1501 */ 1502 X509 *x; 1503 int i; 1504 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) 1505 { 1506 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 1507 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) 1508 continue; 1509 ctx->current_cert = x; 1510 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; 1511 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1512 return 0; 1513 } 1514 return 1; 1515 } 1516 if (ret == -2) 1517 { 1518 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 1519 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; 1520 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1521 } 1522 1523 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) 1524 { 1525 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 1526 ctx->error = X509_V_OK; 1527 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) 1528 return 0; 1529 } 1530 1531 return 1; 1532 } 1533 1534static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1535 { 1536 time_t *ptime; 1537 int i; 1538 1539 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 1540 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 1541 else 1542 ptime = NULL; 1543 1544 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); 1545 if (i == 0) 1546 { 1547 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; 1548 ctx->current_cert=x; 1549 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1550 return 0; 1551 } 1552 1553 if (i > 0) 1554 { 1555 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; 1556 ctx->current_cert=x; 1557 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1558 return 0; 1559 } 1560 1561 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); 1562 if (i == 0) 1563 { 1564 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; 1565 ctx->current_cert=x; 1566 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1567 return 0; 1568 } 1569 1570 if (i < 0) 1571 { 1572 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; 1573 ctx->current_cert=x; 1574 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1575 return 0; 1576 } 1577 1578 return 1; 1579 } 1580 1581static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1582 { 1583 int ok=0,n; 1584 X509 *xs,*xi; 1585 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 1586 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 1587 1588 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 1589 1590 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 1591 ctx->error_depth=n-1; 1592 n--; 1593 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 1594 1595 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) 1596 xs=xi; 1597 else 1598 { 1599 if (n <= 0) 1600 { 1601 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; 1602 ctx->current_cert=xi; 1603 ok=cb(0,ctx); 1604 goto end; 1605 } 1606 else 1607 { 1608 n--; 1609 ctx->error_depth=n; 1610 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 1611 } 1612 } 1613 1614/* ctx->error=0; not needed */ 1615 while (n >= 0) 1616 { 1617 ctx->error_depth=n; 1618 1619 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless 1620 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and 1621 * just wastes time. 1622 */ 1623 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) 1624 { 1625 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) 1626 { 1627 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 1628 ctx->current_cert=xi; 1629 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); 1630 if (!ok) goto end; 1631 } 1632 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) 1633 { 1634 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1635 ctx->current_cert=xs; 1636 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); 1637 if (!ok) 1638 { 1639 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1640 goto end; 1641 } 1642 } 1643 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1644 pkey=NULL; 1645 } 1646 1647 xs->valid = 1; 1648 1649 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); 1650 if (!ok) 1651 goto end; 1652 1653 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ 1654 ctx->current_issuer=xi; 1655 ctx->current_cert=xs; 1656 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx); 1657 if (!ok) goto end; 1658 1659 n--; 1660 if (n >= 0) 1661 { 1662 xi=xs; 1663 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 1664 } 1665 } 1666 ok=1; 1667end: 1668 return ok; 1669 } 1670 1671int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) 1672{ 1673 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); 1674} 1675 1676int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) 1677 { 1678 char *str; 1679 ASN1_TIME atm; 1680 long offset; 1681 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p; 1682 int i,j; 1683 1684 p=buff1; 1685 i=ctm->length; 1686 str=(char *)ctm->data; 1687 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1688 { 1689 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0; 1690 memcpy(p,str,10); 1691 p+=10; 1692 str+=10; 1693 } 1694 else 1695 { 1696 if (i < 13) return 0; 1697 memcpy(p,str,12); 1698 p+=12; 1699 str+=12; 1700 } 1701 1702 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) 1703 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; } 1704 else 1705 { 1706 *(p++)= *(str++); 1707 *(p++)= *(str++); 1708 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */ 1709 if (*str == '.') 1710 { 1711 str++; 1712 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++; 1713 } 1714 1715 } 1716 *(p++)='Z'; 1717 *(p++)='\0'; 1718 1719 if (*str == 'Z') 1720 offset=0; 1721 else 1722 { 1723 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) 1724 return 0; 1725 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60; 1726 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0'); 1727 if (*str == '-') 1728 offset= -offset; 1729 } 1730 atm.type=ctm->type; 1731 atm.flags = 0; 1732 atm.length=sizeof(buff2); 1733 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2; 1734 1735 if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL) 1736 return 0; 1737 1738 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1739 { 1740 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0'); 1741 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ 1742 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0'); 1743 if (j < 50) j+=100; 1744 1745 if (i < j) return -1; 1746 if (i > j) return 1; 1747 } 1748 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2); 1749 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ 1750 return -1; 1751 else 1752 return i; 1753 } 1754 1755ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) 1756{ 1757 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); 1758} 1759 1760ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) 