1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112#include <stdio.h> 113#include <openssl/objects.h> 114#include <openssl/evp.h> 115#include <openssl/hmac.h> 116#include <openssl/ocsp.h> 117#include "ssl_locl.h" 118 119const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 120 121#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 122static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, 123 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 124 SSL_SESSION **psess); 125#endif 126 127SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={ 128 tls1_enc, 129 tls1_mac, 130 tls1_setup_key_block, 131 tls1_generate_master_secret, 132 tls1_change_cipher_state, 133 tls1_final_finish_mac, 134 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 135 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 136 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 137 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 138 tls1_alert_code, 139 }; 140 141long tls1_default_timeout(void) 142 { 143 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec 144 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */ 145 return(60*60*2); 146 } 147 148int tls1_new(SSL *s) 149 { 150 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0); 151 s->method->ssl_clear(s); 152 return(1); 153 } 154 155void tls1_free(SSL *s) 156 { 157#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 158 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) 159 { 160 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); 161 } 162#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ 163 ssl3_free(s); 164 } 165 166void tls1_clear(SSL *s) 167 { 168 ssl3_clear(s); 169 s->version=TLS1_VERSION; 170 } 171 172#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 173static int nid_list[] = 174 { 175 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 176 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 177 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 178 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 179 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 180 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 181 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 182 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 183 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 184 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 185 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 186 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 187 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 188 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 189 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 190 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 191 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 192 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 193 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 194 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 195 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 196 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 197 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 198 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 199 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ 200 }; 201 202int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) 203 { 204 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ 205 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > 206 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]))) 207 return 0; 208 return nid_list[curve_id-1]; 209 } 210 211int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) 212 { 213 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ 214 switch (nid) 215 { 216 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ 217 return 1; 218 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ 219 return 2; 220 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ 221 return 3; 222 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 223 return 4; 224 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 225 return 5; 226 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ 227 return 6; 228 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 229 return 7; 230 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 231 return 8; 232 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ 233 return 9; 234 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 235 return 10; 236 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 237 return 11; 238 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ 239 return 12; 240 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 241 return 13; 242 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 243 return 14; 244 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ 245 return 15; 246 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 247 return 16; 248 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 249 return 17; 250 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ 251 return 18; 252 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 253 return 19; 254 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 255 return 20; 256 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ 257 return 21; 258 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 259 return 22; 260 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 261 return 23; 262 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ 263 return 24; 264 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ 265 return 25; 266 default: 267 return 0; 268 } 269 } 270#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 271 272#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 273unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) 274 { 275 int extdatalen=0; 276 unsigned char *ret = p; 277 278 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ 279 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION 280 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 281 return p; 282 283 ret+=2; 284 285 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 286 287 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) 288 { 289 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ 290 unsigned long size_str; 291 long lenmax; 292 293 /* check for enough space. 294 4 for the servername type and entension length 295 2 for servernamelist length 296 1 for the hostname type 297 2 for hostname length 298 + hostname length 299 */ 300 301 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 302 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) 303 return NULL; 304 305 /* extension type and length */ 306 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 307 s2n(size_str+5,ret); 308 309 /* length of servername list */ 310 s2n(size_str+3,ret); 311 312 /* hostname type, length and hostname */ 313 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; 314 s2n(size_str,ret); 315 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); 316 ret+=size_str; 317 } 318 319 /* Add RI if renegotiating */ 320 if (s->new_session) 321 { 322 int el; 323 324 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) 325 { 326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 327 return NULL; 328 } 329 330 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 331 332 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); 333 s2n(el,ret); 334 335 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 336 { 337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 338 return NULL; 339 } 340 341 ret += el; 342 } 343 344#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 345 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && 346 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 347 { 348 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ 349 long lenmax; 350 351 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 352 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 353 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) 354 { 355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 356 return NULL; 357 } 358 359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); 360 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); 361 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 362 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 363 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 364 } 365 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL && 366 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 367 { 368 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ 369 long lenmax; 370 371 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; 372 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 373 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) 374 { 375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 376 return NULL; 377 } 378 379 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret); 380 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret); 381 382 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for 383 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes. 384 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html 385 * resolves this to two bytes. 