15821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)/* ssl/d1_both.c */
25821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)/*
35821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
45821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
55821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) */
65821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)/* ====================================================================
75821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
85821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *
95821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
105821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
115821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * are met:
125821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *
135821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
145821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
155821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *
165821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
175821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
185821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
195821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    distribution.
205821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *
215821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
225821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
235821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
245821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
255821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *
265821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
275821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
285821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
295821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
305821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *
315821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
325821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
335821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
345821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *
355821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
365821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    acknowledgment:
375821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
385821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
395821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *
405821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
415821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
425821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
435821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
445821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
455821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
465821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
475821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
485821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
495821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
505821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
515821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
525821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * ====================================================================
535821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *
545821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
555821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
565821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
575821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *
585821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) */
595821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
605821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * All rights reserved.
615821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *
625821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * This package is an SSL implementation written
635821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
645821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
655821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *
665821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
675821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
685821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
695821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
705821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
715821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
725821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *
735821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
745821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * the code are not to be removed.
755821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
765821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * as the author of the parts of the library used.
775821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
785821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
795821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *
805821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
815821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
825821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * are met:
835821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
845821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
855821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
865821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
875821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
885821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
895821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    must display the following acknowledgement:
905821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
915821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
925821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
935821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
945821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
955821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
965821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
975821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *
985821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
995821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
1005821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
1015821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
1025821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
1035821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
1045821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
1055821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
1065821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
1075821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
1085821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * SUCH DAMAGE.
1095821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) *
1105821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
1115821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
1125821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * copied and put under another distribution licence
1135821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
1145821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles) */
1155821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
1165821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)#include <limits.h>
1175821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)#include <string.h>
1185821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)#include <stdio.h>
1195821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)#include "ssl_locl.h"
1205821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)#include <openssl/buffer.h>
1215821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)#include <openssl/rand.h>
1225821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)#include <openssl/objects.h>
1235821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)#include <openssl/evp.h>
1245821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)#include <openssl/x509.h>
1255821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
1265821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(msg_len) (((msg_len) + 7) / 8)
1275821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
1285821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(bitmask, start, end) { \
1295821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			if ((end) - (start) <= 8) { \
1305821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)				long ii; \
