s3_srvr.c revision 656d9c7f52f88b3a3daccafa7655dec086c4756e
1/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111/* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124 125#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 126#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 127 128#include <stdio.h> 129#include "ssl_locl.h" 130#include "kssl_lcl.h" 131#include <openssl/buffer.h> 132#include <openssl/rand.h> 133#include <openssl/objects.h> 134#include <openssl/evp.h> 135#include <openssl/hmac.h> 136#include <openssl/x509.h> 137#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 138#include <openssl/dh.h> 139#endif 140#include <openssl/bn.h> 141#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 142#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> 143#endif 144#include <openssl/md5.h> 145 146static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); 147#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 148static int nid2curve_id(int nid); 149#endif 150 151static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) 152 { 153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) 154 return(SSLv3_server_method()); 155 else 156 return(NULL); 157 } 158 159IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, 160 ssl3_accept, 161 ssl_undefined_function, 162 ssl3_get_server_method) 163 164int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 165 { 166 BUF_MEM *buf; 167 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); 168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; 169 long num1; 170 int ret= -1; 171 int new_state,state,skip=0; 172 173 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); 174 ERR_clear_error(); 175 clear_sys_error(); 176 177 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 178 cb=s->info_callback; 179 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 180 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; 181 182 /* init things to blank */ 183 s->in_handshake++; 184 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 185 186 if (s->cert == NULL) 187 { 188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 189 return(-1); 190 } 191 192 for (;;) 193 { 194 state=s->state; 195 196 switch (s->state) 197 { 198 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 199 s->new_session=1; 200 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 201 202 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 203 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 204 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 205 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 206 207 s->server=1; 208 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); 209 210 if ((s->version>>8) != 3) 211 { 212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 213 return -1; 214 } 215 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 216 217 if (s->init_buf == NULL) 218 { 219 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) 220 { 221 ret= -1; 222 goto end; 223 } 224 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) 225 { 226 ret= -1; 227 goto end; 228 } 229 s->init_buf=buf; 230 } 231 232 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) 233 { 234 ret= -1; 235 goto end; 236 } 237 238 s->init_num=0; 239 240 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) 241 { 242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that 243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) 244 */ 245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; } 246 247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 248 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 249 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; 250 } 251 else 252 { 253 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, 254 * we will just send a HelloRequest */ 255 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 256 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 257 } 258 break; 259 260 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 261 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 262 263 s->shutdown=0; 264 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 265 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 266 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 267 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 268 s->init_num=0; 269 270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 271 break; 272 273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 274 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 275 break; 276 277 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 278 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 279 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 280 281 s->shutdown=0; 282 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 283 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 284 s->new_session = 2; 285 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 286 s->init_num=0; 287 break; 288 289 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 290 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 291 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 292 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 293#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 294 if (s->hit) 295 { 296 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 297 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 298 else 299 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 300 } 301#else 302 if (s->hit) 303 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 304#endif 305 else 306 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 307 s->init_num=0; 308 break; 309 310 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 311 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 312 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */ 313 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) 314 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5)) 315 { 316 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 317 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 318#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 319 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 320 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 321 else 322 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 323 } 324 else 325 { 326 skip = 1; 327 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 328 } 329#else 330 } 331 else 332 skip=1; 333 334 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 335#endif 336 s->init_num=0; 337 break; 338 339 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 340 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 341 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; 342 343 /* clear this, it may get reset by 344 * send_server_key_exchange */ 345 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA) 346#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 347 && !(l & SSL_KRB5) 348#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 349 ) 350 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key 351 * even when forbidden by protocol specs 352 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to 353 * be able to handle this) */ 354 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; 355 else 356 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; 357 358 359 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or 360 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate 361 * 362 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange 363 * message only if the cipher suite is either 364 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the 365 * server certificate contains the server's 366 * public key for key exchange. 367 */ 368 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp 369 || (l & SSL_kECDHE) 370 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA)) 371 || ((l & SSL_kRSA) 372 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL 373 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 374 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 375 ) 376 ) 377 ) 378 ) 379 { 380 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 381 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 382 } 383 else 384 skip=1; 385 386 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 387 s->init_num=0; 388 break; 389 390 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 391 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 392 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 393 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 394 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, 395 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ 396 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 397 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 398 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites 399 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts 400 * and in RFC 2246): */ 401 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) && 402 /* ... except when the application insists on verification 403 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ 404 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || 405 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ 406 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5)) 407 { 408 /* no cert request */ 409 skip=1; 410 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; 411 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 412 } 413 else 414 { 415 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; 416 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 417 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 418#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 419 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 420#else 421 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 422 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 423#endif 424 s->init_num=0; 425 } 426 break; 427 428 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 429 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 430 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s); 431 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 432 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 433 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 434 s->init_num=0; 435 break; 436 437 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 438 /* number of bytes to be flushed */ 439 