386 */ 387 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret); 388 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 389 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 390 } 391#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 392 393 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 394 { 395 int ticklen; 396 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) 397 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; 398 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 399 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) 400 { 401 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; 402 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); 403 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) 404 return NULL; 405 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, 406 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, 407 ticklen); 408 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; 409 } 410 else 411 ticklen = 0; 412 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 413 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) 414 goto skip_ext; 415 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len 416 * rest for ticket 417 */ 418 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL; 419 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 420 s2n(ticklen,ret); 421 if (ticklen) 422 { 423 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); 424 ret += ticklen; 425 } 426 } 427 skip_ext: 428 429#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 430 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 431 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 432 { 433 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; 434 435 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) 436 return NULL; 437 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 438 return NULL; 439 440 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 441 s2n(col + 2, ret); 442 s2n(col, ret); 443 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); 444 ret += col; 445 } 446#endif 447 448 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && 449 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 450 { 451 int i; 452 long extlen, idlen, itmp; 453 OCSP_RESPID *id; 454 455 idlen = 0; 456 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) 457 { 458 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 459 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); 460 if (itmp <= 0) 461 return NULL; 462 idlen += itmp + 2; 463 } 464 465 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) 466 { 467 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); 468 if (extlen < 0) 469 return NULL; 470 } 471 else 472 extlen = 0; 473 474 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL; 475 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 476 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) 477 return NULL; 478 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); 479 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; 480 s2n(idlen, ret); 481 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) 482 { 483 /* save position of id len */ 484 unsigned char *q = ret; 485 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 486 /* skip over id len */ 487 ret += 2; 488 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); 489 /* write id len */ 490 s2n(itmp, q); 491 } 492 s2n(extlen, ret); 493 if (extlen > 0) 494 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); 495 } 496 497 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 498 return p; 499 500 s2n(extdatalen,p); 501 return ret; 502 } 503 504unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) 505 { 506 int extdatalen=0; 507 unsigned char *ret = p; 508 509 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ 510 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 511 return p; 512 513 ret+=2; 514 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 515 516 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) 517 { 518 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 519 520 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 521 s2n(0,ret); 522 } 523 524 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding) 525 { 526 int el; 527 528 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) 529 { 530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 531 return NULL; 532 } 533 534 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 535 536 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); 537 s2n(el,ret); 538 539 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 540 { 541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 542 return NULL; 543 } 544 545 ret += el; 546 } 547 548#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 549 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && 550 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 551 { 552 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ 553 long lenmax; 554 555 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 556 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 557 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) 558 { 559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 560 return NULL; 561 } 562 563 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); 564 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); 565 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 566 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 567 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 568 569 } 570 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */ 571#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 572 573 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected 574 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 575 { 576 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 577 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 578 s2n(0,ret); 579 } 580 581 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 582 { 583 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 584 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret); 585 s2n(0,ret); 586 } 587 588#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 589 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 590 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 591 { 592 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; 593 594 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) 595 return NULL; 596 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 597 return NULL; 598 599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 600 s2n(sol + 2, ret); 601 s2n(sol, ret); 602 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); 603 ret += sol; 604 } 605#endif 606 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) 607 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) 608 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 609 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/ 610 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/ 611 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 612 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 613 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 614 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17}; 615 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL; 616 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36); 617 ret+=36; 618 619 } 620 621 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 622 return p; 623 624 s2n(extdatalen,p); 625 return ret; 626 } 627 628int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 629 { 630 unsigned short type; 631 unsigned short size; 632 unsigned short len; 633 unsigned char *data = *p; 634 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 635 636 s->servername_done = 0; 637 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 638 639 if (data >= (d+n-2)) 640 goto ri_check; 641 n2s(data,len); 642 643 if (data > (d+n-len)) 644 goto ri_check; 645 646 while (data <= (d+n-4)) 647 { 648 n2s(data,type); 649 n2s(data,size); 650 651 if (data+size > (d+n)) 652 goto ri_check; 653#if 0 654 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size); 655#endif 656 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 657 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, 658 s->tlsext_debug_arg); 659/* The servername extension is treated as follows: 660 661 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. 