1315821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)				for (ii = (start); ii < (end); ii++) bitmask[((ii) >> 3)] |= (1 << ((ii) & 7)); \
1325821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			} else { \
1335821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)				long ii; \
1345821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)				bitmask[((start) >> 3)] |= bitmask_start_values[((start) & 7)]; \
1355821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)				for (ii = (((start) >> 3) + 1); ii < ((((end) - 1)) >> 3); ii++) bitmask[ii] = 0xff; \
1365821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)				bitmask[(((end) - 1) >> 3)] |= bitmask_end_values[((end) & 7)]; \
1375821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			} }
1385821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
1395821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \
1405821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			long ii; \
1415821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \
1425821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			is_complete = 1; \
1435821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \
1445821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \
1455821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)				if (bitmask[ii] != 0xff) { is_complete = 0; break; } }
1465821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
1475821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)#if 0
1485821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_PRINT(bitmask, msg_len) { \
1495821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			long ii; \
1505821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			printf("bitmask: "); for (ii = 0; ii < (msg_len); ii++) \
1515821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			printf("%d ", (bitmask[ii >> 3] & (1 << (ii & 7))) >> (ii & 7)); \
1525821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			printf("\n"); }
1535821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)#endif
1545821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
1555821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] = {0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80};
1565821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[]   = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f};
1575821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
1585821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)/* XDTLS:  figure out the right values */
1595821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28};
1605821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
1615821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu);
1625821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
1635821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	unsigned long frag_len);
1645821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s,
1655821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	unsigned char *p);
1665821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
1675821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off,
1685821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	unsigned long frag_len);
1695821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn,
1705821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	long max, int *ok);
1715821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
1725821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)static hm_fragment *
1735821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, int reassembly)
1745821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	{
1755821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
1765821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
1775821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	unsigned char *bitmask = NULL;
1785821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
1795821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment));
1805821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	if ( frag == NULL)
1815821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		return NULL;
1825821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
1835821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	if (frag_len)
1845821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		{
1855821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
1865821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		if ( buf == NULL)
1875821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			{
1885821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			OPENSSL_free(frag);
1895821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			return NULL;
1905821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			}
1915821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		}
1925821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
1935821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	/* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */
1945821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	frag->fragment = buf;
1955821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
1965821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	/* Initialize reassembly bitmask if necessary */
1975821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	if (reassembly)
1985821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		{
1995821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		bitmask = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
2005821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		if (bitmask == NULL)
2015821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			{
2025821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			if (buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buf);
2035821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			OPENSSL_free(frag);
2045821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			return NULL;
2055821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			}
2065821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		memset(bitmask, 0, RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
2075821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		}
2085821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
2095821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	frag->reassembly = bitmask;
2105821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
2115821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	return frag;
2125821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	}
2135821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
2145821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)static void
2155821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
2165821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	{
2175821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
2185821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
2195821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		{
2205821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx);
2215821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash);
2225821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		}
2235821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
2245821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	if (frag->reassembly) OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
2255821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	OPENSSL_free(frag);
2265821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	}
2275821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
2285821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
2295821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
2305821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	{
2315821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	int ret;
2325821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	int curr_mtu;
2335821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize;
2345821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
2355821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	/* AHA!  Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
2365821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
2375821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		{
2385821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		s->d1->mtu =
2395821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
2405821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
2415821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		/* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
2425821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