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL); 440 if (num1 > 0) 441 { 442 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; 443 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio); 444 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; } 445 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 446 } 447 448 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; 449 break; 450 451 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 452 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 453 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ 454 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); 455 if (ret <= 0) 456 goto end; 457 if (ret == 2) 458 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; 459 else { 460 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 461 { 462 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 463 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 464 } 465 s->init_num=0; 466 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 467 } 468 break; 469 470 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 471 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 472 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 473 if (ret <= 0) 474 goto end; 475 if (ret == 2) 476 { 477 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when 478 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in 479 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify 480 * message is not sent. 481 */ 482 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 483 s->init_num = 0; 484 } 485 else 486 { 487 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 488 s->init_num=0; 489 490 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is 491 * a client cert, it can be verified 492 */ 493 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, 494 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1), 495 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0])); 496 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, 497 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2), 498 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH])); 499 } 500 break; 501 502 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 503 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 504 505 /* we should decide if we expected this one */ 506 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 507 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 508 509 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 510 s->init_num=0; 511 break; 512 513 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 514 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 515 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 516 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 517 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 518 if (s->hit) 519 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 520#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 521 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 522 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 523#endif 524 else 525 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 526 s->init_num=0; 527 break; 528 529#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 530 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 531 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 532 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 533 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 534 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 535 s->init_num=0; 536 break; 537 538 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 539 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 540 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 541 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 542 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 543 s->init_num=0; 544 break; 545 546#endif 547 548 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 549 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 550 551 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 552 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) 553 { ret= -1; goto end; } 554 555 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 556 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 557 558 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 559 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 560 s->init_num=0; 561 562 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 563 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 564 { 565 ret= -1; 566 goto end; 567 } 568 569 break; 570 571 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 572 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 573 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, 574 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 575 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, 576 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); 577 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 578 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 579 if (s->hit) 580 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 581 else 582 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; 583 s->init_num=0; 584 break; 585 586 case SSL_ST_OK: 587 /* clean a few things up */ 588 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 589 590 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); 591 s->init_buf=NULL; 592 593 /* remove buffering on output */ 594 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 595 596 s->init_num=0; 597 598 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ 599 { 600 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless 601 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */ 602 603 s->new_session=0; 604 605 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 606 607 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; 608 /* s->server=1; */ 609 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept; 610 611 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); 612 } 613 614 ret = 1; 615 goto end; 616 /* break; */ 617 618 default: 619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 620 ret= -1; 621 goto end; 622 /* break; */ 623 } 624 625 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) 626 { 627 if (s->debug) 628 { 629 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 630 goto end; 631 } 632 633 634 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) 635 { 636 new_state=s->state; 637 s->state=state; 638 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); 639 s->state=new_state; 640 } 641 } 642 skip=0; 643 } 644end: 645 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 646 647 s->in_handshake--; 648 if (cb != NULL) 649 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); 650 return(ret); 651 } 652 653int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 654 { 655 unsigned char *p; 656 657 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) 658 { 659 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 660 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; 661 *(p++)=0; 662 *(p++)=0; 663 *(p++)=0; 664 665 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 666 /* number of bytes to write */ 667 s->init_num=4; 668 s->init_off=0; 669 } 670 671 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 672 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 673 } 674 675int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) 676 { 677 int ok; 678 long n; 679 680 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, 681 * so permit appropriate message length */ 682 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 683 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 684 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 685 -1, 686 s->max_cert_list, 687 &ok); 688 if (!ok) return((int)n); 689 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 690 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) 691 { 692 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, 693 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) 694 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared 695 * when a handshake is not completed ... */ 696#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 697 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 698 { 699 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 700 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 701 } 702#endif 703 return 2; 704 } 705 return 1; 706} 707 708int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 709 { 710 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1; 711 unsigned int cookie_len; 712 long n; 713 unsigned long id; 714 unsigned char *p,*d,*q; 715 SSL_CIPHER *c; 716#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 717 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL; 718#endif 719 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL; 720 721 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. 722 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, 723 * This down switching should be handled by a different method. 724 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with 725 * TLSv1. 726 */ 727 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) 728 { 729 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 730 } 731 s->first_packet=1; 732 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 733 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 734 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, 735 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 736 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, 737 &ok); 738 739 if (!ok) return((int)n); 740 s->first_packet=0; 741 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 742 743 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header 744 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ 745 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1]; 746 p+=2; 747 748 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || 749 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) 750 { 751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 752 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) 753 { 754 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ 755 s->version = s->client_version; 756 } 757 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 758 goto f_err; 759 } 760 761 /* load the client random */ 762 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 763 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 764 765 /* get the session-id */ 766 j= *(p++); 767 768 s->hit=0; 769 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation 770 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option 771 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7. 