1/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112#include <stdio.h> 113#include <errno.h> 114#define USE_SOCKETS 115#include "ssl_locl.h" 116#include <openssl/evp.h> 117#include <openssl/buffer.h> 118 119static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 120 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); 121static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); 122 123int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) 124 { 125 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase 126 * packet by another n bytes. 127 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified 128 * by s->packet and s->packet_length. 129 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf 130 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) 131 */ 132 int i,off,newb; 133 134 if (!extend) 135 { 136 /* start with empty packet ... */ 137 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) 138 s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0; 139 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf + s->s3->rbuf.offset; 140 s->packet_length = 0; 141 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ 142 } 143 144 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets 145 * because the read operation returns the whole packet 146 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */ 147 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION) 148 { 149 if ( s->s3->rbuf.left > 0 && n > s->s3->rbuf.left) 150 n = s->s3->rbuf.left; 151 } 152 153 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ 154 if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n) 155 { 156 s->packet_length+=n; 157 s->s3->rbuf.left-=n; 158 s->s3->rbuf.offset+=n; 159 return(n); 160 } 161 162 /* else we need to read more data */ 163 if (!s->read_ahead) 164 max=n; 165 166 { 167 /* avoid buffer overflow */ 168 int max_max = s->s3->rbuf.len - s->packet_length; 169 if (max > max_max) 170 max = max_max; 171 } 172 if (n > max) /* does not happen */ 173 { 174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 175 return -1; 176 } 177 178 off = s->packet_length; 179 newb = s->s3->rbuf.left; 180 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 181 * 'off' bytes already pointed to by 'packet', 182 * 'newb' extra ones at the end */ 183 if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf) 184 { 185 /* off > 0 */ 186 memmove(s->s3->rbuf.buf, s->packet, off+newb); 187 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf; 188 } 189 190 while (newb < n) 191 { 192 /* Now we have off+newb bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and need 193 * to read in more until we have off+n (up to off+max if possible) */ 194 195 clear_sys_error(); 196 if (s->rbio != NULL) 197 { 198 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; 199 i=BIO_read(s->rbio, &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off+newb]), max-newb); 200 } 201 else 202 { 203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); 204 i = -1; 205 } 206 207 if (i <= 0) 208 { 209 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb; 210 return(i); 211 } 212 newb+=i; 213 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because 214 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed 215 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */ 216 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION) 217 { 218 if (n > newb) 219 n = newb; /* makes the while condition false */ 220 } 221 } 222 223 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ 224 s->s3->rbuf.offset = off + n; 225 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb - n; 226 s->packet_length += n; 227 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 228 return(n); 229 } 230 231/* Call this to get a new input record. 232 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error 233 * or non-blocking IO. 234 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in 235 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record 236 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data 237 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes 238 */ 239/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ 240static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) 241 { 242 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al; 243 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1; 244 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 245 SSL_SESSION *sess; 246 unsigned char *p; 247 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 248 short version; 249 unsigned int mac_size; 250 int clear=0; 251 size_t extra; 252 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0; 253 unsigned char *mac = NULL; 254 255 rr= &(s->s3->rrec); 256 sess=s->session; 257 258 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) 259 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; 260 else 261 extra=0; 262 if (!(SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS) && 263 extra != s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) 264 { 265 /* actually likely an application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER 266 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */ 267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 268 return -1; 269 } 270 271again: 272 /* check if we have the header */ 273 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || 274 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) 275 { 276 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); 277 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */ 278 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY; 279 280 p=s->packet; 281 282 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ 283 rr->type= *(p++); 284 ssl_major= *(p++); 285 ssl_minor= *(p++); 286 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor; 287 n2s(p,rr->length); 288 289 /* Lets check version */ 290 if (!s->first_packet) 291 { 292 if (version != s->version) 293 { 294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 295 /* If the major versions match then we'll send 296 * the error back using the peer's version. */ 297 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)) 298 s->version = version; 299 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 300 goto f_err; 301 } 302 } 303 304 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) 305 { 306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 307 goto err; 308 } 309 310 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra) 311 { 312 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 314 goto f_err; 315 } 316 317 /* If we receive a valid record larger than the current buffer size, 318 * allocate some memory for it. 319 */ 320 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) 321 { 322 if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(s->s3->rbuf.buf, rr->length + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))==NULL) 323 { 324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 325 goto err; 326 } 327 s->s3->rbuf.buf=p; 328 s->s3->rbuf.len=rr->length + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 329 s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]); 330 } 331 332 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ 333 } 334 335 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ 336 337 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) 338 { 339 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ 340 i=rr->length; 341 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1); 342 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */ 343 /* now n == rr->length, 344 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */ 345 } 346 347 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ 348 349 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, 350 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet 351 */ 352 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); 353 354 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' 355 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which 356 * need to be copied into rr->data by either 357 * the decryption or by the decompression 358 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer, 359 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ 360 361 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] 362 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ 363 364 /* check is not needed I believe */ 365 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra) 366 { 367 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 369 goto f_err; 370 } 371 372 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ 373 rr->data=rr->input; 374 375 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0); 376 if (enc_err <= 0) 377 { 378 if (enc_err == 0) 379 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */ 380 goto err; 381 382 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding 383 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case). 