2435821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
2445821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			{
2455821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			s->d1->mtu = 0;
2465821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu);
2475821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
2485821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)				s->d1->mtu, NULL);
2495821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			}
2505821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		}
2515821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)#if 0
2525821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	mtu = s->d1->mtu;
2535821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
2545821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	fprintf(stderr, "using MTU = %d\n", mtu);
2555821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
2565821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	mtu -= (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
2575821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
2585821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	curr_mtu = mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s));
2595821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
2605821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	if ( curr_mtu > 0)
2615821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		mtu = curr_mtu;
2625821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	else if ( ( ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s))) <= 0)
2635821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		return ret;
2645821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
2655821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	if ( BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + s->init_num >= mtu)
2665821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		{
2675821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
2685821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		if ( ret <= 0)
2695821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			return ret;
2705821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
2715821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		}
2725821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)#endif
2735821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
2745821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu());  /* should have something reasonable now */
2755821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
2765821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	if ( s->init_off == 0  && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
2775821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
2785821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			(int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
2795821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
2805821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	if (s->write_hash)
2815821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
2825821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	else
2835821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		mac_size = 0;
2845821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
2855821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
2865821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		(EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
2875821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
2885821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	else
2895821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		blocksize = 0;
2905821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
2915821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	frag_off = 0;
2925821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)	while( s->init_num)
2935821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		{
2945821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) -
2955821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - mac_size - blocksize;
2965821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
2975821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		if ( curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
2985821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			{
2995821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			/* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong */
3005821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
3015821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			if ( ret <= 0)
3025821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)				return ret;
3035821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH -
3045821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)				mac_size - blocksize;
3055821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			}
3065821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
3075821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
3085821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			len = curr_mtu;
3095821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		else
3105821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			len = s->init_num;
3115821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
3125821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
3135821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		/* XDTLS: this function is too long.  split out the CCS part */
3145821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
3155821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			{
3165821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			if ( s->init_off != 0)
3175821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)				{
3185821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)				OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
3195821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)				s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
3205821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)				s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
3215821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
3225821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)				if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
3235821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)					len = curr_mtu;
3245821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)				else
3255821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)					len = s->init_num;
3265821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)				}
3275821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
3285821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off,
3295821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)				len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
3305821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
3315821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]);
3325821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
3335821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			OPENSSL_assert(len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
3345821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			}
3355821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)
3365821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		ret=dtls1_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
3375821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			len);
3385821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		if (ret < 0)
3395821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			{
3405821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			/* might need to update MTU here, but we don't know
3415821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			 * which previous packet caused the failure -- so can't
3425821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			 * really retransmit anything.  continue as if everything
3435821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			 * is fine and wait for an alert to handle the
3445821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			 * retransmit
3455821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			 */
3465821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			if ( BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
3475821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)				BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0 )
3485821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)				s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