772 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default, 773 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications 774 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with 775 * an earlier library version) 776 */ 777 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) 778 { 779 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 780 goto err; 781 } 782 else 783 { 784 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); 785 if (i == 1) 786 { /* previous session */ 787 s->hit=1; 788 } 789 else if (i == -1) 790 goto err; 791 else /* i == 0 */ 792 { 793 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 794 goto err; 795 } 796 } 797 798 p+=j; 799 800 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) 801 { 802 /* cookie stuff */ 803 cookie_len = *(p++); 804 805 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && 806 s->d1->send_cookie == 0) 807 { 808 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */ 809 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len) 810 { 811 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 813 goto f_err; 814 } 815 } 816 817 /* 818 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the 819 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it 820 * does not cause an overflow. 821 */ 822 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) 823 { 824 /* too much data */ 825 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 826 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 827 goto f_err; 828 } 829 830 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 831 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && 832 cookie_len > 0) 833 { 834 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); 835 836 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) 837 { 838 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, 839 cookie_len) == 0) 840 { 841 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 843 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 844 goto f_err; 845 } 846 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 847 } 848 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 849 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */ 850 { 851 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 853 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 854 goto f_err; 855 } 856 } 857 858 p += cookie_len; 859 } 860 861 n2s(p,i); 862 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) 863 { 864 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ 865 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 867 goto f_err; 868 } 869 if ((p+i) >= (d+n)) 870 { 871 /* not enough data */ 872 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 874 goto f_err; 875 } 876 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers)) 877 == NULL)) 878 { 879 goto err; 880 } 881 p+=i; 882 883 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 884 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) 885 { 886 j=0; 887 id=s->session->cipher->id; 888 889#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 890 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers)); 891#endif 892 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) 893 { 894 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i); 895#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 896 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 897 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 898#endif 899 if (c->id == id) 900 { 901 j=1; 902 break; 903 } 904 } 905 if (j == 0) 906 { 907 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) 908 { 909 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */ 910 s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); 911 } 912 else 913 { 914 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher 915 * list if we are asked to reuse it */ 916 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 918 goto f_err; 919 } 920 } 921 } 922 923 /* compression */ 924 i= *(p++); 925 if ((p+i) > (d+n)) 926 { 927 /* not enough data */ 928 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 930 goto f_err; 931 } 932 q=p; 933 for (j=0; j<i; j++) 934 { 935 if (p[j] == 0) break; 936 } 937 938 p+=i; 939 if (j >= i) 940 { 941 /* no compress */ 942 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 944 goto f_err; 945 } 946 947#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 948 /* TLS extensions*/ 949 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) 950 { 951 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) 952 { 953 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ 954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 955 goto f_err; 956 } 957 } 958 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { 959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 960 goto err; 961 } 962#endif 963 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 964 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression 965 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ 966 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL; 967#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 968 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL) 969 { /* See if we have a match */ 970 int m,nn,o,v,done=0; 971 972 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 973 for (m=0; m<nn; m++) 974 { 975 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); 976 v=comp->id; 977 for (o=0; o<i; o++) 978 { 979 if (v == q[o]) 980 { 981 done=1; 982 break; 983 } 984 } 985 if (done) break; 986 } 987 if (done) 988 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; 989 else 990 comp=NULL; 991 } 992#endif 993 994 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */ 995#if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test 996 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b, 997 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */ 998 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) 999 { 1000 if (p < (d+n)) 1001 { 1002 /* wrong number of bytes, 1003 * there could be more to follow */ 1004 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1006 goto f_err; 1007 } 1008 } 1009#endif 1010 1011 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must 1012 * pick a cipher */ 1013 1014 if (!s->hit) 1015 { 1016#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1017 s->session->compress_meth=0; 1018#else 1019 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id; 1020#endif 1021 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) 1022 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1023 s->session->ciphers=ciphers; 1024 if (ciphers == NULL) 1025 { 1026 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); 1028 goto f_err; 1029 } 1030 ciphers=NULL; 1031 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers, 1032 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1033 1034 if (c == NULL) 1035 { 1036 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1038 goto f_err; 1039 } 1040 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; 1041 } 1042 else 1043 { 1044 /* Session-id reuse */ 1045#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 1046 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; 1047 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL; 1048 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL; 1049 1050 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) 1051 { 1052 sk=s->session->ciphers; 1053 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) 1054 { 1055 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i); 1056 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL) 1057 nc=c; 1058 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) 1059 ec=c; 1060 } 1061 if (nc != NULL) 1062 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc; 1063 else if (ec != NULL) 1064 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec; 1065 else 1066 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1067 } 1068 else 1069#endif 1070 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1071 } 1072 1073 /* we now have the following setup. 1074 * client_random 1075 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1076 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1077 * compression - basically ignored right now 1078 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1079 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1080 * s->hit - session reuse flag 1081 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1082 */ 1083 1084 ret=1; 1085 if (0) 1086 { 1087f_err: 1088 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1089 } 1090err: 1091 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1092 return(ret); 1093 } 1094 1095int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1096 { 1097 unsigned char *buf; 1098 unsigned char *p,*d; 1099 int i,sl; 1100 unsigned long l,Time; 1101 1102 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) 1103 { 1104 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1105 p=s->s3->server_random; 1106 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ 1107 l2n(Time,p); 1108 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) 1109 return -1; 1110 /* Do the message type and length last */ 1111 d=p= &(buf[4]); 1112 1113 *(p++)=s->version>>8; 1114 *(p++)=s->version&0xff; 1115 1116 /* Random stuff */ 1117 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1118 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1119 1120 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the 1121 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the 1122 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send 1123 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length 1124 * session-id if we want it to be single use. 1125 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id 1126 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff. 1127 * 1128 * We also have an additional case where stateless session 1129 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old 1130 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can 1131 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful 1132 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality 1133 * is unaffected. 