gss_krb5_wrap.c revision e678e06bf8fa25981a6fa1f08b979fd086d713f8
1#include <linux/types.h> 2#include <linux/slab.h> 3#include <linux/jiffies.h> 4#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h> 5#include <linux/random.h> 6#include <linux/pagemap.h> 7#include <asm/scatterlist.h> 8#include <linux/crypto.h> 9 10#ifdef RPC_DEBUG 11# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH 12#endif 13 14static inline int 15gss_krb5_padding(int blocksize, int length) 16{ 17 /* Most of the code is block-size independent but currently we 18 * use only 8: */ 19 BUG_ON(blocksize != 8); 20 return 8 - (length & 7); 21} 22 23static inline void 24gss_krb5_add_padding(struct xdr_buf *buf, int offset, int blocksize) 25{ 26 int padding = gss_krb5_padding(blocksize, buf->len - offset); 27 char *p; 28 struct kvec *iov; 29 30 if (buf->page_len || buf->tail[0].iov_len) 31 iov = &buf->tail[0]; 32 else 33 iov = &buf->head[0]; 34 p = iov->iov_base + iov->iov_len; 35 iov->iov_len += padding; 36 buf->len += padding; 37 memset(p, padding, padding); 38} 39 40static inline int 41gss_krb5_remove_padding(struct xdr_buf *buf, int blocksize) 42{ 43 u8 *ptr; 44 u8 pad; 45 int len = buf->len; 46 47 if (len <= buf->head[0].iov_len) { 48 pad = *(u8 *)(buf->head[0].iov_base + len - 1); 49 if (pad > buf->head[0].iov_len) 50 return -EINVAL; 51 buf->head[0].iov_len -= pad; 52 goto out; 53 } else 54 len -= buf->head[0].iov_len; 55 if (len <= buf->page_len) { 56 int last = (buf->page_base + len - 1) 57 >>PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT; 58 int offset = (buf->page_base + len - 1) 59 & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1); 60 ptr = kmap_atomic(buf->pages[last], KM_USER0); 61 pad = *(ptr + offset); 62 kunmap_atomic(ptr, KM_USER0); 63 goto out; 64 } else 65 len -= buf->page_len; 66 BUG_ON(len > buf->tail[0].iov_len); 67 pad = *(u8 *)(buf->tail[0].iov_base + len - 1); 68out: 69 /* XXX: NOTE: we do not adjust the page lengths--they represent 70 * a range of data in the real filesystem page cache, and we need 71 * to know that range so the xdr code can properly place read data. 72 * However adjusting the head length, as we do above, is harmless. 73 * In the case of a request that fits into a single page, the server 74 * also uses length and head length together to determine the original 75 * start of the request to copy the request for deferal; so it's 76 * easier on the server if we adjust head and tail length in tandem. 77 * It's not really a problem that we don't fool with the page and 78 * tail lengths, though--at worst badly formed xdr might lead the 79 * server to attempt to parse the padding. 80 * XXX: Document all these weird requirements for gss mechanism 81 * wrap/unwrap functions. */ 82 if (pad > blocksize) 83 return -EINVAL; 84 if (buf->len > pad) 85 buf->len -= pad; 86 else 87 return -EINVAL; 88 return 0; 89} 90 91static inline void 92make_confounder(char *p, int blocksize) 93{ 94 static u64 i = 0; 95 u64 *q = (u64 *)p; 96 97 /* rfc1964 claims this should be "random". But all that's really 98 * necessary is that it be unique. And not even that is necessary in 99 * our case since our "gssapi" implementation exists only to support 100 * rpcsec_gss, so we know that the only buffers we will ever encrypt 101 * already begin with a unique sequence number. Just to hedge my bets 102 * I'll make a half-hearted attempt at something unique, but ensuring 103 * uniqueness would mean worrying about atomicity and rollover, and I 104 * don't care enough. */ 105 106 BUG_ON(blocksize != 8); 107 *q = i++; 108} 109 110/* Assumptions: the head and tail of inbuf are ours to play with. 111 * The pages, however, may be real pages in the page cache and we replace 112 * them with scratch pages from **pages before writing to them. */ 113/* XXX: obviously the above should be documentation of wrap interface, 114 * and shouldn't be in this kerberos-specific file. */ 115 116/* XXX factor out common code with seal/unseal. */ 117 118u32 119gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, 120 struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages) 121{ 122 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id; 123 s32 checksum_type; 124 char cksumdata[16]; 125 struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = 0, .data = cksumdata}; 126 int blocksize = 0, plainlen; 127 unsigned char *ptr, *krb5_hdr, *msg_start; 128 s32 now; 129 int headlen; 130 struct page **tmp_pages; 131 u32 seq_send; 132 133 dprintk("RPC: gss_wrap_kerberos\n"); 134 135 now = get_seconds(); 136 137 checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5; 138 if (kctx->sealalg != SEAL_ALG_NONE && kctx->sealalg != SEAL_ALG_DES) { 139 dprintk("RPC: gss_krb5_seal: kctx->sealalg %d not supported\n", 140 kctx->sealalg); 141 goto out_err; 142 } 143 144 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc); 145 gss_krb5_add_padding(buf, offset, blocksize); 146 BUG_ON((buf->len - offset) % blocksize); 147 plainlen = blocksize + buf->len - offset; 148 149 headlen = g_token_size(&kctx->mech_used, 22 + plainlen) - 150 (buf->len - offset); 151 152 ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; 153 /* shift data to make room for header. */ 154 /* XXX Would be cleverer to encrypt while copying. */ 155 /* XXX bounds checking, slack, etc. */ 156 memmove(ptr + headlen, ptr, buf->head[0].iov_len - offset); 157 buf->head[0].iov_len += headlen; 158 buf->len += headlen; 159 BUG_ON((buf->len - offset - headlen) % blocksize); 160 161 g_make_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, 22 + plainlen, &ptr); 162 163 164 *ptr++ = (unsigned char) ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG>>8)&0xff); 165 *ptr++ = (unsigned char) (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG&0xff); 166 167 /* ptr now at byte 2 of header described in rfc 1964, section 1.2.1: */ 168 krb5_hdr = ptr - 2; 169 msg_start = krb5_hdr + 24; 170 /* XXXJBF: */ BUG_ON(buf->head[0].iov_base + offset + headlen != msg_start + blocksize); 171 172 *(__be16 *)(krb5_hdr + 2) = htons(SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5); 173 memset(krb5_hdr + 4, 0xff, 4); 174 *(__be16 *)(krb5_hdr + 4) = htons(kctx->sealalg); 175 176 make_confounder(msg_start, blocksize); 177 178 /* XXXJBF: UGH!: */ 179 tmp_pages = buf->pages; 180 buf->pages = pages; 181 if (make_checksum(checksum_type, krb5_hdr, 8, buf, 182 offset + headlen - blocksize, &md5cksum)) 183 goto out_err; 184 buf->pages = tmp_pages; 185 186 if (krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data, 187 md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len)) 188 goto out_err; 189 memcpy(krb5_hdr + 16, 190 md5cksum.data + md5cksum.len - KRB5_CKSUM_LENGTH, 191 KRB5_CKSUM_LENGTH); 192 193 spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock); 194 seq_send = kctx->seq_send++; 195 spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock); 196 197 /* XXX would probably be more efficient to compute checksum 198 * and encrypt at the same time: */ 199 if ((krb5_make_seq_num(kctx->seq, kctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff, 200 seq_send, krb5_hdr + 16, krb5_hdr + 8))) 201 goto out_err; 202 203 if (gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, offset + headlen - blocksize, 204 pages)) 205 goto out_err; 206 207 return ((kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE); 208out_err: 209 return GSS_S_FAILURE; 210} 211 212u32 213gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) 214{ 215 struct krb5_ctx *kctx = ctx->internal_ctx_id; 216 int signalg; 217 int sealalg; 218 s32 checksum_type; 219 char cksumdata[16]; 220 struct xdr_netobj md5cksum = {.len = 0, .data = cksumdata}; 221 s32 now; 222 int direction; 223 s32 seqnum; 224 unsigned char *ptr; 225 int bodysize; 226 u32 ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; 227 void *data_start, *orig_start; 228 int data_len; 229 int blocksize; 230 231 dprintk("RPC: gss_unwrap_kerberos\n"); 232 233 ptr = (u8 *)buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; 234 if (g_verify_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, &bodysize, &ptr, 235 buf->len - offset)) 236 goto out; 237 238 if ((*ptr++ != ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG>>8)&0xff)) || 239 (*ptr++ != (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG &0xff)) ) 240 goto out; 241 242 /* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */ 243 244 /* get the sign and seal algorithms */ 245 246 signalg = ptr[0] + (ptr[1] << 8); 247 sealalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8); 248 249 /* Sanity checks */ 250 251 if ((ptr[4] != 0xff) || (ptr[5] != 0xff)) 252 goto out; 253 254 if (sealalg == 0xffff) 255 goto out; 256 257 /* in the current spec, there is only one valid seal algorithm per 258 key type, so a simple comparison is ok */ 259 260 if (sealalg != kctx->sealalg) 261 goto out; 262 263 /* there are several mappings of seal algorithms to sign algorithms, 264 but few enough that we can try them all. */ 265 266 if ((kctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_NONE && signalg > 1) || 267 (kctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_1 && signalg != SGN_ALG_3) || 268 (kctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_DES3KD && 269 signalg != SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD)) 270 goto out; 271 272 if (gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, 273 ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base)) 274 goto out; 275 276 /* compute the checksum of the message */ 277 278 /* initialize the the cksum */ 279 switch (signalg) { 280 case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5: 281 checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5; 282 break; 283 default: 284 ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; 285 goto out; 286 } 287 288 switch (signalg) { 289 case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5: 290 ret = make_checksum(checksum_type, ptr - 2, 8, buf, 291 ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base, &md5cksum); 292 if (ret) 293 goto out; 294 295 ret = krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data, 296 md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len); 297 if (ret) 298 goto out; 299 300 if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + 14, 8)) { 301 ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG; 302 goto out; 303 } 304 break; 305 default: 306 ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; 307 goto out; 308 } 309 310 /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */ 311 312 now = get_seconds(); 313 314 ret = GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED; 315 if (now > kctx->endtime) 316 goto out; 317 318 /* do sequencing checks */ 319 320 ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG; 321 if ((ret = krb5_get_seq_num(kctx->seq, ptr + 14, ptr + 6, &direction, 322 &seqnum))) 323 goto out; 324 325 if ((kctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) || 326 (!kctx->initiate && direction != 0)) 327 goto out; 328 329 /* Copy the data back to the right position. XXX: Would probably be 330 * better to copy and encrypt at the same time. */ 331 332 blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc); 333 data_start = ptr + 22 + blocksize; 334 orig_start = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; 335 data_len = (buf->head[0].iov_base + buf->head[0].iov_len) - data_start; 336 memmove(orig_start, data_start, data_len); 337 buf->head[0].iov_len -= (data_start - orig_start); 338 buf->len -= (data_start - orig_start); 339 340 ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; 341 if (gss_krb5_remove_padding(buf, blocksize)) 342 goto out; 343 344 ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE; 345out: 346 return ret; 347} 348