1761 { 1762 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); 1763 } 1764 1765ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, 1766 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) 1767 { 1768 time_t t; 1769 1770 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm; 1771 else time(&t); 1772 1773 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) 1774 { 1775 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1776 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1777 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) 1778 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, 1779 offset_sec); 1780 } 1781 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1782 } 1783 1784int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 1785 { 1786 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2; 1787 int i,j; 1788 1789 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1; 1790 1791 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++) 1792 { 1793 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i)); 1794 if (ktmp == NULL) 1795 { 1796 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); 1797 return 0; 1798 } 1799 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) 1800 break; 1801 else 1802 { 1803 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); 1804 ktmp=NULL; 1805 } 1806 } 1807 if (ktmp == NULL) 1808 { 1809 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); 1810 return 0; 1811 } 1812 1813 /* first, populate the other certs */ 1814 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--) 1815 { 1816 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j)); 1817 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp); 1818 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); 1819 } 1820 1821 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp); 1822 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); 1823 return 1; 1824 } 1825 1826int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, 1827 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) 1828 { 1829 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by 1830 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */ 1831 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, 1832 new_func, dup_func, free_func); 1833 } 1834 1835int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) 1836 { 1837 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data); 1838 } 1839 1840void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) 1841 { 1842 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx); 1843 } 1844 1845int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1846 { 1847 return ctx->error; 1848 } 1849 1850void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) 1851 { 1852 ctx->error=err; 1853 } 1854 1855int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1856 { 1857 return ctx->error_depth; 1858 } 1859 1860X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1861 { 1862 return ctx->current_cert; 1863 } 1864 1865STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1866 { 1867 return ctx->chain; 1868 } 1869 1870STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1871 { 1872 int i; 1873 X509 *x; 1874 STACK_OF(X509) *chain; 1875 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL; 1876 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) 1877 { 1878 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 1879 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 1880 } 1881 return chain; 1882 } 1883 1884X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1885 { 1886 return ctx->current_issuer; 1887 } 1888 1889X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1890 { 1891 return ctx->current_crl; 1892 } 1893 1894X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1895 { 1896 return ctx->parent; 1897 } 1898 1899void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1900 { 1901 ctx->cert=x; 1902 } 1903 1904void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 1905 { 1906 ctx->untrusted=sk; 1907 } 1908 1909void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) 1910 { 1911 ctx->crls=sk; 1912 } 1913 1914int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) 1915 { 1916 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); 1917 } 1918 1919int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) 1920 { 1921 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); 1922 } 1923 1924/* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust 1925 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its 1926 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by 1927 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default 1928 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value. 1929 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own 1930 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they 1931 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server. 1932 */ 1933 1934int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, 1935 int purpose, int trust) 1936{ 1937 int idx; 1938 /* If purpose not set use default */ 1939 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; 1940 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ 1941 if (purpose) 1942 { 1943 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; 1944 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); 1945 if (idx == -1) 1946 { 1947 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1948 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 1949 return 0; 1950 } 1951 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 1952 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) 1953 { 1954 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); 1955 if (idx == -1) 1956 { 1957 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1958 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 1959 return 0; 1960 } 1961 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 1962 } 1963 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ 1964 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; 1965 } 1966 if (trust) 1967 { 1968 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); 1969 if (idx == -1) 1970 { 1971 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1972 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); 1973 return 0; 1974 } 1975 } 1976 1977 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose; 1978 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust; 1979 return 1; 1980} 1981 1982X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) 1983{ 1984 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; 1985 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 1986 if (!ctx) 1987 { 1988 