1134 */ 1135 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1136 && !s->hit) 1137 s->session->session_id_length=0; 1138 1139 sl=s->session->session_id_length; 1140 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) 1141 { 1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1143 return -1; 1144 } 1145 *(p++)=sl; 1146 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl); 1147 p+=sl; 1148 1149 /* put the cipher */ 1150 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p); 1151 p+=i; 1152 1153 /* put the compression method */ 1154#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1155 *(p++)=0; 1156#else 1157 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1158 *(p++)=0; 1159 else 1160 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 1161#endif 1162#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1163 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1164 { 1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1166 return -1; 1167 } 1168#endif 1169 /* do the header */ 1170 l=(p-d); 1171 d=buf; 1172 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; 1173 l2n3(l,d); 1174 1175 s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; 1176 /* number of bytes to write */ 1177 s->init_num=p-buf; 1178 s->init_off=0; 1179 } 1180 1181 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ 1182 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1183 } 1184 1185int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1186 { 1187 unsigned char *p; 1188 1189 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) 1190 { 1191 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1192 1193 /* do the header */ 1194 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1195 *(p++)=0; 1196 *(p++)=0; 1197 *(p++)=0; 1198 1199 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1200 /* number of bytes to write */ 1201 s->init_num=4; 1202 s->init_off=0; 1203 } 1204 1205 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ 1206 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1207 } 1208 1209int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1210 { 1211#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1212 unsigned char *q; 1213 int j,num; 1214 RSA *rsa; 1215 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1216 unsigned int u; 1217#endif 1218#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1219 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp; 1220#endif 1221#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1222 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp; 1223 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 1224 int encodedlen = 0; 1225 int curve_id = 0; 1226 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1227#endif 1228 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1229 unsigned char *p,*d; 1230 int al,i; 1231 unsigned long type; 1232 int n; 1233 CERT *cert; 1234 BIGNUM *r[4]; 1235 int nr[4],kn; 1236 BUF_MEM *buf; 1237 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1238 1239 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1240 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) 1241 { 1242 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK; 1243 cert=s->cert; 1244 1245 buf=s->init_buf; 1246 1247 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL; 1248 n=0; 1249#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1250 if (type & SSL_kRSA) 1251 { 1252 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp; 1253 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1254 { 1255 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, 1256 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1257 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1258 if(rsa == NULL) 1259 { 1260 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1262 goto f_err; 1263 } 1264 RSA_up_ref(rsa); 1265 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa; 1266 } 1267 if (rsa == NULL) 1268 { 1269 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1271 goto f_err; 1272 } 1273 r[0]=rsa->n; 1274 r[1]=rsa->e; 1275 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; 1276 } 1277 else 1278#endif 1279#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1280 if (type & SSL_kEDH) 1281 { 1282 dhp=cert->dh_tmp; 1283 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1284 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 1285 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1286 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1287 if (dhp == NULL) 1288 { 1289 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1291 goto f_err; 1292 } 1293 1294 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 1295 { 1296 DH_free(dh); 1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1298 goto err; 1299 } 1300 1301 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) 1302 { 1303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1304 goto err; 1305 } 1306 1307 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh; 1308 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || 1309 dhp->priv_key == NULL || 1310 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) 1311 { 1312 if(!DH_generate_key(dh)) 1313 { 1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1315 ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1316 goto err; 1317 } 1318 } 1319 else 1320 { 1321 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); 1322 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); 1323 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || 1324 (dh->priv_key == NULL)) 1325 { 1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1327 goto err; 1328 } 1329 } 1330 r[0]=dh->p; 1331 r[1]=dh->g; 1332 r[2]=dh->pub_key; 1333 } 1334 else 1335#endif 1336#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1337 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) 1338 { 1339 const EC_GROUP *group; 1340 1341 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp; 1342 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1343 { 1344 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 1345 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1346 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1347 } 1348 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1349 { 1350 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1352 goto f_err; 1353 } 1354 1355 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) 1356 { 1357 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1359 goto err; 1360 } 1361 1362 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ 1363 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1364 { 1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1366 goto err; 1367 } 1368 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp)) 1369 { 1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1371 goto err; 1372 } 1373 ecdh = ecdhp; 1374 1375 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh; 1376 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1377 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1378 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) 1379 { 1380 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) 1381 { 1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1383 goto err; 1384 } 1385 } 1386 1387 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || 1388 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1389 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) 1390 { 1391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1392 goto err; 1393 } 1394 1395 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && 1396 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) 1397 { 1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); 1399 goto err; 1400 } 1401 1402 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH 1403 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For 1404 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. 1405 */ 1406 if ((curve_id = 1407 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) 1408 == 0) 1409 { 1410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1411 goto err; 1412 } 1413 1414 /* Encode the public key. 1415 * First check the size of encoding and 1416 * allocate memory accordingly. 1417 */ 1418 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1419 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1420 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1421 NULL, 0, NULL); 1422 1423 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 1424 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); 1425 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); 1426 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) 1427 { 1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1429 goto err; 1430 } 1431 1432 1433 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1434 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1435 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1436 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); 1437 1438 if (encodedlen == 0) 1439 { 1440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1441 goto err; 1442 } 1443 1444 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL; 1445 1446 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not 1447 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. 1448 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes 1449 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams 1450 * structure. 1451 */ 1452 n = 4 + encodedlen; 1453 1454 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message 1455 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs 1456 */ 1457 r[0]=NULL; 1458 r[1]=NULL; 1459 r[2]=NULL; 1460 r[3]=NULL; 1461 } 1462 else 1463#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 1464 { 1465 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1467 goto f_err; 1468 } 1469 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) 1470 { 1471 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); 1472 n+=2+nr[i]; 1473 } 1474 1475 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)) 1476 { 1477 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) 1478 == NULL) 1479 { 1480 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1481 goto f_err; 1482 } 1483 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1484 } 1485 else 1486 { 1487 pkey=NULL; 1488 kn=0; 1489 } 1490 1491 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn)) 1492 { 1493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF); 1494 goto err; 1495 } 1496 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1497 p= &(d[4]); 1498 1499 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) 1500 { 1501 s2n(nr[i],p); 1502 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); 1503 p+=nr[i]; 1504 } 1505 1506#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1507 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) 1508 { 1509 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. 