1###
2### A domain for further sandboxing privileged apps.
3###
4type priv_app, domain, domain_deprecated;
5app_domain(priv_app)
6# Access the network.
7net_domain(priv_app)
8# Access bluetooth.
9bluetooth_domain(priv_app)
10
11# webview crash handling depends on self ptrace (b/27697529, b/20150694, b/19277529#comment7)
12allow priv_app self:process ptrace;
13
14# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out
15# to their sandbox directory and then execute.
16allow priv_app app_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
17
18# android.process.media uses /dev/mtp_usb
19allow priv_app mtp_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
20
21# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
22# Used by: https://play.privileged.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
23create_pty(priv_app)
24
25allow priv_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
26allow priv_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
27allow priv_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
28allow priv_app mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
29allow priv_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
30allow priv_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
31allow priv_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
32allow priv_app nfc_service:service_manager find;
33allow priv_app radio_service:service_manager find;
34allow priv_app surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
35allow priv_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
36allow priv_app system_api_service:service_manager find;
37allow priv_app persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find;
38allow priv_app recovery_service:service_manager find;
39
40# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon
41# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider
42allow priv_app mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
43
44# Write to /cache.
45allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
46allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file create_file_perms;
47
48# Write to /data/ota_package for OTA packages.
49allow priv_app ota_package_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
50allow priv_app ota_package_file:file create_file_perms;
51
52# Access to /data/media.
53allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
54allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
55
56# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
57# running "adb install foo.apk".
58allow priv_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
59allow priv_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
60
61# Allow verifier to access staged apks.
62allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
63allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file r_file_perms;
64
65# b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt
66allow priv_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
67
68# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored
69# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all
70# data stored in that directory to process them one by one.
71userdebug_or_eng(`
72  allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms;
73  allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
74')
75
76# Allow GMS core to scan executables on the system partition
77allow priv_app exec_type:file { getattr read open };
78
79# For AppFuse.
80allow priv_app vold:fd use;
81allow priv_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write };
82allow priv_app app_fuse_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
83allow priv_app app_fuse_file:file rw_file_perms;
84
85# /sys access
86allow priv_app sysfs_zram:dir search;
87allow priv_app sysfs_zram:file r_file_perms;
88
89# access the mac address
90allowxperm priv_app self:udp_socket ioctl SIOCGIFHWADDR;
91
92# Allow GMS core to communicate with update_engine for A/B update.
93binder_call(priv_app, update_engine)
94allow priv_app update_engine_service:service_manager find;
95
96# Allow Phone to read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
97allow priv_app ringtone_file:file { getattr read write };
98
99# Access to /data/preloads
100allow priv_app preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms;
101allow priv_app preloads_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
102
103###
104### neverallow rules
105###
106
107# Receive or send uevent messages.
108neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
109
110# Receive or send generic netlink messages
111neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_socket *;
112
113# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
114# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
115neverallow priv_app debugfs:file read;
116
117# Do not allow privileged apps to register services.
118# Only trusted components of Android should be registering
119# services.
120neverallow priv_app service_manager_type:service_manager add;
121
122# Do not allow privileged apps to connect to the property service
123# or set properties. b/10243159
124neverallow priv_app property_socket:sock_file write;
125neverallow priv_app init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
126neverallow priv_app property_type:property_service set;
127
128# Do not allow priv_app to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
129# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
130# enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls
131# constraints.  As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow
132# on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork
133# permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
134# never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
135# and priv_app is allowed fork permission to itself.
136neverallow priv_app mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
137
138# Do not allow priv_app to hard link to any files.
139# In particular, if priv_app links to other app data
140# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
141# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
142# bugs, so we want to ensure priv_app never has this
143# capability.
144neverallow priv_app file_type:file link;
145