384 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform 385 * the MAC computation anyway. */ 386 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; 387 } 388 389#ifdef TLS_DEBUG 390printf("dec %d\n",rr->length); 391{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } 392printf("\n"); 393#endif 394 395 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ 396 if ( (sess == NULL) || 397 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) || 398 (s->read_hash == NULL)) 399 clear=1; 400 401 if (!clear) 402 { 403 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash); 404 405 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size) 406 { 407#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */ 408 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 410 goto f_err; 411#else 412 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; 413#endif 414 } 415 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */ 416 if (rr->length >= mac_size) 417 { 418 rr->length -= mac_size; 419 mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; 420 } 421 else 422 { 423 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */ 424#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */ 425 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 427 goto f_err; 428#else 429 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; 430 rr->length = 0; 431#endif 432 } 433 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0); 434 if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) 435 { 436 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; 437 } 438 } 439 440 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac) 441 { 442 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, 443 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption 444 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, 445 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this 446 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */ 447 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; 448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); 449 goto f_err; 450 } 451 452 /* r->length is now just compressed */ 453 if (s->expand != NULL) 454 { 455 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra) 456 { 457 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 459 goto f_err; 460 } 461 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) 462 { 463 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; 464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); 465 goto f_err; 466 } 467 } 468 469 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra) 470 { 471 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 473 goto f_err; 474 } 475 476 rr->off=0; 477 /* So at this point the following is true 478 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record 479 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record 480 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte 481 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment 482 * after use :-). 483 */ 484 485 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ 486 s->packet_length=0; 487 488 /* just read a 0 length packet */ 489 if (rr->length == 0) goto again; 490 491 return(1); 492 493f_err: 494 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 495err: 496 return(ret); 497 } 498 499int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) 500 { 501#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 502 int i; 503 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 504 505 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec); 506 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp, 507 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length); 508 if (i < 0) 509 return(0); 510 else 511 rr->length=i; 512 rr->data=rr->comp; 513#endif 514 return(1); 515 } 516 517int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) 518 { 519#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 520 int i; 521 SSL3_RECORD *wr; 522 523 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec); 524 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data, 525 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, 526 wr->input,(int)wr->length); 527 if (i < 0) 528 return(0); 529 else 530 wr->length=i; 531 532 wr->input=wr->data; 533#endif 534 return(1); 535 } 536 537/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' 538 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. 539 */ 540int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) 541 { 542 const unsigned char *buf=buf_; 543 unsigned int tot,n,nw; 544 int i; 545 unsigned int max_plain_length; 546 547 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 548 tot=s->s3->wnum; 549 s->s3->wnum=0; 550 551 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) 552 { 553 i=s->handshake_func(s); 554 if (i < 0) return(i); 555 if (i == 0) 556 { 557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 558 return -1; 559 } 560 } 561 562 n=(len-tot); 563 for (;;) 564 { 565 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS)) 566 max_plain_length = SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PLAIN_LENGTH; 567 else 568 max_plain_length = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; 569 570 if (n > max_plain_length) 571 nw = max_plain_length; 572 else 573 nw=n; 574 575 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); 576 if (i <= 0) 577 { 578 s->s3->wnum=tot; 579 return i; 580 } 581 582 if ((i == (int)n) || 583 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && 584 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) 585 { 586 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment 587 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */ 588 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; 589 590 return tot+i; 591 } 592 593 n-=i; 594 tot+=i; 595 } 596 } 597 598static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 599 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) 600 { 601 unsigned char *p,*plen; 602 int i,mac_size,clear=0; 603 int prefix_len = 0; 604 SSL3_RECORD *wr; 605 SSL3_BUFFER *wb; 606 SSL_SESSION *sess; 607 608 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written 609 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */ 610 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) 611 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len)); 612 613 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ 614 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) 615 { 616 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 617 if (i <= 0) 618 return(i); 619 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ 620 } 621 622 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) 623 return 0; 624 625 wr= &(s->s3->wrec); 626 wb= &(s->s3->wbuf); 627 sess=s->session; 628 629 if ( (sess == NULL) || 630 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || 631 (s->write_hash == NULL)) 632 clear=1; 633 634 if (clear) 635 mac_size=0; 636 else 637 mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash); 638 639 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */ 640 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) 641 { 642 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites 643 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ 644 645 