1510 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: 1511 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] 1512 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by 1513 * the actual encoded point itself 1514 */ 1515 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; 1516 p += 1; 1517 *p = 0; 1518 p += 1; 1519 *p = curve_id; 1520 p += 1; 1521 *p = encodedlen; 1522 p += 1; 1523 memcpy((unsigned char*)p, 1524 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 1525 encodedlen); 1526 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1527 p += encodedlen; 1528 } 1529#endif 1530 1531 /* not anonymous */ 1532 if (pkey != NULL) 1533 { 1534 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) 1535 * and p points to the space at the end. */ 1536#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1537 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) 1538 { 1539 q=md_buf; 1540 j=0; 1541 for (num=2; num > 0; num--) 1542 { 1543 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) 1544 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); 1545 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1546 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1547 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1548 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q, 1549 (unsigned int *)&i); 1550 q+=i; 1551 j+=i; 1552 } 1553 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 1554 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) 1555 { 1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA); 1557 goto err; 1558 } 1559 s2n(u,p); 1560 n+=u+2; 1561 } 1562 else 1563#endif 1564#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) 1565 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) 1566 { 1567 /* lets do DSS */ 1568 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL); 1569 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1570 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1571 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1572 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), 1573 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) 1574 { 1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA); 1576 goto err; 1577 } 1578 s2n(i,p); 1579 n+=i+2; 1580 } 1581 else 1582#endif 1583#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA) 1584 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) 1585 { 1586 /* let's do ECDSA */ 1587 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL); 1588 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1589 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1590 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1591 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), 1592 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) 1593 { 1594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA); 1595 goto err; 1596 } 1597 s2n(i,p); 1598 n+=i+2; 1599 } 1600 else 1601#endif 1602 { 1603 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 1604 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 1606 goto f_err; 1607 } 1608 } 1609 1610 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; 1611 l2n3(n,d); 1612 1613 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 1614 * it off */ 1615 s->init_num=n+4; 1616 s->init_off=0; 1617 } 1618 1619 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 1620 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1621 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1622f_err: 1623 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1624err: 1625#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1626 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1627 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1628#endif 1629 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1630 return(-1); 1631 } 1632 1633int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 1634 { 1635 unsigned char *p,*d; 1636 int i,j,nl,off,n; 1637 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL; 1638 X509_NAME *name; 1639 BUF_MEM *buf; 1640 1641 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) 1642 { 1643 buf=s->init_buf; 1644 1645 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); 1646 1647 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 1648 p++; 1649 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p); 1650 d[0]=n; 1651 p+=n; 1652 n++; 1653 1654 off=n; 1655 p+=2; 1656 n+=2; 1657 1658 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 1659 nl=0; 1660 if (sk != NULL) 1661 { 1662 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) 1663 { 1664 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i); 1665 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL); 1666 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2)) 1667 { 1668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 1669 goto err; 1670 } 1671 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]); 1672 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) 1673 { 1674 s2n(j,p); 1675 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 1676 n+=2+j; 1677 nl+=2+j; 1678 } 1679 else 1680 { 1681 d=p; 1682 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 1683 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2; 1684 n+=j; 1685 nl+=j; 1686 } 1687 } 1688 } 1689 /* else no CA names */ 1690 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]); 1691 s2n(nl,p); 1692 1693 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data; 1694 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; 1695 l2n3(n,d); 1696 1697 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 1698 * it off */ 1699 1700 s->init_num=n+4; 1701 s->init_off=0; 1702#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 1703 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; 1704 1705 /* do the header */ 1706 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1707 *(p++)=0; 1708 *(p++)=0; 1709 *(p++)=0; 1710 s->init_num += 4; 1711#endif 1712 1713 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 1714 } 1715 1716 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 1717 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1718err: 1719 return(-1); 1720 } 1721 1722int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1723 { 1724 int i,al,ok; 1725 long n; 1726 unsigned long l; 1727 unsigned char *p; 1728#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1729 RSA *rsa=NULL; 1730 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 1731#endif 1732#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1733 BIGNUM *pub=NULL; 1734 DH *dh_srvr; 1735#endif 1736#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 1737 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; 1738#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 1739 1740#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1741 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; 1742 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; 1743 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; 1744 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1745#endif 1746 1747 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 1748 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 1749 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, 1750 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1751 2048, /* ??? */ 1752 &ok); 1753 1754 if (!ok) return((int)n); 1755 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 1756 1757 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; 1758 1759#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1760 if (l & SSL_kRSA) 1761 { 1762 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ 1763 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) 1764 { 1765 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) 1766 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp; 1767 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should 1768 * be sent already */ 1769 if (rsa == NULL) 1770 { 1771 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); 1773 goto f_err; 1774 1775 } 1776 } 1777 else 1778 { 1779 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 1780 if ( (pkey == NULL) || 1781 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || 1782 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) 1783 { 1784 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 1786 goto f_err; 1787 } 1788 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; 1789 } 1790 1791 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */ 1792 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && 1793 s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 1794 { 1795 n2s(p,i); 1796 if (n != i+2) 1797 { 1798 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) 1799 { 1800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 1801 goto err; 1802 } 1803 else 1804 p-=2; 1805 } 1806 else 1807 n=i; 1808 } 1809 1810 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 1811 1812 al = -1; 1813 1814 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 1815 { 1816 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1817 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ 1818 } 1819 1820 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) 1821 { 1822 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 1823 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 1824 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 1825 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol 1826 * version instead if the server does not support the requested 1827 * protocol version. 