1/* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 *    must display the following acknowledgement:
33 *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
57
58#include <string.h>
59
60#include <openssl/asn1.h>
61#include <openssl/buf.h>
62#include <openssl/digest.h>
63#include <openssl/err.h>
64#include <openssl/mem.h>
65#include <openssl/obj.h>
66#include <openssl/stack.h>
67#include <openssl/x509.h>
68#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
69
70
71int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
72	{
73	int i;
74	X509_CINF *ai,*bi;
75
76	ai=a->cert_info;
77	bi=b->cert_info;
78	i=M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber,bi->serialNumber);
79	if (i) return(i);
80	return(X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer,bi->issuer));
81	}
82
83unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
84	{
85	unsigned long ret=0;
86	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
87	unsigned char md[16];
88	char *f;
89
90	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
91	f=X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer,NULL,0);
92	if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
93		goto err;
94	if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)f,strlen(f)))
95		goto err;
96	OPENSSL_free(f);
97	if(!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
98		(unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
99		goto err;
100	if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,&(md[0]),NULL))
101		goto err;
102	ret=(	((unsigned long)md[0]     )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
103		((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
104		)&0xffffffffL;
105	err:
106	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
107	return(ret);
108	}
109
110int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
111	{
112	return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer,b->cert_info->issuer));
113	}
114
115int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
116	{
117	return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject,b->cert_info->subject));
118	}
119
120int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
121	{
122	return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer,b->crl->issuer));
123	}
124
125int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
126	{
127	return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
128	}
129
130X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
131	{
132	return(a->cert_info->issuer);
133	}
134
135unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
136	{
137	return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
138	}
139
140unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
141	{
142	return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
143	}
144
145X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
146	{
147	return(a->cert_info->subject);
148	}
149
150ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
151	{
152	return(a->cert_info->serialNumber);
153	}
154
155unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
156	{
157	return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
158	}
159
160unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
161	{
162	return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
163	}
164
165/* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for
166 * this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally
167 * prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in
168 * STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may
169 * involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
170 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point
171 * where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt
172 * with an evil cast.
173 */
174int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
175{
176	int rv;
177	/* ensure hash is valid */
178	X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
179	X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
180
181	rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
182	if (rv)
183		return rv;
184	/* Check for match against stored encoding too */
185	if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified)
186		{
187		rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
188		if (rv)
189			return rv;
190		return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
191				a->cert_info->enc.len);
192		}
193	return rv;
194}
195
196
197int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
198	{
199	int ret;
200
201	/* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
202
203	if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified)
204		{
205		ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
206		if (ret < 0)
207			return -2;
208		}
209
210	if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified)
211		{
212		ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
213		if (ret < 0)
214			return -2;
215		}
216
217	ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
218
219	if (ret)
220		return ret;
221
222	return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
223
224	}
225
226unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
227	{
228	unsigned long ret=0;
229	unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
230
231	/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
232	i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
233	if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
234		NULL))
235		return 0;
236
237	ret=(	((unsigned long)md[0]     )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
238		((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
239		)&0xffffffffL;
240	return(ret);
241	}
242
243
244/* I now DER encode the name and hash it.  Since I cache the DER encoding,
245 * this is reasonably efficient. */
246
247unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
248	{
249	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
250	unsigned long ret=0;
251	unsigned char md[16];
252
253	/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
254	i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
255	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
256	/* EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); */
257	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
258	    && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
259	    && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,md,NULL))
260		ret=(((unsigned long)md[0]     )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
261		     ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
262		     )&0xffffffffL;
263	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
264
265	return(ret);
266	}
267
268/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
269X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
270		ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
271	{
272	size_t i;
273	X509_CINF cinf;
274	X509 x,*x509=NULL;
275
276	if(!sk) return NULL;
277
278	x.cert_info= &cinf;
279	cinf.serialNumber=serial;
280	cinf.issuer=name;
281
282	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
283		{
284		x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i);
285		if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509,&x) == 0)
286			return(x509);
287		}
288	return(NULL);
289	}
290
291X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
292	{
293	X509 *x509;
294	size_t i;
295
296	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
297		{
298		x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i);
299		if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509),name) == 0)
300			return(x509);
301		}
302	return(NULL);
303	}
304
305EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
306	{
307	if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
308		return(NULL);
309	return(X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
310	}
311
312ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
313	{
314	if(!x) return NULL;
315	return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
316	}
317
318
319int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
320	{
321	EVP_PKEY *xk;
322	int ret;
323
324	xk=X509_get_pubkey(x);
325
326	if (xk)
327		ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
328	else
329		ret = -2;
330
331	switch (ret)
332		{
333	case 1:
334		break;
335	case 0:
336		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
337		break;
338	case -1:
339		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
340		break;
341	case -2:
342	        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
343		}
344	if (xk)
345		EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
346	if (ret > 0)
347		return 1;
348	return 0;
349	}
350
351/* Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and
352 * the NID of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is
353 * a pointer to a flags field which must contain the suite B verification
354 * flags.
355 */
356
357
358static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
359	{
360	const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
361	int curve_nid;
362	if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
363		grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
364	if (!grp)
365		return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
366	curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
367	/* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
368	if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) /* P-384 */
369		{
370		/* Check signature algorithm is consistent with
371		 * curve.
372		 */
373		if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
374			return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
375		if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
376			return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
377		/* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
378		*pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
379		}
380	else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) /* P-256 */
381		{
382		if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
383			return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
384		if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
385			return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
386		}
387	else
388		return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
389
390	return X509_V_OK;
391	}
392
393int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
394							unsigned long flags)
395	{
396	int rv, sign_nid;
397	size_t i;
398	EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
399	unsigned long tflags;
400	if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
401		return X509_V_OK;
402	tflags = flags;
403	/* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
404	if (x == NULL)
405		{
406		x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
407		i = 1;
408		}
409	else
410		i = 0;
411
412	if (X509_get_version(x) != 2)
413		{
414		rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
415		/* Correct error depth */
416		i = 0;
417		goto end;
418		}
419
420	pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
421	/* Check EE key only */
422	rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
423	if (rv != X509_V_OK)
424		{
425		/* Correct error depth */
426		i = 0;
427		goto end;
428		}
429	for(; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
430		{
431		sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
432		x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
433		if (X509_get_version(x) != 2)
434			{
435			rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
436			goto end;
437			}
438		EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
439		pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
440		rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
441		if (rv != X509_V_OK)
442			goto end;
443		}
444
445	/* Final check: root CA signature */
446	rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
447	end:
448	if (pk)
449		EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
450	if (rv != X509_V_OK)
451		{
452		/* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
453		if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
454		    || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
455			i--;
456		/* If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing
457		 * P-384 with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
458		 */
459		if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
460			rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
461		if (perror_depth)
462			*perror_depth = i;
463		}
464	return rv;
465	}
466
467int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
468	{
469	int sign_nid;
470	if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
471		return X509_V_OK;
472	sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
473	return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
474	}
475
476/* Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
477 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref
478 * of each X509 structure.
479 */
480STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
481	{
482	STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
483	size_t i;
484	ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
485	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++)
486		{
487		X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i));
488		}
489	return ret;
490	}
491