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) 646 { 647 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; 648 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment 649 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later 650 * together with the actual payload) */ 651 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); 652 if (prefix_len <= 0) 653 goto err; 654 655 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + 656 ((SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_SMALL_BUFFERS) ? SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE : 657 SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)) 658 { 659 /* insufficient space */ 660 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 661 goto err; 662 } 663 } 664 665 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; 666 } 667 668 /* resize if necessary to hold the data. */ 669 if (len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD > wb->len) 670 { 671 if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(wb->buf, len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD))==NULL) 672 { 673 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 674 goto err; 675 } 676 wb->buf = p; 677 wb->len = len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD; 678 } 679 680 p = wb->buf + prefix_len; 681 682 /* write the header */ 683 684 *(p++)=type&0xff; 685 wr->type=type; 686 687 *(p++)=(s->version>>8); 688 *(p++)=s->version&0xff; 689 690 /* field where we are to write out packet length */ 691 plen=p; 692 p+=2; 693 694 /* lets setup the record stuff. */ 695 wr->data=p; 696 wr->length=(int)len; 697 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf; 698 699 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into 700 * wr->data */ 701 702 /* first we compress */ 703 if (s->compress != NULL) 704 { 705 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) 706 { 707 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); 708 goto err; 709 } 710 } 711 else 712 { 713 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length); 714 wr->input=wr->data; 715 } 716 717 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input 718 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length. 719 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */ 720 721 if (mac_size != 0) 722 { 723 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1); 724 wr->length+=mac_size; 725 wr->input=p; 726 wr->data=p; 727 } 728 729 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ 730 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1); 731 732 /* record length after mac and block padding */ 733 s2n(wr->length,plen); 734 735 /* we should now have 736 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is 737 * wr->length long */ 738 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ 739 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 740 741 if (create_empty_fragment) 742 { 743 /* we are in a recursive call; 744 * just return the length, don't write out anything here 745 */ 746 return wr->length; 747 } 748 749 /* now let's set up wb */ 750 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; 751 wb->offset = 0; 752 753 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */ 754 s->s3->wpend_tot=len; 755 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf; 756 s->s3->wpend_type=type; 757 s->s3->wpend_ret=len; 758 759 /* we now just need to write the buffer */ 760 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len); 761err: 762 return -1; 763 } 764 765/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ 766int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 767 unsigned int len) 768 { 769 int i; 770 771/* XXXX */ 772 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) 773 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && 774 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) 775 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) 776 { 777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); 778 return(-1); 779 } 780 781 for (;;) 782 { 783 clear_sys_error(); 784 if (s->wbio != NULL) 785 { 786 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; 787 i=BIO_write(s->wbio, 788 (char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]), 789 (unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left); 790 } 791 else 792 { 793 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); 794 i= -1; 795 } 796 if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left) 797 { 798 s->s3->wbuf.left=0; 799 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 800 return(s->s3->wpend_ret); 801 } 802 else if (i <= 0) { 803 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || 804 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 805 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole 806 point in using a datagram service */ 807 s->s3->wbuf.left = 0; 808 } 809 return(i); 810 } 811 s->s3->wbuf.offset+=i; 812 s->s3->wbuf.left-=i; 813 } 814 } 815 816/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. 817 * 'type' is one of the following: 818 * 819 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) 820 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) 821 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) 822 * 823 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first 824 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). 825 * 826 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as 827 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really 828 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. 829 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store 830 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol 831 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): 832 * Change cipher spec protocol 833 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored 834 * Alert protocol 835 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) 836 * Handshake protocol 837 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have 838 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages 839 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers 840 * Application data protocol 841 * none of our business 842 */ 843int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) 844 { 845 int al,i,j,ret; 846 unsigned int n; 847 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 848 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL; 849 850 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ 851 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) 852 return(-1); 853 854 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) || 855 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) 856 { 857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 858 return -1; 859 } 860 861 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) 862 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ 863 { 864 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; 865 unsigned char *dst = buf; 866 unsigned int k; 867 868 /* peek == 0 */ 869 n = 0; 870 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) 871 { 872 *dst++ = *src++; 873 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; 874 n++; 875 } 876 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ 877 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) 878 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; 879 return n; 880 } 881 882 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ 883 884 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) 885 { 886 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ 887 i=s->handshake_func(s); 888 if (i < 0) return(i); 889 if (i == 0) 890 { 891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 892 return(-1); 893 } 894 } 895start: 896 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 897 898 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record 899 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data 900 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read 901 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ 902 rr = &(s->s3->rrec); 903 904 /* get new packet if necessary */ 905 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) 