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1989 return NULL; 1990 } 1991 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 1992 return ctx; 1993} 1994 1995void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1996{ 1997 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); 1998 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 1999} 2000 2001int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, 2002 STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 2003 { 2004 int ret = 1; 2005 ctx->ctx=store; 2006 ctx->current_method=0; 2007 ctx->cert=x509; 2008 ctx->untrusted=chain; 2009 ctx->crls = NULL; 2010 ctx->last_untrusted=0; 2011 ctx->other_ctx=NULL; 2012 ctx->valid=0; 2013 ctx->chain=NULL; 2014 ctx->error=0; 2015 ctx->explicit_policy=0; 2016 ctx->error_depth=0; 2017 ctx->current_cert=NULL; 2018 ctx->current_issuer=NULL; 2019 ctx->current_crl=NULL; 2020 ctx->current_crl_score=0; 2021 ctx->current_reasons=0; 2022 ctx->tree = NULL; 2023 ctx->parent = NULL; 2024 2025 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); 2026 2027 if (!ctx->param) 2028 { 2029 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2030 return 0; 2031 } 2032 2033 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set 2034 * use defaults. 2035 */ 2036 2037 2038 if (store) 2039 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); 2040 else 2041 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; 2042 2043 if (store) 2044 { 2045 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 2046 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; 2047 } 2048 else 2049 ctx->cleanup = 0; 2050 2051 if (ret) 2052 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, 2053 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); 2054 2055 if (ret == 0) 2056 { 2057 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2058 return 0; 2059 } 2060 2061 if (store && store->check_issued) 2062 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; 2063 else 2064 ctx->check_issued = check_issued; 2065 2066 if (store && store->get_issuer) 2067 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; 2068 else 2069 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; 2070 2071 if (store && store->verify_cb) 2072 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 2073 else 2074 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; 2075 2076 if (store && store->verify) 2077 ctx->verify = store->verify; 2078 else 2079 ctx->verify = internal_verify; 2080 2081 if (store && store->check_revocation) 2082 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; 2083 else 2084 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; 2085 2086 if (store && store->get_crl) 2087 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; 2088 else 2089 ctx->get_crl = NULL; 2090 2091 if (store && store->check_crl) 2092 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; 2093 else 2094 ctx->check_crl = check_crl; 2095 2096 if (store && store->cert_crl) 2097 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; 2098 else 2099 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; 2100 2101 if (store && store->lookup_certs) 2102 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; 2103 else 2104 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; 2105 2106 if (store && store->lookup_crls) 2107 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; 2108 else 2109 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; 2110 2111 ctx->check_policy = check_policy; 2112 2113 2114 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As 2115 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a 2116 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */ 2117 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */ 2118 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, 2119 &(ctx->ex_data))) 2120 { 2121 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 2122 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2123 return 0; 2124 } 2125 return 1; 2126 } 2127 2128/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. 2129 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. 2130 */ 2131 2132void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 2133{ 2134 ctx->other_ctx = sk; 2135 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; 2136} 2137 2138void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2139 { 2140 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx); 2141 if (ctx->param != NULL) 2142 { 2143 if (ctx->parent == NULL) 2144 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2145 ctx->param=NULL; 2146 } 2147 if (ctx->tree != NULL) 2148 { 2149 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); 2150 ctx->tree=NULL; 2151 } 2152 if (ctx->chain != NULL) 2153 { 2154 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free); 2155 ctx->chain=NULL; 2156 } 2157 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); 2158 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); 2159 } 2160 2161void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) 2162 { 2163 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); 2164 } 2165 2166void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) 2167 { 2168 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); 2169 } 2170 2171void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t) 2172 { 2173 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); 2174 } 2175 2176void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 2177 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) 2178 { 2179 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb; 2180 } 2181 2182X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2183 { 2184 return ctx->tree; 2185 } 2186 2187int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2188 { 2189 return ctx->explicit_policy; 2190 } 2191 2192int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) 2193 { 2194 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; 2195 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); 2196 if (!param) 2197 return 0; 2198 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); 2199 } 2200 2201X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2202 { 2203 return ctx->param; 2204 } 2205 2206void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) 2207 { 2208 if (ctx->param) 2209 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2210 ctx->param = param; 2211 } 2212 2213IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) 2214IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) 2215 2216IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) 2217 2218IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 2219IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 2220