662 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, 663 in which case an fatal alert is generated. 664 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. 665 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order 666 to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 667 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 668 it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 669 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time 670 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the 671 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and 672 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername 673 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches 674 the value of the Host: field. 675 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 676 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session, 677 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. 678 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 679 680*/ 681 682 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 683 { 684 unsigned char *sdata; 685 int servname_type; 686 int dsize; 687 688 if (size < 2) 689 { 690 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 691 return 0; 692 } 693 n2s(data,dsize); 694 size -= 2; 695 if (dsize > size ) 696 { 697 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 698 return 0; 699 } 700 701 sdata = data; 702 while (dsize > 3) 703 { 704 servname_type = *(sdata++); 705 n2s(sdata,len); 706 dsize -= 3; 707 708 if (len > dsize) 709 { 710 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 711 return 0; 712 } 713 if (s->servername_done == 0) 714 switch (servname_type) 715 { 716 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: 717 if (!s->hit) 718 { 719 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname) 720 { 721 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 722 return 0; 723 } 724 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) 725 { 726 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 727 return 0; 728 } 729 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) 730 { 731 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 732 return 0; 733 } 734 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); 735 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0'; 736 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { 737 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); 738 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; 739 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 740 return 0; 741 } 742 s->servername_done = 1; 743 744 } 745 else 746 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname 747 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 748 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0; 749 750 break; 751 752 default: 753 break; 754 } 755 756 dsize -= len; 757 } 758 if (dsize != 0) 759 { 760 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 761 return 0; 762 } 763 764 } 765 766#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 767 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && 768 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 769 { 770 unsigned char *sdata = data; 771 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 772 773 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) 774 { 775 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 776 return 0; 777 } 778 if (!s->hit) 779 { 780 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) 781 { 782 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 783 return 0; 784 } 785 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 786 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) 787 { 788 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 789 return 0; 790 } 791 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; 792 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); 793 } 794#if 0 795 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 796 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 797 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 798 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 799 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 800#endif 801 } 802 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves && 803 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 804 { 805 unsigned char *sdata = data; 806 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); 807 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); 808 809 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2) 810 { 811 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 812 return 0; 813 } 814 if (!s->hit) 815 { 816 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) 817 { 818 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 819 return 0; 820 } 821 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 822 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) 823 { 824 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 825 return 0; 826 } 827 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length; 828 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length); 829 } 830#if 0 831 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 832 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 833 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) 834 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 835 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 836#endif 837 } 838#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 839#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 840 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 841 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 842 { 843 unsigned char *sdata = data; 844 845 if (size < 2) 846 { 847 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 848 return 0; 849 } 850 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 851 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) 852 { 853 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 854 return 0; 855 } 856 857 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 858 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 859 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 860 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 861 else 862 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 863 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 864 { 865 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 866 return 0; 867 } 868 } 869#endif 870 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 871 { 872 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 873 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 874 { 875 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 876 return 0; 877 } 878 } 879 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 880 { 881 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 882 return 0; 883 renegotiate_seen = 1; 884 } 885 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 886 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 887 { 888 889 if (size < 5) 890 { 891 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 892 return 0; 893 } 894 895 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; 896 size--; 897 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) 898 { 899 const unsigned char *sdata; 900 int dsize; 901 /* Read in responder_id_list */ 902 n2s(data,dsize); 903 size -= 2; 904 if (dsize > size ) 905 { 906 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 907 return 0; 908 } 909 while (dsize > 0) 910 { 911 OCSP_RESPID *id; 912 int idsize; 913 if (dsize < 4) 914 { 915 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 916 return 0; 917 } 918 n2s(data, idsize); 919 dsize -= 2 + idsize; 920 if (dsize < 0) 921 { 922 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 923 return 0; 924 } 925 sdata = data; 926 data += idsize; 927 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, 928 &sdata, idsize); 929 if (!id) 930 { 931 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 932 return 0; 