906 { 907 ret=ssl3_get_record(s); 908 if (ret <= 0) return(ret); 909 } 910 911 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ 912 913 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, 914 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ 915 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) 916 { 917 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 918 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); 919 goto f_err; 920 } 921 922 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away 923 * (even in 'peek' mode) */ 924 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) 925 { 926 rr->length=0; 927 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 928 return(0); 929 } 930 931 932 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ 933 { 934 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we 935 * are doing a handshake for the first time */ 936 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && 937 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) 938 { 939 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); 941 goto f_err; 942 } 943 944 if (len <= 0) return(len); 945 946 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) 947 n = rr->length; 948 else 949 n = (unsigned int)len; 950 951 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n); 952 if (!peek) 953 { 954 rr->length-=n; 955 rr->off+=n; 956 if (rr->length == 0) 957 { 958 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; 959 rr->off=0; 960 } 961 } 962 return(n); 963 } 964 965 966 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake 967 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ 968 969 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, 970 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. 971 */ 972 { 973 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; 974 unsigned char *dest = NULL; 975 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; 976 977 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) 978 { 979 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment; 980 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment; 981 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; 982 } 983 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) 984 { 985 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment; 986 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment; 987 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len; 988 } 989 990 if (dest_maxlen > 0) 991 { 992 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ 993 if (rr->length < n) 994 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ 995 996 /* now move 'n' bytes: */ 997 while (n-- > 0) 998 { 999 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; 1000 rr->length--; 1001 } 1002 1003 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) 1004 goto start; /* fragment was too small */ 1005 } 1006 } 1007 1008 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; 1009 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. 1010 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ 1011 1012 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ 1013 if ((!s->server) && 1014 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && 1015 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && 1016 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) 1017 { 1018 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; 1019 1020 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || 1021 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || 1022 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) 1023 { 1024 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); 1026 goto f_err; 1027 } 1028 1029 if (s->msg_callback) 1030 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1031 1032 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && 1033 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && 1034 !s->s3->renegotiate) 1035 { 1036 ssl3_renegotiate(s); 1037 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) 1038 { 1039 i=s->handshake_func(s); 1040 if (i < 0) return(i); 1041 if (i == 0) 1042 { 1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1044 return(-1); 1045 } 1046 1047 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) 1048 { 1049 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ 1050 { 1051 BIO *bio; 1052 /* In the case where we try to read application data, 1053 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with 1054 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may 1055 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ 1056 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; 1057 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); 1058 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1059 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1060 return(-1); 1061 } 1062 } 1063 } 1064 } 1065 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, 1066 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ 1067 goto start; 1068 } 1069 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't 1070 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. 1071 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) 1072 */ 1073 if (s->server && 1074 SSL_is_init_finished(s) && 1075 !s->s3->send_connection_binding && 1076 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && 1077 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && 1078 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && 1079 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && 1080 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1081 1082 { 1083 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/ 1084 rr->length = 0; 1085 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1086 goto start; 1087 } 1088 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) 1089 { 1090 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; 1091 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1]; 1092 1093 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0; 1094 1095 if (s->msg_callback) 1096 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1097 1098 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1099 cb=s->info_callback; 1100 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1101 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; 1102 1103 if (cb != NULL) 1104 { 1105 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; 1106 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); 1107 } 1108 1109 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */ 1110 { 1111 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; 1112 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) 1113 { 1114 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1115 return(0); 1116 } 1117 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested 1118 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with 1119 * a fatal alert because if application tried to 1120 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and 1121 * expects it to succeed. 