1### 2### A domain for further sandboxing privileged apps. 3### 4type priv_app, domain, domain_deprecated; 5app_domain(priv_app) 6# Access the network. 7net_domain(priv_app) 8# Access bluetooth. 9bluetooth_domain(priv_app) 10 11# webview crash handling depends on self ptrace (b/27697529, b/20150694, b/19277529#comment7) 12allow priv_app self:process ptrace; 13 14# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out 15# to their sandbox directory and then execute. 16allow priv_app app_data_file:file rx_file_perms; 17 18# android.process.media uses /dev/mtp_usb 19allow priv_app mtp_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; 20 21# Allow the allocation and use of ptys 22# Used by: https://play.privileged.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm 23create_pty(priv_app) 24 25allow priv_app audioserver_service:service_manager find; 26allow priv_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find; 27allow priv_app drmserver_service:service_manager find; 28allow priv_app mediacodec_service:service_manager find; 29allow priv_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find; 30allow priv_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find; 31allow priv_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find; 32allow priv_app nfc_service:service_manager find; 33allow priv_app radio_service:service_manager find; 34allow priv_app surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find; 35allow priv_app app_api_service:service_manager find; 36allow priv_app system_api_service:service_manager find; 37allow priv_app persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find; 38allow priv_app recovery_service:service_manager find; 39 40# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon 41# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider 42allow priv_app mnt_media_rw_file:dir search; 43 44# Write to /cache. 45allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir create_dir_perms; 46allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file create_file_perms; 47 48# Write to /data/ota_package for OTA packages. 49allow priv_app ota_package_file:dir rw_dir_perms; 50allow priv_app ota_package_file:file create_file_perms; 51 52# Access to /data/media. 53allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms; 54allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms; 55 56# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when 57# running "adb install foo.apk". 58allow priv_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms; 59allow priv_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; 60 61# Allow verifier to access staged apks. 62allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir r_dir_perms; 63allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file r_file_perms; 64 65# b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt 66allow priv_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms; 67 68# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored 69# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all 70# data stored in that directory to process them one by one. 71userdebug_or_eng(` 72 allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms; 73 allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; 74') 75 76# Allow GMS core to scan executables on the system partition 77allow priv_app exec_type:file { getattr read open }; 78 79# For AppFuse. 80allow priv_app vold:fd use; 81allow priv_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write }; 82allow priv_app app_fuse_file:dir rw_dir_perms; 83allow priv_app app_fuse_file:file rw_file_perms; 84 85# /sys access 86allow priv_app sysfs_zram:dir search; 87allow priv_app sysfs_zram:file r_file_perms; 88 89# access the mac address 90allowxperm priv_app self:udp_socket ioctl SIOCGIFHWADDR; 91 92# Allow GMS core to communicate with update_engine for A/B update. 93binder_call(priv_app, update_engine) 94allow priv_app update_engine_service:service_manager find; 95 96# Allow Phone to read/write cached ringtones (opened by system). 97allow priv_app ringtone_file:file { getattr read write }; 98 99# Access to /data/preloads 100allow priv_app preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms; 101allow priv_app preloads_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; 102 103### 104### neverallow rules 105### 106 107# Receive or send uevent messages. 108neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *; 109 110# Receive or send generic netlink messages 111neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_socket *; 112 113# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security 114# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable. 115neverallow priv_app debugfs:file read; 116 117# Do not allow privileged apps to register services. 118# Only trusted components of Android should be registering 119# services. 120neverallow priv_app service_manager_type:service_manager add; 121 122# Do not allow privileged apps to connect to the property service 123# or set properties. b/10243159 124neverallow priv_app property_socket:sock_file write; 125neverallow priv_app init:unix_stream_socket connectto; 126neverallow priv_app property_type:property_service set; 127 128# Do not allow priv_app to be assigned mlstrustedsubject. 129# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being 130# enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls 131# constraints. As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow 132# on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork 133# permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should 134# never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject) 135# and priv_app is allowed fork permission to itself. 136neverallow priv_app mlstrustedsubject:process fork; 137 138# Do not allow priv_app to hard link to any files. 139# In particular, if priv_app links to other app data 140# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion 141# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security 142# bugs, so we want to ensure priv_app never has this 143# capability. 144neverallow priv_app file_type:file link; 145