1/* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 *    must display the following acknowledgement:
33 *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
57
58#include <openssl/asn1.h>
59#include <openssl/buf.h>
60#include <openssl/digest.h>
61#include <openssl/err.h>
62#include <openssl/mem.h>
63#include <openssl/obj.h>
64#include <openssl/stack.h>
65#include <openssl/x509.h>
66#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
67
68
69int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
70	{
71	int i;
72	X509_CINF *ai,*bi;
73
74	ai=a->cert_info;
75	bi=b->cert_info;
76	i=M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber,bi->serialNumber);
77	if (i) return(i);
78	return(X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer,bi->issuer));
79	}
80
81unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
82	{
83	unsigned long ret=0;
84	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
85	unsigned char md[16];
86	char *f;
87
88	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
89	f=X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer,NULL,0);
90	if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
91		goto err;
92	if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)f,strlen(f)))
93		goto err;
94	OPENSSL_free(f);
95	if(!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
96		(unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
97		goto err;
98	if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,&(md[0]),NULL))
99		goto err;
100	ret=(	((unsigned long)md[0]     )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
101		((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
102		)&0xffffffffL;
103	err:
104	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
105	return(ret);
106	}
107
108int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
109	{
110	return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer,b->cert_info->issuer));
111	}
112
113int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
114	{
115	return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject,b->cert_info->subject));
116	}
117
118int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
119	{
120	return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer,b->crl->issuer));
121	}
122
123int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
124	{
125	return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
126	}
127
128X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
129	{
130	return(a->cert_info->issuer);
131	}
132
133unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
134	{
135	return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
136	}
137
138unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
139	{
140	return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
141	}
142
143X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
144	{
145	return(a->cert_info->subject);
146	}
147
148ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
149	{
150	return(a->cert_info->serialNumber);
151	}
152
153unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
154	{
155	return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
156	}
157
158unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
159	{
160	return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
161	}
162
163/* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for
164 * this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally
165 * prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in
166 * STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may
167 * involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
168 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point
169 * where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt
170 * with an evil cast.
171 */
172int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
173{
174	int rv;
175	/* ensure hash is valid */
176	X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
177	X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
178
179	rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
180	if (rv)
181		return rv;
182	/* Check for match against stored encoding too */
183	if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified)
184		{
185		rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
186		if (rv)
187			return rv;
188		return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
189				a->cert_info->enc.len);
190		}
191	return rv;
192}
193
194
195int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
196	{
197	int ret;
198
199	/* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
200
201	if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified)
202		{
203		ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
204		if (ret < 0)
205			return -2;
206		}
207
208	if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified)
209		{
210		ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
211		if (ret < 0)
212			return -2;
213		}
214
215	ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
216
217	if (ret)
218		return ret;
219
220	return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
221
222	}
223
224unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
225	{
226	unsigned long ret=0;
227	unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
228
229	/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
230	i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
231	if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
232		NULL))
233		return 0;
234
235	ret=(	((unsigned long)md[0]     )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
236		((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
237		)&0xffffffffL;
238	return(ret);
239	}
240
241
242/* I now DER encode the name and hash it.  Since I cache the DER encoding,
243 * this is reasonably efficient. */
244
245unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
246	{
247	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
248	unsigned long ret=0;
249	unsigned char md[16];
250
251	/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
252	i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
253	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
254	/* EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); */
255	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
256	    && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
257	    && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,md,NULL))
258		ret=(((unsigned long)md[0]     )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
259		     ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
260		     )&0xffffffffL;
261	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
262
263	return(ret);
264	}
265
266/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
267X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
268		ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
269	{
270	size_t i;
271	X509_CINF cinf;
272	X509 x,*x509=NULL;
273
274	if(!sk) return NULL;
275
276	x.cert_info= &cinf;
277	cinf.serialNumber=serial;
278	cinf.issuer=name;
279
280	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
281		{
282		x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i);
283		if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509,&x) == 0)
284			return(x509);
285		}
286	return(NULL);
287	}
288
289X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
290	{
291	X509 *x509;
292	size_t i;
293
294	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
295		{
296		x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i);
297		if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509),name) == 0)
298			return(x509);
299		}
300	return(NULL);
301	}
302
303EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
304	{
305	if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
306		return(NULL);
307	return(X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
308	}
309
310ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
311	{
312	if(!x) return NULL;
313	return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
314	}
315
316
317int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
318	{
319	EVP_PKEY *xk;
320	int ret;
321
322	xk=X509_get_pubkey(x);
323
324	if (xk)
325		ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
326	else
327		ret = -2;
328
329	switch (ret)
330		{
331	case 1:
332		break;
333	case 0:
334		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_check_private_key, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
335		break;
336	case -1:
337		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_check_private_key, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
338		break;
339	case -2:
340	        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_check_private_key, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
341		}
342	if (xk)
343		EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
344	if (ret > 0)
345		return 1;
346	return 0;
347	}
348
349/* Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and
350 * the NID of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is
351 * a pointer to a flags field which must contain the suite B verification
352 * flags.
353 */
354
355
356static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
357	{
358	const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
359	int curve_nid;
360	if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
361		grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
362	if (!grp)
363		return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
364	curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
365	/* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
366	if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) /* P-384 */
367		{
368		/* Check signature algorithm is consistent with
369		 * curve.
370		 */
371		if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
372			return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
373		if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
374			return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
375		/* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
376		*pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
377		}
378	else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) /* P-256 */
379		{
380		if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
381			return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
382		if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
383			return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
384		}
385	else
386		return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
387
388	return X509_V_OK;
389	}
390
391int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
392							unsigned long flags)
393	{
394	int rv, sign_nid;
395	size_t i;
396	EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
397	unsigned long tflags;
398	if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
399		return X509_V_OK;
400	tflags = flags;
401	/* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
402	if (x == NULL)
403		{
404		x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
405		i = 1;
406		}
407	else
408		i = 0;
409
410	if (X509_get_version(x) != 2)
411		{
412		rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
413		/* Correct error depth */
414		i = 0;
415		goto end;
416		}
417
418	pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
419	/* Check EE key only */
420	rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
421	if (rv != X509_V_OK)
422		{
423		/* Correct error depth */
424		i = 0;
425		goto end;
426		}
427	for(; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
428		{
429		sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
430		x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
431		if (X509_get_version(x) != 2)
432			{
433			rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
434			goto end;
435			}
436		EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
437		pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
438		rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
439		if (rv != X509_V_OK)
440			goto end;
441		}
442
443	/* Final check: root CA signature */
444	rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
445	end:
446	if (pk)
447		EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
448	if (rv != X509_V_OK)
449		{
450		/* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
451		if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
452		    || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
453			i--;
454		/* If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing
455		 * P-384 with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
456		 */
457		if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
458			rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
459		if (perror_depth)
460			*perror_depth = i;
461		}
462	return rv;
463	}
464
465int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
466	{
467	int sign_nid;
468	if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
469		return X509_V_OK;
470	sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
471	return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
472	}
473
474/* Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
475 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref
476 * of each X509 structure.
477 */
478STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
479	{
480	STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
481	size_t i;
482	ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
483	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++)
484		{
485		X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i));
486		}
487	return ret;
488	}
489