1###
2### Services with isolatedProcess=true in their manifest.
3###
4### This file defines the rules for isolated apps. An "isolated
5### app" is an APP with UID between AID_ISOLATED_START (99000)
6### and AID_ISOLATED_END (99999).
7###
8
9typeattribute isolated_app coredomain;
10
11app_domain(isolated_app)
12
13# Access already open app data files received over Binder or local socket IPC.
14allow isolated_app app_data_file:file { append read write getattr lock };
15
16allow isolated_app activity_service:service_manager find;
17allow isolated_app display_service:service_manager find;
18allow isolated_app webviewupdate_service:service_manager find;
19
20# Google Breakpad (crash reporter for Chrome) relies on ptrace
21# functionality. Without the ability to ptrace, the crash reporter
22# tool is broken.
23# b/20150694
24# https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=475270
25allow isolated_app self:process ptrace;
26
27# b/32896414: Allow accessing sdcard file descriptors passed to isolated_apps
28# by other processes. Open should never be allowed, and is blocked by
29# neverallow rules below.
30# media_rw_data_file is included for sdcardfs, and can be removed if sdcardfs
31# is modified to change the secontext when accessing the lower filesystem.
32allow isolated_app { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:file { read write append getattr lock };
33
34# For webviews, isolated_app processes can be forked from the webview_zygote
35# in addition to the zygote. Allow access to resources inherited from the
36# webview_zygote process. These rules are specialized copies of the ones in app.te.
37# Inherit FDs from the webview_zygote.
38allow isolated_app webview_zygote:fd use;
39# Notify webview_zygote of child death.
40allow isolated_app webview_zygote:process sigchld;
41# Inherit logd write socket.
42allow isolated_app webview_zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
43# Read system properties managed by webview_zygote.
44allow isolated_app webview_zygote_tmpfs:file read;
45
46# TODO (b/63631799) fix this access
47# suppress denials to /data/local/tmp
48dontaudit isolated_app shell_data_file:dir search;
49
50# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
51# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
52allow isolated_app traced:fd use;
53allow isolated_app traced_tmpfs:file { read write getattr map };
54unix_socket_connect(isolated_app, traced_producer, traced)
55
56#####
57##### Neverallow
58#####
59
60# Do not allow isolated_app to directly open tun_device
61neverallow isolated_app tun_device:chr_file open;
62
63# Isolated apps should not directly open app data files themselves.
64neverallow isolated_app app_data_file:file open;
65
66# Only allow appending to /data/anr/traces.txt (b/27853304, b/18340553)
67# TODO: are there situations where isolated_apps write to this file?
68# TODO: should we tighten these restrictions further?
69neverallow isolated_app anr_data_file:file ~{ open append };
70neverallow isolated_app anr_data_file:dir ~search;
71
72# Isolated apps must not be permitted to use HwBinder
73neverallow isolated_app hwbinder_device:chr_file *;
74neverallow isolated_app *:hwservice_manager *;
75
76# Isolated apps must not be permitted to use VndBinder
77neverallow isolated_app vndbinder_device:chr_file *;
78
79# Isolated apps must not be permitted to perform actions on Binder and VndBinder service_manager
80# except the find actions for services whitelisted below.
81neverallow isolated_app *:service_manager ~find;
82
83# b/17487348
84# Isolated apps can only access three services,
85# activity_service, display_service and webviewupdate_service.
86neverallow isolated_app {
87    service_manager_type
88    -activity_service
89    -display_service
90    -webviewupdate_service
91}:service_manager find;
92
93# Isolated apps shouldn't be able to access the driver directly.
94neverallow isolated_app gpu_device:chr_file { rw_file_perms execute };
95
96# Do not allow isolated_app access to /cache
97neverallow isolated_app cache_file:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
98neverallow isolated_app cache_file:file ~{ read getattr };
99
100# Do not allow isolated_app to access external storage, except for files passed
101# via file descriptors (b/32896414).
102neverallow isolated_app { storage_file mnt_user_file sdcard_type }:dir ~getattr;
103neverallow isolated_app { storage_file mnt_user_file }:file_class_set *;
104neverallow isolated_app sdcard_type:{ devfile_class_set lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } *;
105neverallow isolated_app sdcard_type:file ~{ read write append getattr lock };
106
107# Do not allow USB access
108neverallow isolated_app { usb_device usbaccessory_device }:chr_file *;
109
110# Restrict the webview_zygote control socket.
111neverallow isolated_app webview_zygote:sock_file write;
112
113# Limit the /sys files which isolated_app can access. This is important
114# for controlling isolated_app attack surface.
115neverallow isolated_app {
116  sysfs_type
117  -sysfs_devices_system_cpu
118  -sysfs_usb # TODO: check with audio team if needed for isolated_app (b/28417852)
119}:file no_rw_file_perms;
120