3495821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)					BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
3505821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			else
3515821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)				return(-1);
3525821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)			}
3535821806d5e7f356e8fa4b058a389a808ea183019Torne (Richard Coles)		else
354			{
355
356			/* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake
357			 * message got sent.  but why would this happen? */
358			OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
359
360			if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting)
361				{
362				/* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
363				 * we'll ignore the result anyway */
364				unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
365				const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
366				int xlen;
367
368				if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
369					{
370					/* reconstruct message header is if it
371					 * is being sent in single fragment */
372					*p++ = msg_hdr->type;
373					l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
374					s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
375					l2n3(0,p);
376					l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
377					p  -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
378					xlen = ret;
379					}
380				else
381					{
382					p  += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
383					xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
384					}
385
386				ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen);
387				}
388
389			if (ret == s->init_num)
390				{
391				if (s->msg_callback)
392					s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
393						(size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
394						s->msg_callback_arg);
395
396				s->init_off = 0;  /* done writing this message */
397				s->init_num = 0;
398
399				return(1);
400				}
401			s->init_off+=ret;
402			s->init_num-=ret;
403			frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
404			}
405		}
406	return(0);
407	}
408
409
410/* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
411 * maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
412 * Read an entire handshake message.  Handshake messages arrive in
413 * fragments.
414 */
415long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
416	{
417	int i, al;
418	struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
419	unsigned char *p;
420	unsigned long msg_len;
421
422	/* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused
423	 * by the absence of an optional handshake message */
424	if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message)
425		{
426		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0;
427		if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt))
428			{
429			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
430			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
431			goto f_err;
432			}
433		*ok=1;
434		s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
435		s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
436		return s->init_num;
437		}
438
439	msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
440	memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
441
442again:
443	i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
444	if ( i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT ||
445		i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY)  /* bad fragment received */
446		goto again;
447	else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok)
448		return i;
449
450	p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
451	msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
452
453	/* reconstruct message header */
454	*(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
455	l2n3(msg_len,p);
456	s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
457	l2n3(0,p);
458	l2n3(msg_len,p);
459	if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
460		p       -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
461		msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
462	}
463
464	ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
465	if (s->msg_callback)
466		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
467			p, msg_len,
468			s, s->msg_callback_arg);
469
470	memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
471
472	/* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
473	if (!s->d1->listen)
474		s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
475
476	s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
477	return s->init_num;
478
479f_err:
480	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
481	*ok = 0;
482	return -1;
483	}
484
485
486static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s,struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,int max)
487	{
488	size_t frag_off,frag_len,msg_len;
489
490	msg_len  = msg_hdr->msg_len;
491	frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off;
492	frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
493
494	/* sanity checking */
495	if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > msg_len)
496		{
497		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
498		return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
499		}
500
501	if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > (unsigned long)max)
502		{
503		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
504		return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
505		}
506
507	if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */
508		{
509		/* msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked
510		 * against max above */
511		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,msg_len+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
512			{
513			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
514			return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
515			}
516
517		s->s3->tmp.message_size  = msg_len;
518		s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
519		s->s3->tmp.message_type  = msg_hdr->type;
520		s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type    = msg_hdr->type;
521		s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq     = msg_hdr->seq;
522		}
523	else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len)
524		{
525		/* They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce
526		 * upper limit would open possibility for buffer overrun. */
527		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
528		return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
529		}
530
531	return 0; /* no error */
532	}
533
534
535static int
536dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
537	{
538	/* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
539	 * if so:
540	 * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
541	 * (2) update s->init_num
542	 */
543	pitem *item;
544	hm_fragment *frag;
545	int al;
546
547	*ok = 0;
548	item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
549	if ( item == NULL)
550		return 0;
551
552	frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
553
554	/* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
555	if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
556		return 0;
557
558	if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq)
559		{
560		unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len;
561		pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
562
563		al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&frag->msg_header,max);
564
565		if (al==0) /* no alert */
566			{
567			unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
568			memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off],
569				frag->fragment,frag->msg_header.frag_len);
570			}
571
572		dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
573		pitem_free(item);
574
575		if (al==0)
576			{
577			*ok = 1;
578			return frag_len;
579			}
580
581		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
582		s->init_num = 0;
583		*ok = 0;
584		return -1;
585		}
586	else
587		return 0;
588	}
589
590/* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
591 * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
592 * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
593static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
594	{
595	unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
596	if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
597		return s->max_cert_list;
598	return max_len;
599	}
600
601static int
602dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