933 } 934 if (data != sdata) 935 { 936 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 937 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 938 return 0; 939 } 940 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids 941 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = 942 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) 943 { 944 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 945 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 946 return 0; 947 } 948 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push( 949 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) 950 { 951 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 952 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 953 return 0; 954 } 955 } 956 957 /* Read in request_extensions */ 958 n2s(data,dsize); 959 size -= 2; 960 if (dsize > size) 961 { 962 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 963 return 0; 964 } 965 sdata = data; 966 if (dsize > 0) 967 { 968 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = 969 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, 970 &sdata, dsize); 971 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts 972 || (data + dsize != sdata)) 973 { 974 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 975 return 0; 976 } 977 } 978 } 979 /* We don't know what to do with any other type 980 * so ignore it. 981 */ 982 else 983 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 984 } 985 986 /* session ticket processed earlier */ 987 data+=size; 988 } 989 990 *p = data; 991 992 ri_check: 993 994 /* Need RI if renegotiating */ 995 996 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session && 997 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 998 { 999 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 1001 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1002 return 0; 1003 } 1004 1005 return 1; 1006 } 1007 1008int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 1009 { 1010 unsigned short type; 1011 unsigned short size; 1012 unsigned short len; 1013 unsigned char *data = *p; 1014 int tlsext_servername = 0; 1015 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 1016 1017 if (data >= (d+n-2)) 1018 goto ri_check; 1019 1020 n2s(data,len); 1021 1022 while(data <= (d+n-4)) 1023 { 1024 n2s(data,type); 1025 n2s(data,size); 1026 1027 if (data+size > (d+n)) 1028 goto ri_check; 1029 1030 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 1031 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, 1032 s->tlsext_debug_arg); 1033 1034 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1035 { 1036 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) 1037 { 1038 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1039 return 0; 1040 } 1041 tlsext_servername = 1; 1042 } 1043 1044#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1045 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && 1046 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1047 { 1048 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1049 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 1050 1051 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) 1052 { 1053 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1054 return 0; 1055 } 1056 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 1057 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1058 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) 1059 { 1060 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1061 return 0; 1062 } 1063 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; 1064 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); 1065#if 0 1066 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); 1067 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1068 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1069 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 1070 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 1071#endif 1072 } 1073#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1074 1075 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1076 { 1077 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1078 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1079 { 1080 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1081 return 0; 1082 } 1083 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 1084 || (size > 0)) 1085 { 1086 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1087 return 0; 1088 } 1089 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 1090 } 1091#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1092 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 1093 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1094 { 1095 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1096 1097 if (size < 2) 1098 { 1099 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1100 return 0; 1101 } 1102 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1103 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) 1104 { 1105 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1106 return 0; 1107 } 1108 1109 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1110 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1111 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1112 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1113 else 1114 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1115 1116 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1117 { 1118 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1119 return 0; 1120 } 1121 } 1122#endif 1123 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 1124 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1125 { 1126 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested 1127 * a status request message. 1128 */ 1129 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) 1130 { 1131 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1132 return 0; 1133 } 1134 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ 1135 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 1136 } 1137 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 1138 { 1139 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1140 return 0; 1141 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1142 } 1143 data+=size; 1144 } 1145 1146 if (data != d+n) 1147 { 1148 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1149 return 0; 1150 } 1151 1152 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) 1153 { 1154 if (s->tlsext_hostname) 1155 { 1156 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) 1157 { 1158 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); 1159 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) 1160 { 1161 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1162 return 0; 1163 } 1164 } 1165 else 1166 { 1167 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1168 return 0; 1169 } 1170 } 1171 } 1172 1173 *p = data; 1174 1175 ri_check: 1176 1177 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to 1178 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server 1179 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an 1180 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server 1181 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI 1182 * absence on initial connect only. 1183 */ 1184 if (!renegotiate_seen 1185 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) 1186 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1187 { 1188 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 1190 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1191 return 0; 1192 } 1193 1194 return 1; 1195 } 1196 1197 1198int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1199 { 1200#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1201 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats 1202 * and elliptic curves we support. 