1###
2### A domain for further sandboxing privileged apps.
3###
4
5typeattribute priv_app coredomain;
6app_domain(priv_app)
7
8# Access the network.
9net_domain(priv_app)
10# Access bluetooth.
11bluetooth_domain(priv_app)
12
13# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
14# Used by: https://play.privileged.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
15create_pty(priv_app)
16
17# webview crash handling depends on self ptrace (b/27697529, b/20150694, b/19277529#comment7)
18allow priv_app self:process ptrace;
19
20# Some apps ship with shared libraries that they write out
21# to their sandbox directory and then dlopen().
22allow priv_app app_data_file:file execute;
23
24allow priv_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
25allow priv_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
26allow priv_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
27allow priv_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
28allow priv_app mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
29allow priv_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
30allow priv_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
31allow priv_app mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
32allow priv_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
33allow priv_app network_watchlist_service:service_manager find;
34allow priv_app nfc_service:service_manager find;
35allow priv_app oem_lock_service:service_manager find;
36allow priv_app persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find;
37allow priv_app radio_service:service_manager find;
38allow priv_app recovery_service:service_manager find;
39allow priv_app stats_service:service_manager find;
40allow priv_app system_api_service:service_manager find;
41
42# Write to /cache.
43allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
44allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file create_file_perms;
45# /cache is a symlink to /data/cache on some devices. Allow reading the link.
46allow priv_app cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
47
48# Write to /data/ota_package for OTA packages.
49allow priv_app ota_package_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
50allow priv_app ota_package_file:file create_file_perms;
51
52# Access to /data/media.
53allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
54allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
55
56# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
57# running "adb install foo.apk".
58allow priv_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
59allow priv_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
60
61# Allow traceur to pass file descriptors through a content provider to betterbug
62allow priv_app trace_data_file:file { getattr read };
63
64# Allow verifier to access staged apks.
65allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
66allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file r_file_perms;
67
68# b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt
69allow priv_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
70
71# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored
72# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all
73# data stored in that directory to process them one by one.
74userdebug_or_eng(`
75  allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms;
76  allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
77')
78
79# For AppFuse.
80allow priv_app vold:fd use;
81allow priv_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write };
82
83# /proc access
84allow priv_app {
85  proc_vmstat
86}:file r_file_perms;
87
88allow priv_app sysfs_type:dir search;
89# Read access to /sys/class/net/wlan*/address
90r_dir_file(priv_app, sysfs_net)
91# Read access to /sys/block/zram*/mm_stat
92r_dir_file(priv_app, sysfs_zram)
93
94r_dir_file(priv_app, rootfs)
95
96# Allow GMS core to open kernel config for OTA matching through libvintf
97allow priv_app config_gz:file { open read getattr };
98
99# access the mac address
100allowxperm priv_app self:udp_socket ioctl SIOCGIFHWADDR;
101
102# Allow GMS core to communicate with update_engine for A/B update.
103binder_call(priv_app, update_engine)
104allow priv_app update_engine_service:service_manager find;
105
106# Allow GMS core to communicate with dumpsys storaged.
107binder_call(priv_app, storaged)
108allow priv_app storaged_service:service_manager find;
109
110# Allow GMS core to access system_update_service (e.g. to publish pending
111# system update info).
112allow priv_app system_update_service:service_manager find;
113
114# Allow GMS core to communicate with statsd.
115binder_call(priv_app, statsd)
116
117# Allow Phone to read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
118allow priv_app ringtone_file:file { getattr read write };
119
120# Access to /data/preloads
121allow priv_app preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms;
122allow priv_app preloads_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
123allow priv_app preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms;
124allow priv_app preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms;
125
126# Allow privileged apps (e.g. GMS core) to generate unique hardware IDs
127allow priv_app keystore:keystore_key gen_unique_id;
128
129# Allow GMS core to access /sys/fs/selinux/policyvers for compatibility check
130allow priv_app selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
131
132read_runtime_log_tags(priv_app)
133
134# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
135# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
136allow priv_app traced:fd use;
137allow priv_app traced_tmpfs:file { read write getattr map };
138unix_socket_connect(priv_app, traced_producer, traced)
139
140# suppress denials for non-API accesses.
141dontaudit priv_app exec_type:file getattr;
142dontaudit priv_app device:dir read;
143dontaudit priv_app fs_bpf:dir search;
144dontaudit priv_app net_dns_prop:file read;
145dontaudit priv_app proc:file read;
146dontaudit priv_app proc_interrupts:file read;
147dontaudit priv_app proc_modules:file read;
148dontaudit priv_app proc_stat:file read;
149dontaudit priv_app proc_version:file read;
150dontaudit priv_app sysfs:dir read;
151dontaudit priv_app sysfs_android_usb:file read;
152dontaudit priv_app wifi_prop:file read;
153dontaudit priv_app { wifi_prop exported_wifi_prop }:file read;
154
155# allow privileged apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
156# modify them other than to connect
157allow priv_app system_server:udp_socket {
158        connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };
159
160###
161### neverallow rules
162###
163
164# Receive or send uevent messages.
165neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
166
167# Receive or send generic netlink messages
168neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_socket *;
169
170# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
171# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
172neverallow priv_app debugfs:file read;
173
174# Do not allow privileged apps to register services.
175# Only trusted components of Android should be registering
176# services.
177neverallow priv_app service_manager_type:service_manager add;
178
179# Do not allow privileged apps to connect to the property service
180# or set properties. b/10243159
181neverallow priv_app property_socket:sock_file write;
182neverallow priv_app init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
183neverallow priv_app property_type:property_service set;
184
185# Do not allow priv_app to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
186# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
187# enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls
188# constraints.  As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow
189# on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork
190# permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
191# never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
192# and priv_app is allowed fork permission to itself.
193neverallow priv_app mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
194
195# Do not allow priv_app to hard link to any files.
196# In particular, if priv_app links to other app data
197# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
198# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
199# bugs, so we want to ensure priv_app never has this
200# capability.
201neverallow priv_app file_type:file link;
202
203# priv apps should not be able to open trace data files, they should depend
204# upon traceur to pass a file descriptor which they can then read
205neverallow priv_app trace_data_file:dir *;
206neverallow priv_app trace_data_file:file { no_w_file_perms open };
207