603	{
604	hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
605	pitem *item = NULL;
606	int i = -1, is_complete;
607	unsigned char seq64be[8];
608	unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
609
610	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
611	    msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
612		goto err;
613
614	if (frag_len == 0)
615		return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
616
617	/* Try to find item in queue */
618	memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
619	seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
620	seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
621	item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
622
623	if (item == NULL)
624		{
625		frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1);
626		if ( frag == NULL)
627			goto err;
628		memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
629		frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len;
630		frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
631		}
632	else
633		{
634		frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
635		if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
636			{
637			item = NULL;
638			frag = NULL;
639			goto err;
640			}
641		}
642
643
644	/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
645	 * retransmit and can be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag
646	 * does not need to be freed.
647	 */
648	if (frag->reassembly == NULL)
649		{
650		unsigned char devnull [256];
651
652		while (frag_len)
653			{
654			i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
655				devnull,
656				frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
657			if (i<=0) goto err;
658			frag_len -= i;
659			}
660		return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
661		}
662
663	/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
664	i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
665		frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0);
666	if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
667		i=-1;
668	if (i<=0)
669		goto err;
670
671	RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
672	                    (long)(msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len));
673
674	RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->msg_len,
675	                           is_complete);
676
677	if (is_complete)
678		{
679		OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
680		frag->reassembly = NULL;
681		}
682
683	if (item == NULL)
684		{
685		item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
686		if (item == NULL)
687			{
688			i = -1;
689			goto err;
690			}
691
692		item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
693		/* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
694		 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
695		 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control
696		 * would never have reached this branch. */
697		OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
698		}
699
700	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
701
702err:
703	if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
704	*ok = 0;
705	return i;
706	}
707
708
709static int
710dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
711{
712	int i=-1;
713	hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
714	pitem *item = NULL;
715	unsigned char seq64be[8];
716	unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
717
718	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
719		goto err;
720
721	/* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */
722	memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
723	seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
724	seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
725	item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
726
727	/* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment,
728	 * don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it.
729	 */
730	if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
731		item = NULL;
732
733	/* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is
734	 * too far in the future, already in the queue or if we received
735	 * a FINISHED before the SERVER_HELLO, which then must be a stale
736	 * retransmit.
737	 */
738	if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
739		msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL ||
740		(s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED))
741		{
742		unsigned char devnull [256];
743
744		while (frag_len)
745			{
746			i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
747				devnull,
748				frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
749			if (i<=0) goto err;
750			frag_len -= i;
751			}
752		}
753	else
754		{
755		if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
756			return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
757
758		if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
759			goto err;
760
761		frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
762		if ( frag == NULL)
763			goto err;
764
765		memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
766
767		if (frag_len)
768			{
769			/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
770			i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
771				frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
772			if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
773				i = -1;
774			if (i<=0)
775				goto err;
776			}
777
778		item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
779		if ( item == NULL)
780			goto err;
781
782		item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
783		/* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
784		 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
785		 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either
786		 * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set
787		 * to NULL and it will have been processed with
788		 * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have
789		 * been discarded. */
790		OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
791		}
792
793	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
794
795err:
796	if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
797	*ok = 0;
798	return i;
799	}
800
801
802static long
803dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
804	{
805	unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
806	unsigned long len, frag_off, frag_len;
807	int i,al;
808	struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
809
810	redo:
811	/* see if we have the required fragment already */
812	if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
813		{
814		if (*ok)	s->init_num = frag_len;
815		return frag_len;
816		}
817
818	/* read handshake message header */
819	i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,wire,
820		DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
821	if (i <= 0) 	/* nbio, or an error */
822		{
823		s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
824		*ok = 0;
825		return i;
826		}
827	/* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
828	if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
829		{
830		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
831		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
832		goto f_err;
833		}
834
835	/* parse the message fragment header */
836	dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
837
838	/*
839	 * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
840	 * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time
841	 * While listening, we accept seq 1 (ClientHello with cookie)
842	 * although we're still expecting seq 0 (ClientHello)
843	 */
844	if (msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq && !(s->d1->listen && msg_hdr.seq == 1))
845		return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
846
847	len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
848	frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
849	frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
850
851	if (frag_len && frag_len < len)
852		return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
853
854	if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
855		wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
856		{
857		/* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
858		 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
859		 * if their format is correct. Does not count for
860		 * 'Finished' MAC. */
861		if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0)
862			{