1203 */ 1204 int using_ecc = 0; 1205 int i; 1206 unsigned char *j; 1207 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; 1208 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); 1209 1210 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) 1211 { 1212 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); 1213 1214 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; 1215 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; 1216 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) 1217 { 1218 using_ecc = 1; 1219 break; 1220 } 1221 } 1222 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version == TLS1_VERSION); 1223 if (using_ecc) 1224 { 1225 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1226 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) 1227 { 1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1229 return -1; 1230 } 1231 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1232 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1233 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1234 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1235 1236 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */ 1237 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); 1238 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2; 1239 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) 1240 { 1241 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1243 return -1; 1244 } 1245 for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <= 1246 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++) 1247 s2n(i,j); 1248 } 1249#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1250 1251#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1252 { 1253 int r = 1; 1254 1255 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) 1256 { 1257 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1258 if (!r) 1259 return -1; 1260 } 1261 1262 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) 1263 { 1264 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1265 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 1266 1267 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1268 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1269 else 1270 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1271 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1272 { 1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1274 return -1; 1275 } 1276 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1277 } 1278 1279 if (r == 2) 1280 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */ 1281 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1282 } 1283#endif 1284 1285 return 1; 1286 } 1287 1288int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1289 { 1290#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1291 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support 1292 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not 1293 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension. 1294 */ 1295 1296 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1297 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1298 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); 1299 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); 1300 1301 if (using_ecc) 1302 { 1303 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1304 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) 1305 { 1306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1307 return -1; 1308 } 1309 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1310 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1311 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1312 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1313 } 1314#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1315 1316 return 1; 1317 } 1318 1319int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1320 { 1321 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 1322 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1323 1324#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1325 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in 1326 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1327 */ 1328 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in 1329 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1330 */ 1331#endif 1332 1333 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1334 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1335 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1336 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1337 1338 /* If status request then ask callback what to do. 1339 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 1340 * the certificate has changed. 1341 */ 1342 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 1343 { 1344 int r; 1345 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 1346 switch (r) 1347 { 1348 /* We don't want to send a status request response */ 1349 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1350 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1351 break; 1352 /* status request response should be sent */ 1353 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: 1354 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 1355 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 1356 else 1357 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1358 break; 1359 /* something bad happened */ 1360 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1361 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1362 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1363 goto err; 1364 } 1365 } 1366 else 1367 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1368 1369#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1370 { 1371 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), 1372 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, 1373 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */ 1374 1375 int r = 1; 1376 1377 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) 1378 { 1379 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1380 if (!r) 1381 { 1382 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1383 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1384 goto err; 1385 } 1386 } 1387 1388 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1389 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1390 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; 1391 1392 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) 1393 { 1394 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 1395 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) 1396 { 1397 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input 1398 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */ 1399 1400 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1401 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1402 else 1403 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1404 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1405 { 1406 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1407 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1408 goto err; 1409 } 1410 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1411 } 1412 } 1413 1414 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1415 { 1416 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, 1417 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; 1418 * abort the handshake. 1419 */ 1420 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1421 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1422 } 1423 } 1424 1425#endif 1426 err: 1427 switch (ret) 1428 { 1429 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1430 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1431 return -1; 1432 1433 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 1434 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 1435 return 1; 1436 1437 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1438 s->servername_done=0; 1439 default: 1440 return 1; 1441 } 1442 } 1443 1444int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1445 { 1446 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 1447 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1448 1449#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1450 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, then server 1451 * must return a an EC point formats lists containing uncompressed. 