1828 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */ 1829 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) && 1830 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) 1831 { 1832 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1833 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ 1834 1835 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 1836 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version 1837 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would 1838 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext 1839 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except 1840 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, 1841 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */ 1842 } 1843 } 1844 1845 if (al != -1) 1846 { 1847 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure 1848 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding 1849 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */ 1850 ERR_clear_error(); 1851 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; 1852 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8; 1853 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; 1854 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */ 1855 goto err; 1856 } 1857 1858 s->session->master_key_length= 1859 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 1860 s->session->master_key, 1861 p,i); 1862 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); 1863 } 1864 else 1865#endif 1866#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1867 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) 1868 { 1869 n2s(p,i); 1870 if (n != i+2) 1871 { 1872 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) 1873 { 1874 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 1875 goto err; 1876 } 1877 else 1878 { 1879 p-=2; 1880 i=(int)n; 1881 } 1882 } 1883 1884 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */ 1885 { 1886 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); 1888 goto f_err; 1889 } 1890 else 1891 { 1892 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) 1893 { 1894 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1896 goto f_err; 1897 } 1898 else 1899 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh; 1900 } 1901 1902 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL); 1903 if (pub == NULL) 1904 { 1905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB); 1906 goto err; 1907 } 1908 1909 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr); 1910 1911 if (i <= 0) 1912 { 1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1914 goto err; 1915 } 1916 1917 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 1918 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL; 1919 1920 BN_clear_free(pub); 1921 pub=NULL; 1922 s->session->master_key_length= 1923 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 1924 s->session->master_key,p,i); 1925 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); 1926 } 1927 else 1928#endif 1929#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 1930 if (l & SSL_kKRB5) 1931 { 1932 krb5_error_code krb5rc; 1933 krb5_data enc_ticket; 1934 krb5_data authenticator; 1935 krb5_data enc_pms; 1936 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; 1937 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; 1938 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; 1939 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 1940 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 1941 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; 1942 int padl, outl; 1943 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; 1944 krb5_ticket_times ttimes; 1945 1946 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); 1947 1948 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); 1949 1950 n2s(p,i); 1951 enc_ticket.length = i; 1952 1953 if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6) 1954 { 1955 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1956 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 1957 goto err; 1958 } 1959 1960 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; 1961 p+=enc_ticket.length; 1962 1963 n2s(p,i); 1964 authenticator.length = i; 1965 1966 if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6) 1967 { 1968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1969 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 1970 goto err; 1971 } 1972 1973 authenticator.data = (char *)p; 1974 p+=authenticator.length; 1975 1976 n2s(p,i); 1977 enc_pms.length = i; 1978 enc_pms.data = (char *)p; 1979 p+=enc_pms.length; 1980 1981 /* Note that the length is checked again below, 1982 ** after decryption 1983 */ 1984 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) 1985 { 1986 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1987 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 1988 goto err; 1989 } 1990 1991 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 1992 enc_pms.length + 6)) 1993 { 1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1995 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 1996 goto err; 1997 } 1998 1999 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, 2000 &kssl_err)) != 0) 2001 { 2002#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2003 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", 2004 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2005 if (kssl_err.text) 2006 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2007#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2009 kssl_err.reason); 2010 goto err; 2011 } 2012 2013 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, 2014 ** but will return authtime == 0. 2015 */ 2016 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, 2017 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) 2018 { 2019#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2020 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", 2021 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2022 if (kssl_err.text) 2023 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2024#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2026 kssl_err.reason); 2027 goto err; 2028 } 2029 2030 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) 2031 { 2032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); 2033 goto err; 2034 } 2035 2036#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2037 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); 2038#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2039 2040 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); 2041 if (enc == NULL) 2042 goto err; 2043 2044 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ 2045 2046 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv)) 2047 { 2048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2049 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2050 goto err; 2051 } 2052 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl, 2053 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) 2054 { 2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2056 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2057 goto err; 2058 } 2059 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2060 { 2061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2062 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2063 goto err; 2064 } 2065 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl)) 2066 { 2067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2068 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2069 goto err; 2070 } 2071 outl += padl; 2072 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2073 { 2074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2075 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2076 goto err; 2077 } 2078 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) 2079 { 2080 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2081 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2082 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2083 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of 2084 * the protocol version. 2085 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 2086 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher) 2087 */ 2088 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) 2089 { 2090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2091 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 2092 goto err; 2093 } 2094 } 2095 2096 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); 2097 2098 s->session->master_key_length= 2099 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2100 s->session->master_key, pms, outl); 2101 2102 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) 2103 { 2104 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); 2105 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) 2106 { 2107 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; 2108 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len); 2109 } 2110 } 2111 2112 2113 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, 2114 ** but it caused problems for apache. 2115 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); 2116 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; 2117 */ 2118 } 2119 else 2120#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2121 2122#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2123 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE)) 2124 { 2125 int ret = 1; 2126 int field_size = 0; 2127 const EC_KEY *tkey; 2128 const EC_GROUP *group; 2129 const BIGNUM *priv_key; 2130 2131 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ 2132 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 2133 { 2134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2135 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2136 goto err; 2137 } 2138 2139 /* Let's get server private key and group information */ 2140 if (l & SSL_kECDH) 2141 { 2142 /* use the certificate */ 2143 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; 2144 } 2145 else 2146 { 2147 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when 2148 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg. 2149 */ 2150 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; 2151 } 2152 2153 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); 2154 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); 2155 2156 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || 2157 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) 2158 { 2159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2160 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2161 goto err; 2162 } 2163 2164 /* Let's get client's public key */ 2165 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) 2166 { 2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2168 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2169 goto err; 2170 } 2171 2172 if (n == 0L) 2173 { 2174 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ 2175 2176 if (l & SSL_kECDHE) 2177 { 2178 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 2180 goto f_err; 2181 } 2182 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) 2183 == NULL) || 2184 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) 2185 { 2186 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client 2187 * authentication using ECDH certificates 2188 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is 2189 * never executed. When that support is 2190 * added, we ought to ensure the key 2191 * received in the certificate is 2192 * authorized for key agreement. 