863			if (s->msg_callback)
864				s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
865					wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
866					s->msg_callback_arg);
867
868			s->init_num = 0;
869			goto redo;
870			}
871		else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
872			{
873			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
874			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
875			goto f_err;
876			}
877		}
878
879	if ((al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&msg_hdr,max)))
880		goto f_err;
881
882	/* XDTLS:  ressurect this when restart is in place */
883	s->state=stn;
884
885	if ( frag_len > 0)
886		{
887		unsigned char *p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
888
889		i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
890			&p[frag_off],frag_len,0);
891		/* XDTLS:  fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets */
892		if (i <= 0)
893			{
894			s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
895			*ok = 0;
896			return i;
897			}
898		}
899	else
900		i = 0;
901
902	/* XDTLS:  an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the
903	 * handshake to fail */
904	if (i != (int)frag_len)
905		{
906		al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
907		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
908		goto f_err;
909		}
910
911	*ok = 1;
912
913	/* Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in
914	 * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments'
915	 * lengths: as soon as they sum up to handshake packet
916	 * length, we assume we have got all the fragments. */
917	s->init_num = frag_len;
918	return frag_len;
919
920f_err:
921	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
922	s->init_num = 0;
923
924	*ok=0;
925	return(-1);
926	}
927
928int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
929	{
930	unsigned char *p,*d;
931	int i;
932	unsigned long l;
933
934	if (s->state == a)
935		{
936		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
937		p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
938
939		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
940			sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
941		s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
942		memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
943		p+=i;
944		l=i;
945
946	/* Copy the finished so we can use it for
947	 * renegotiation checks
948	 */
949	if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
950		{
951		OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
952		memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished,
953		       s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
954		s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i;
955		}
956	else
957		{
958		OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
959		memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished,
960		       s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
961		s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i;
962		}
963
964#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
965		/* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless
966		 * I do this.
967		 */
968		l&=0xffff;
969#endif
970
971		d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l, 0, l);
972		s->init_num=(int)l+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
973		s->init_off=0;
974
975		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
976		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
977
978		s->state=b;
979		}
980
981	/* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
982	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
983	}
984
985/* for these 2 messages, we need to
986 * ssl->enc_read_ctx			re-init
987 * ssl->s3->read_sequence		zero
988 * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret		re-init
989 * ssl->session->read_sym_enc		assign
990 * ssl->session->read_compression	assign
991 * ssl->session->read_hash		assign
992 */
993int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
994	{
995	unsigned char *p;
996
997	if (s->state == a)
998		{
999		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1000		*p++=SSL3_MT_CCS;
1001		s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
1002		s->init_num=DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1003
1004		if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1005			s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
1006			s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,p);
1007			s->init_num+=2;
1008		}
1009
1010		s->init_off=0;
1011
1012		dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0,
1013			s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0);
1014
1015		/* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
1016		dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1);
1017
1018		s->state=b;
1019		}
1020
1021	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
1022	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
1023	}
1024
1025static int dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
1026	{
1027	int n;
1028	unsigned char *p;
1029
1030	n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
1031	if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3)))
1032		{
1033		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1034		return 0;
1035		}
1036	p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
1037	l2n3(n,p);
1038	i2d_X509(x,&p);
1039	*l+=n+3;
1040
1041	return 1;
1042	}
1043unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
1044	{
1045	unsigned char *p;
1046	int i;
1047	unsigned long l= 3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1048	BUF_MEM *buf;
1049
1050	/* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
1051	buf=s->init_buf;
1052	if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10))
1053		{
1054		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1055		return(0);
1056		}
1057	if (x != NULL)
1058		{
1059		X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
1060
1061		if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,NULL))
1062  			{
1063  			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
1064  			return(0);
1065  			}
1066
1067		X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
1068		/* Don't leave errors in the queue */
1069		ERR_clear_error();
1070		for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++)
1071  			{
1072			x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
1073
1074			if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
1075  				{
1076				X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
1077				return 0;
1078  				}
1079  			}
1080  		X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
1081  		}
1082  	/* Thawte special :-) */
1083	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++)
1084		{
1085		x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i);
1086		if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
1087			return 0;
1088		}
1089
1090	l-= (3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
1091
1092	p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
1093	l2n3(l,p);
1094	l+=3;
1095	p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]);
1096	p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l, 0, l);
1097
1098	l+=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1099	return(l);
1100	}
1101
1102int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code)
1103	{
1104	if ( code > 0)
1105		{
1106		fprintf( stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__);
1107		return 1;
1108		}
1109
1110	if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s))
1111		{
1112		/* not a timeout, none of our business,
1113		   let higher layers handle this.  in fact it's probably an error */
1114		return code;
1115		}
1116
1117#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1118	if (!SSL_in_init(s) && !s->tlsext_hb_pending)  /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
1119#else
1120	if (!SSL_in_init(s))  /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
1121#endif
1122		{
1123		BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ);
1124		return code;
1125		}
1126
1127#if 0 /* for now, each alert contains only one record number */
1128	item = pqueue_peek(state->rcvd_records);
1129	if ( item )
1130		{
1131		/* send an alert immediately for all the missing records */
1132		}
1133	else
1134#endif
1135
1136#if 0  /* no more alert sending, just retransmit the last set of messages */
1137	if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts >= DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
1138		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1139			DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1140#endif