1452 */ 1453 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1454 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1455 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 1456 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) 1457 { 1458 /* we are using an ECC cipher */ 1459 size_t i; 1460 unsigned char *list; 1461 int found_uncompressed = 0; 1462 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL) || (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length == 0)) 1463 { 1464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); 1465 return -1; 1466 } 1467 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1468 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1469 { 1470 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) 1471 { 1472 found_uncompressed = 1; 1473 break; 1474 } 1475 } 1476 if (!found_uncompressed) 1477 { 1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); 1479 return -1; 1480 } 1481 } 1482 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 1483#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1484 1485 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1486 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1487 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1488 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1489 1490#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1491 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) 1492 { 1493 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs. 1494 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */ 1495 1496 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1497 { 1498 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1499 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1500 } 1501 1502 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check 1503 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */ 1504 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || 1505 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) 1506 { 1507 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1508 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1509 } 1510 } 1511#endif 1512 1513 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one 1514 * tell the callback 1515 */ 1516 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) 1517 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 1518 { 1519 int r; 1520 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows 1521 * there is no response. 1522 */ 1523 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 1524 { 1525 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); 1526 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; 1527 } 1528 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; 1529 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 1530 if (r == 0) 1531 { 1532 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; 1533 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1534 } 1535 if (r < 0) 1536 { 1537 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1538 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1539 } 1540 } 1541 1542 switch (ret) 1543 { 1544 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1545 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1546 return -1; 1547 1548 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 1549 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 1550 return 1; 1551 1552 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1553 s->servername_done=0; 1554 default: 1555 return 1; 1556 } 1557 } 1558 1559/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client 1560 * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS 1561 * session ticket extension at the same time. 1562 */ 1563 1564int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, 1565 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) 1566 { 1567 /* Point after session ID in client hello */ 1568 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; 1569 unsigned short i; 1570 1571 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present 1572 * to permit stateful resumption. 1573 */ 1574 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 1575 return 1; 1576 1577 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) 1578 return 1; 1579 if (p >= limit) 1580 return -1; 1581 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ 1582 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 1583 { 1584 i = *(p++); 1585 p+= i; 1586 if (p >= limit) 1587 return -1; 1588 } 1589 /* Skip past cipher list */ 1590 n2s(p, i); 1591 p+= i; 1592 if (p >= limit) 1593 return -1; 1594 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ 1595 i = *(p++); 1596 p += i; 1597 if (p > limit) 1598 return -1; 1599 /* Now at start of extensions */ 1600 if ((p + 2) >= limit) 1601 return 1; 1602 n2s(p, i); 1603 while ((p + 4) <= limit) 1604 { 1605 unsigned short type, size; 1606 n2s(p, type); 1607 n2s(p, size); 1608 if (p + size > limit) 1609 return 1; 1610 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1611 { 1612 /* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will 1613 * trigger a full handshake 1614 */ 1615 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 1616 return 1; 1617 /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket 1618 * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake 1619 */ 1620 if (size == 0) 1621 { 1622 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 1623 return 0; /* Cache miss */ 1624 } 1625 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) 1626 { 1627 /* Indicate cache miss here and instead of 1628 * generating the session from ticket now, 1629 * trigger abbreviated handshake based on 1630 * external mechanism to calculate the master 1631 * secret later. */ 1632 return 0; 1633 } 1634 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, 1635 ret); 1636 } 1637 p += size; 1638 } 1639 return 1; 1640 } 1641 1642static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, 1643 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 1644 SSL_SESSION **psess) 1645 { 1646 SSL_SESSION *sess; 1647 unsigned char *sdec; 1648 const unsigned char *p; 1649 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; 1650 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 1651 HMAC_CTX hctx; 1652 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 1653 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 1654 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ 1655 if (eticklen < 48) 1656 goto tickerr; 1657 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ 1658 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 1659 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 1660 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) 1661 { 1662 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; 1663 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, 1664 &ctx, &hctx, 0); 1665 if (rv < 0) 1666 return -1; 1667 if (rv == 0) 1668 goto tickerr; 1669 if (rv == 2) 1670 renew_ticket = 1; 1671 } 1672 else 1673 { 1674 /* Check key name matches */ 1675 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) 1676 goto tickerr; 1677 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 1678 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 1679 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 1680 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); 1681 } 1682 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and 1683 * integrity checks on ticket. 1684 */ 1685 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); 1686 if (mlen < 0) 1687 { 1688 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 1689 return -1; 1690 } 1691 eticklen -= mlen; 1692 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ 1693 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); 1694 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); 1695 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 1696 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) 1697 goto tickerr; 1698 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ 1699 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ 1700 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 1701 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 1702 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); 1703 if (!sdec) 1704 { 1705 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 1706 return -1; 1707 } 1708 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); 1709 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) 1710 goto tickerr; 1711 slen += mlen; 1712 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 1713 p = sdec; 1714 1715 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); 1716 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 1717 if (sess) 1718 { 1719 /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to 1720 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to 1721 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero 1722 * as required by standard. 1723 */ 1724 if (sesslen) 1725 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); 1726 sess->session_id_length = sesslen; 1727 *psess = sess; 1728 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket; 1729 return 1; 1730 } 1731 /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to 1732 * send a new ticket 1733 */ 1734 tickerr: 1735 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 1736 return 0; 1737 } 1738 1739#endif 1740