2193 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that 2194 * the two ECDH shares are for the same 2195 * group. 2196 */ 2197 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2199 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); 2200 goto f_err; 2201 } 2202 2203 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, 2204 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0) 2205 { 2206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2207 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2208 goto err; 2209 } 2210 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ 2211 } 2212 else 2213 { 2214 /* Get client's public key from encoded point 2215 * in the ClientKeyExchange message. 2216 */ 2217 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) 2218 { 2219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2220 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2221 goto err; 2222 } 2223 2224 /* Get encoded point length */ 2225 i = *p; 2226 p += 1; 2227 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, 2228 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) 2229 { 2230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2231 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2232 goto err; 2233 } 2234 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer 2235 * currently, so set it to the start 2236 */ 2237 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2238 } 2239 2240 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 2241 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); 2242 if (field_size <= 0) 2243 { 2244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2245 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2246 goto err; 2247 } 2248 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL); 2249 if (i <= 0) 2250 { 2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2252 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2253 goto err; 2254 } 2255 2256 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2257 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2258 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 2259 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2260 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2261 2262 /* Compute the master secret */ 2263 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \ 2264 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i); 2265 2266 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2267 return (ret); 2268 } 2269 else 2270#endif 2271 { 2272 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2274 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2275 goto f_err; 2276 } 2277 2278 return(1); 2279f_err: 2280 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2281#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) 2282err: 2283#endif 2284#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2285 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2286 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2287 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 2288 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2289 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2290#endif 2291 return(-1); 2292 } 2293 2294int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2295 { 2296 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 2297 unsigned char *p; 2298 int al,ok,ret=0; 2299 long n; 2300 int type=0,i,j; 2301 X509 *peer; 2302 2303 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2304 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 2305 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, 2306 -1, 2307 514, /* 514? */ 2308 &ok); 2309 2310 if (!ok) return((int)n); 2311 2312 if (s->session->peer != NULL) 2313 { 2314 peer=s->session->peer; 2315 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer); 2316 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey); 2317 } 2318 else 2319 { 2320 peer=NULL; 2321 pkey=NULL; 2322 } 2323 2324 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) 2325 { 2326 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 2327 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) 2328 { 2329 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); 2331 goto f_err; 2332 } 2333 ret=1; 2334 goto end; 2335 } 2336 2337 if (peer == NULL) 2338 { 2339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); 2340 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2341 goto f_err; 2342 } 2343 2344 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) 2345 { 2346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 2347 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2348 goto f_err; 2349 } 2350 2351 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 2352 { 2353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 2354 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2355 goto f_err; 2356 } 2357 2358 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 2359 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2360 n2s(p,i); 2361 n-=2; 2362 if (i > n) 2363 { 2364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2365 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2366 goto f_err; 2367 } 2368 2369 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 2370 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) 2371 { 2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 2373 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2374 goto f_err; 2375 } 2376 2377#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2378 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) 2379 { 2380 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 2381 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 2382 pkey->pkey.rsa); 2383 if (i < 0) 2384 { 2385 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 2387 goto f_err; 2388 } 2389 if (i == 0) 2390 { 2391 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 2393 goto f_err; 2394 } 2395 } 2396 else 2397#endif 2398#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2399 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) 2400 { 2401 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 2402 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 2403 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa); 2404 if (j <= 0) 2405 { 2406 /* bad signature */ 2407 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); 2409 goto f_err; 2410 } 2411 } 2412 else 2413#endif 2414#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2415 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) 2416 { 2417 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 2418 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 2419 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec); 2420 if (j <= 0) 2421 { 2422 /* bad signature */ 2423 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 2425 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 2426 goto f_err; 2427 } 2428 } 2429 else 2430#endif 2431 { 2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2433 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 2434 goto f_err; 2435 } 2436 2437 2438 ret=1; 2439 if (0) 2440 { 2441f_err: 2442 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2443 } 2444end: 2445 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 2446 return(ret); 2447 } 2448 2449int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 2450 { 2451 int i,ok,al,ret= -1; 2452 X509 *x=NULL; 2453 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n; 2454 const unsigned char *p,*q; 2455 unsigned char *d; 2456 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; 2457 2458 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2459 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 2460 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 2461 -1, 2462 s->max_cert_list, 2463 &ok); 2464 2465 if (!ok) return((int)n); 2466 2467 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) 2468 { 2469 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2470 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 2471 { 2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2473 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2474 goto f_err; 2475 } 2476 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */ 2477 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 2478 { 2479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); 2480 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2481 goto f_err; 2482 } 2483 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 2484 return(1); 2485 } 2486 2487 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) 2488 { 2489 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 2491 goto f_err; 2492 } 2493 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2494 2495 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) 2496 { 2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2498 goto err; 2499 } 2500 2501 n2l3(p,llen); 2502 if (llen+3 != n) 2503 { 2504 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2506 goto f_err; 2507 } 2508 for (nc=0; nc<llen; ) 2509 { 2510 n2l3(p,l); 2511 if ((l+nc+3) > llen) 2512 { 2513 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2515 goto f_err; 2516 } 2517 2518 q=p; 2519 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l); 2520 if (x == NULL) 2521 { 2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 2523 goto err; 2524 } 2525 if (p != (q+l)) 2526 { 2527 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2529 goto f_err; 2530 } 2531 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) 2532 { 2533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2534 goto err; 2535 } 2536 x=NULL; 2537 