1141
1142	return dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
1143	}
1144
1145int
1146dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs)
1147	{
1148	/* The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message sequence number,
1149	 * since the queue only contains messages of a single handshake. However, the
1150	 * ChangeCipherSpec has no message sequence number and so using only the sequence
1151	 * will result in the CCS and Finished having the same index. To prevent this,
1152	 * the sequence number is multiplied by 2. In case of a CCS 1 is subtracted.
1153	 * This does not only differ CSS and Finished, it also maintains the order of the
1154	 * index (important for priority queues) and fits in the unsigned short variable.
1155	 */
1156	return seq * 2 - is_ccs;
1157	}
1158
1159int
1160dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
1161	{
1162	pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages;
1163	piterator iter;
1164	pitem *item;
1165	hm_fragment *frag;
1166	int found = 0;
1167
1168	iter = pqueue_iterator(sent);
1169
1170	for ( item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter))
1171		{
1172		frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
1173			if ( dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1174				(unsigned short)dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs),
1175				0, &found) <= 0 && found)
1176			{
1177			fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n");
1178			return -1;
1179			}
1180		}
1181
1182	return 1;
1183	}
1184
1185int
1186dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
1187	{
1188	pitem *item;
1189	hm_fragment *frag;
1190	unsigned char seq64be[8];
1191
1192	/* this function is called immediately after a message has
1193	 * been serialized */
1194	OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
1195
1196	frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
1197	if (!frag)
1198		return 0;
1199
1200	memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
1201
1202	if ( is_ccs)
1203		{
1204		OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
1205			       ((s->version==DTLS1_VERSION)?DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH:3) == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
1206		}
1207	else
1208		{
1209		OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
1210			DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
1211		}
1212
1213	frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
1214	frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq;
1215	frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type;
1216	frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
1217	frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
1218	frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs;
1219
1220	/* save current state*/
1221	frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
1222	frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
1223	frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress = s->compress;
1224	frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session;
1225	frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
1226
1227	memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
1228	seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
1229														  frag->msg_header.is_ccs)>>8);
1230	seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
1231														  frag->msg_header.is_ccs));
1232
1233	item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
1234	if ( item == NULL)
1235		{
1236		dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
1237		return 0;
1238		}
1239
1240#if 0
1241	fprintf( stderr, "buffered messge: \ttype = %xx\n", msg_buf->type);
1242	fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tlen = %d\n", msg_buf->len);
1243	fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tseq_num = %d\n", msg_buf->seq_num);
1244#endif
1245
1246	pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item);
1247	return 1;
1248	}
1249
1250int
1251dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off,
1252	int *found)
1253	{
1254	int ret;
1255	/* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */
1256	pitem *item;
1257	hm_fragment *frag ;
1258	unsigned long header_length;
1259	unsigned char seq64be[8];
1260	struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state;
1261	unsigned char save_write_sequence[8];
1262
1263	/*
1264	  OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
1265	  OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
1266	 */
1267
1268	/* XDTLS:  the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */
1269	memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
1270	seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(seq>>8);
1271	seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)seq;
1272
1273	item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64be);
1274	if ( item == NULL)
1275		{
1276		fprintf(stderr, "retransmit:  message %d non-existant\n", seq);
1277		*found = 0;
1278		return 0;
1279		}
1280
1281	*found = 1;
1282	frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
1283
1284	if ( frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
1285		header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1286	else
1287		header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1288
1289	memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment,
1290		frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length);
1291		s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length;
1292
1293	dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type,
1294		frag->msg_header.msg_len, frag->msg_header.seq, 0,
1295		frag->msg_header.frag_len);
1296
1297	/* save current state */
1298	saved_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
1299	saved_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
1300	saved_state.compress = s->compress;
1301	saved_state.session = s->session;
1302	saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
1303	saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
1304
1305	s->d1->retransmitting = 1;
1306
1307	/* restore state in which the message was originally sent */
1308	s->enc_write_ctx = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx;
1309	s->write_hash = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash;
1310	s->compress = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress;
1311	s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session;
1312	s->d1->w_epoch = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch;
1313
1314	if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1)
1315	{
1316		memcpy(save_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1317		memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->d1->last_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1318	}
1319
1320	ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ?
1321						 SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
1322
1323	/* restore current state */
1324	s->enc_write_ctx = saved_state.enc_write_ctx;
1325	s->write_hash = saved_state.write_hash;
1326	s->compress = saved_state.compress;
1327	s->session = saved_state.session;
1328	s->d1->w_epoch = saved_state.epoch;
1329
1330	if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1)
1331	{
1332		memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1333		memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, save_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1334	}
1335
1336	s->d1->retransmitting = 0;
1337
1338	(void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
1339	return ret;
1340	}
1341
1342/* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */
1343void
1344dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s)
1345	{
1346	pitem *item;
1347
1348	for(item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages);
1349		item != NULL; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages))
1350		{
1351		dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data);
1352		pitem_free(item);
1353		}
1354	}
1355
1356
1357unsigned char *
1358dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt,
1359			unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len)
1360	{
1361	/* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
1362	if (frag_off == 0 && !s->d1->listen)
1363		{
1364		s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
1365		s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
1366		}
1367
1368	dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq,
1369		frag_off, frag_len);
1370
1371	return p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1372	}