1122 * 1123 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we 1124 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on. 1125 */ 1126 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) 1127 { 1128 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1130 goto f_err; 1131 } 1132 } 1133 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */ 1134 { 1135 char tmp[16]; 1136 1137 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 1138 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; 1139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); 1140 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr); 1141 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp); 1142 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1143 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); 1144 return(0); 1145 } 1146 else 1147 { 1148 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); 1150 goto f_err; 1151 } 1152 1153 goto start; 1154 } 1155 1156 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */ 1157 { 1158 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 1159 rr->length=0; 1160 return(0); 1161 } 1162 1163 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) 1164 { 1165 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know 1166 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */ 1167 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || 1168 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) 1169 { 1170 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); 1172 goto f_err; 1173 } 1174 1175 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ 1176 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) 1177 { 1178 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1180 goto f_err; 1181 } 1182 1183 rr->length=0; 1184 1185 if (s->msg_callback) 1186 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1187 1188 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1; 1189 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) 1190 goto err; 1191 else 1192 goto start; 1193 } 1194 1195 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ 1196 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) 1197 { 1198 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && 1199 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) 1200 { 1201#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and 1202 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting 1203 * protocol violations): */ 1204 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server) 1205 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT 1206 :SSL_ST_CONNECT; 1207#else 1208 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; 1209#endif 1210 s->new_session=1; 1211 } 1212 i=s->handshake_func(s); 1213 if (i < 0) return(i); 1214 if (i == 0) 1215 { 1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1217 return(-1); 1218 } 1219 1220 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) 1221 { 1222 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ 1223 { 1224 BIO *bio; 1225 /* In the case where we try to read application data, 1226 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with 1227 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may 1228 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ 1229 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; 1230 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); 1231 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1232 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1233 return(-1); 1234 } 1235 } 1236 goto start; 1237 } 1238 1239 switch (rr->type) 1240 { 1241 default: 1242#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS 1243 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */ 1244 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) 1245 { 1246 rr->length = 0; 1247 goto start; 1248 } 1249#endif 1250 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1252 goto f_err; 1253 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: 1254 case SSL3_RT_ALERT: 1255 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: 1256 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception 1257 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that 1258 * should not happen when type != rr->type */ 1259 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1261 goto f_err; 1262 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: 1263 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, 1264 * but have application data. If the library was 1265 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data 1266 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data 1267 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started), 1268 * we will indulge it. 1269 */ 1270 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && 1271 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && 1272 (( 1273 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && 1274 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && 1275 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) 1276 ) || ( 1277 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && 1278 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && 1279 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) 1280 ) 1281 )) 1282 { 1283 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; 1284 return(-1); 1285 } 1286 else 1287 { 1288 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1290 goto f_err; 1291 } 1292 } 1293 /* not reached */ 1294 1295f_err: 1296 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1297err: 1298 return(-1); 1299 } 1300 1301int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) 1302 { 1303 int i; 1304 const char *sender; 1305 int slen; 1306 1307 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) 1308 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; 1309 else 1310 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; 1311 1312 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) 1313 { 1314 if (s->session == NULL) 1315 { 1316 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ 1317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1318 return (0); 1319 } 1320 1321 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 1322 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0); 1323 } 1324 1325 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i)) 1326 return(0); 1327 1328 /* we have to record the message digest at 1329 * this point so we can get it before we read 1330 * the finished message */ 1331 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) 1332 { 1333 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; 1334 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; 1335 } 1336 else 1337 { 1338 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; 1339 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; 1340 } 1341 1342 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, 1343 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1), 1344 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2), 1345 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); 1346 1347 return(1); 1348 } 1349 1350int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) 1351 { 1352 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ 1353 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); 1354 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) 1355 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */ 1356 if (desc < 0) return -1; 1357 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ 1358 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) 1359 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); 1360 1361 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; 1362 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level; 1363 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc; 1364 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ 1365 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 1366 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written 1367 * some time in the future */ 1368 return -1; 1369 } 1370 1371int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) 1372 { 1373 int i,j; 1374 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; 1375 1376 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0; 1377 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0); 1378 if (i <= 0) 1379 { 1380 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; 1381 } 1382 else 1383 { 1384 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. 1385 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, 1386 * we will not worry too much. */ 1387 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) 1388 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); 1389 1390 if (s->msg_callback) 1391 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1392 1393 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1394 cb=s->info_callback; 1395 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1396 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; 1397 1398 if (cb != NULL) 1399 { 1400 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1]; 1401 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j); 1402 } 1403 } 1404 return(i); 1405 } 1406