nc+=l+3; 2538 } 2539 2540 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) 2541 { 2542 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 2543 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) 2544 { 2545 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 2547 goto f_err; 2548 } 2549 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 2550 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2551 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 2552 { 2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2554 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2555 goto f_err; 2556 } 2557 } 2558 else 2559 { 2560 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); 2561 if (i <= 0) 2562 { 2563 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 2564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); 2565 goto f_err; 2566 } 2567 } 2568 2569 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ 2570 X509_free(s->session->peer); 2571 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk); 2572 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 2573 2574 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL 2575 * when we arrive here. */ 2576 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 2577 { 2578 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 2579 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 2580 { 2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2582 goto err; 2583 } 2584 } 2585 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) 2586 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 2587 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk; 2588 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the 2589 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ 2590 2591 sk=NULL; 2592 2593 ret=1; 2594 if (0) 2595 { 2596f_err: 2597 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2598 } 2599err: 2600 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); 2601 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); 2602 return(ret); 2603 } 2604 2605int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 2606 { 2607 unsigned long l; 2608 X509 *x; 2609 2610 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) 2611 { 2612 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); 2613 if (x == NULL && 2614 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ 2615 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms 2616 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK)) 2617 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5)) 2618 { 2619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2620 return(0); 2621 } 2622 2623 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x); 2624 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 2625 s->init_num=(int)l; 2626 s->init_off=0; 2627 } 2628 2629 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 2630 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2631 } 2632 2633 2634#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2635/* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */ 2636static int nid2curve_id(int nid) 2637{ 2638 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001) 2639 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */ 2640 switch (nid) { 2641 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ 2642 return 1; 2643 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ 2644 return 2; 2645 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ 2646 return 3; 2647 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 2648 return 4; 2649 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 2650 return 5; 2651 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ 2652 return 6; 2653 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 2654 return 7; 2655 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 2656 return 8; 2657 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ 2658 return 9; 2659 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 2660 return 10; 2661 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 2662 return 11; 2663 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ 2664 return 12; 2665 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 2666 return 13; 2667 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 2668 return 14; 2669 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ 2670 return 15; 2671 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 2672 return 16; 2673 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 2674 return 17; 2675 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ 2676 return 18; 2677 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 2678 return 19; 2679 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 2680 return 20; 2681 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ 2682 return 21; 2683 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 2684 return 22; 2685 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 2686 return 23; 2687 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ 2688 return 24; 2689 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ 2690 return 25; 2691 default: 2692 return 0; 2693 } 2694} 2695#endif 2696#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 2697int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 2698 { 2699 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) 2700 { 2701 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; 2702 int len, slen; 2703 unsigned int hlen; 2704 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 2705 HMAC_CTX hctx; 2706 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2707 unsigned char key_name[16]; 2708 2709 /* get session encoding length */ 2710 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 2711 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is 2712 * too long 2713 */ 2714 if (slen > 0xFF00) 2715 return -1; 2716 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 2717 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length 2718 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + 2719 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + 2720 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session 2721 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). 2722 */ 2723 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 2724 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + 2725 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) 2726 return -1; 2727 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen); 2728 if (!senc) 2729 return -1; 2730 p = senc; 2731 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); 2732 2733 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2734 /* do the header */ 2735 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; 2736 /* Skip message length for now */ 2737 p += 3; 2738 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 2739 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 2740 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present 2741 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values 2742 * from parent ctx. 2743 */ 2744 if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) 2745 { 2746 if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, 2747 &hctx, 1) < 0) 2748 { 2749 OPENSSL_free(senc); 2750 return -1; 2751 } 2752 } 2753 else 2754 { 2755 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); 2756 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 2757 s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); 2758 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 2759 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 2760 memcpy(key_name, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 2761 } 2762 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p); 2763 /* Skip ticket length for now */ 2764 p += 2; 2765 /* Output key name */ 2766 macstart = p; 2767 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); 2768 p += 16; 2769 /* output IV */ 2770 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); 2771 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2772 /* Encrypt session data */ 2773 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); 2774 p += len; 2775 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); 2776 p += len; 2777 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2778 2779 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); 2780 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); 2781 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 2782 2783 p += hlen; 2784 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ 2785 /* Total length */ 2786 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2787 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; 2788 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ 2789 p += 4; 2790 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ 2791 2792 /* number of bytes to write */ 2793 s->init_num= len; 2794 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 2795 s->init_off=0; 2796 OPENSSL_free(senc); 2797 } 2798 2799 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 2800 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2801 } 2802 2803int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 2804 { 2805 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) 2806 { 2807 unsigned char *p; 2808 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 2809 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + 2810 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) 2811 * + (ocsp response) 2812 */ 2813 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) 2814 return -1; 2815 2816 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2817 2818 /* do the header */ 2819 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; 2820 /* message length */ 2821 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); 2822 /* status type */ 2823 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type; 2824 /* length of OCSP response */ 2825 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); 2826 /* actual response */ 2827 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); 2828 /* number of bytes to write */ 2829 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; 2830 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; 2831 s->init_off = 0; 2832 } 2833 2834 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 2835 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2836 } 2837#endif 2838