1373
1374
1375/* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */
1376static void
1377dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
1378			    unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off,
1379			    unsigned long frag_len)
1380	{
1381	struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
1382
1383	msg_hdr->type = mt;
1384	msg_hdr->msg_len = len;
1385	msg_hdr->seq = seq_num;
1386	msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
1387	msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
1388	}
1389
1390static void
1391dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
1392			unsigned long frag_len)
1393	{
1394	struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
1395
1396	msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
1397	msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
1398	}
1399
1400static unsigned char *
1401dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
1402	{
1403	struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
1404
1405	*p++ = msg_hdr->type;
1406	l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
1407
1408	s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
1409	l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p);
1410	l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p);
1411
1412	return p;
1413	}
1414
1415unsigned int
1416dtls1_min_mtu(void)
1417	{
1418	return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /
1419		sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
1420	}
1421
1422static unsigned int
1423dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu)
1424	{
1425	unsigned int i;
1426
1427	if ( curr_mtu == 0 )
1428		return g_probable_mtu[0] ;
1429
1430	for ( i = 0; i < sizeof(g_probable_mtu)/sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0]); i++)
1431		if ( curr_mtu > g_probable_mtu[i])
1432			return g_probable_mtu[i];
1433
1434	return curr_mtu;
1435	}
1436
1437void
1438dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
1439	{
1440	memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
1441	msg_hdr->type = *(data++);
1442	n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len);
1443
1444	n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq);
1445	n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off);
1446	n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len);
1447	}
1448
1449void
1450dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr)
1451	{
1452	memset(ccs_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct ccs_header_st));
1453
1454	ccs_hdr->type = *(data++);
1455	}
1456
1457int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
1458	{
1459	int ret;
1460#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1461	if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
1462	    !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN))
1463		{
1464		ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
1465		if (ret < 0) return -1;
1466
1467		if (ret == 0)
1468			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1, NULL);
1469		}
1470#endif
1471	ret = ssl3_shutdown(s);
1472#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1473	BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL);
1474#endif
1475	return ret;
1476	}
1477
1478#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1479int
1480dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
1481	{
1482	unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
1483	unsigned short hbtype;
1484	unsigned int payload;
1485	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
1486
1487	if (s->msg_callback)
1488		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
1489			&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
1490			s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1491
1492	/* Read type and payload length first */
1493	if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
1494		return 0; /* silently discard */
1495	if (s->s3->rrec.length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1496		return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
1497
1498	hbtype = *p++;
1499	n2s(p, payload);
1500	if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
1501		return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
1502	pl = p;
1503
1504	if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
1505		{
1506		unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
1507		unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
1508					    2 /* heartbeat length */ +
1509					    payload + padding;
1510		int r;
1511
1512		if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1513			return 0;
1514
1515		/* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte
1516		 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
1517		 * payload, plus padding
1518		 */
1519		buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
1520		bp = buffer;
1521
1522		/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
1523		*bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
1524		s2n(payload, bp);
1525		memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
1526		bp += payload;
1527		/* Random padding */
1528		RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
1529
1530		r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
1531
1532		if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
1533			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
1534				buffer, write_length,
1535				s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1536
1537		OPENSSL_free(buffer);
1538
1539		if (r < 0)
1540			return r;
1541		}
1542	else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
1543		{
1544		unsigned int seq;
1545
1546		/* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
1547		 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
1548		 * sequence number */
1549		n2s(pl, seq);
1550
1551		if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
1552			{
1553			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
1554			s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
1555			s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
1556			}
1557		}
1558
1559	return 0;
1560	}
1561
1562int
1563dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
1564	{
1565	unsigned char *buf, *p;
1566	int ret;
1567	unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
1568	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
1569
1570	/* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
1571	if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
1572	    s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
1573		{
1574		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
1575		return -1;
1576		}
1577
1578	/* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
1579	if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
1580		{
1581		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
1582		return -1;
1583		}
1584
1585	/* ...and no handshake in progress. */
1586	if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
1587		{
1588		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1589		return -1;
1590		}
1591
1592	/* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
1593	 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
1594	 */
1595	OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
1596
1597	/* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
1598	 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
1599	 * some random stuff.
1600	 *  - Message Type, 1 byte
1601	 *  - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
1602	 *  - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
1603	 *  - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
1604	 *  - Padding
1605	 */
1606	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
1607	p = buf;
1608	/* Message Type */
1609	*p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
1610	/* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
1611	s2n(payload, p);
1612	/* Sequence number */
1613	s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
1614	/* 16 random bytes */
1615	RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
1616	p += 16;
1617	/* Random padding */
1618	RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
1619
1620	ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
1621	if (ret >= 0)
1622		{
1623		if (s->msg_callback)
1624			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
1625				buf, 3 + payload + padding,
1626				s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1627
1628		dtls1_start_timer(s);
1629		s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
1630		}
1631
1632	OPENSSL_free(buf);
1633
1634	return ret;
1635	}
1636#endif
1637