/external/valgrind/main/memcheck/tests/ |
H A D | leak-tree.c | 26 Node* mk(void) function 39 // Building like this rather than "t = mk(mk(mk(NULL, NULL), ...)" seems to 41 t = mk(); // A 42 t->l = mk(); // B 43 t->r = mk(); // C (48(16d,32i)/1 definitely leaked from here) 44 t->l->l = mk(); // D (16/1 definitely leaked from here) 45 t->l->r = mk(); // E 46 t->r->l = mk(); // [all...] |
H A D | leak-cycle.c | 13 struct n *mk(struct n *l, struct n *r) function 26 a = mk(0,0); 27 b = mk(a,0); 28 c = mk(b,0);
|
H A D | leak-cases.c | 48 Node* mk(Node* next) function 70 p1 = mk(NULL); // Case 1: 16/1 still reachable 72 p2 = mk(mk(NULL)); // Case 2: 16/1 still reachable 74 (void)mk(NULL); // Case 3: 16/1 definitely lost 76 (void)mk(mk(NULL)); // Case 4: 16/1 indirectly lost (counted again below!) 78 p5 = mk(NULL); // Case 5: 16/1 possibly lost (ok) 81 p6 = mk(mk(NUL [all...] |
/external/wpa_supplicant_6/wpa_supplicant/src/eap_server/ |
H A D | eap_sim_db.h | 56 const u8 *mk); 72 u8 mk[EAP_SIM_MK_LEN]; member in struct:eap_sim_reauth
|
H A D | eap_pax.c | 41 u8 mk[EAP_PAX_MK_LEN]; member in struct:eap_pax_data 390 data->rand.e, data->mk, data->ck, 508 eap_pax_kdf(data->mac_id, data->mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN, 529 eap_pax_kdf(data->mac_id, data->mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN,
|
/external/wpa_supplicant_8/hostapd/src/eap_server/ |
H A D | eap_sim_db.h | 58 char *reauth_id, u16 counter, const u8 *mk); 72 u8 mk[EAP_SIM_MK_LEN]; member in struct:eap_sim_reauth
|
H A D | eap_server_pax.c | 36 u8 mk[EAP_PAX_MK_LEN]; member in struct:eap_pax_data 385 data->rand.e, data->mk, data->ck, 503 eap_pax_kdf(data->mac_id, data->mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN, 524 eap_pax_kdf(data->mac_id, data->mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN,
|
/external/wpa_supplicant_8/src/eap_server/ |
H A D | eap_sim_db.h | 58 char *reauth_id, u16 counter, const u8 *mk); 72 u8 mk[EAP_SIM_MK_LEN]; member in struct:eap_sim_reauth
|
H A D | eap_server_pax.c | 36 u8 mk[EAP_PAX_MK_LEN]; member in struct:eap_pax_data 385 data->rand.e, data->mk, data->ck, 503 eap_pax_kdf(data->mac_id, data->mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN, 524 eap_pax_kdf(data->mac_id, data->mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN,
|
/external/wpa_supplicant_8/wpa_supplicant/src/eap_server/ |
H A D | eap_sim_db.h | 58 char *reauth_id, u16 counter, const u8 *mk); 72 u8 mk[EAP_SIM_MK_LEN]; member in struct:eap_sim_reauth
|
/external/wpa_supplicant_6/wpa_supplicant/src/eap_common/ |
H A D | eap_pax_common.c | 127 * @mk: Buffer for the derived Master Key 133 u8 *mk, u8 *ck, u8 *ick) 137 e, 2 * EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN, mk) || 138 eap_pax_kdf(mac_id, mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN, "Confirmation Key", 140 eap_pax_kdf(mac_id, mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN, "Integrity Check Key", 145 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PAX: MK", mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN); 132 eap_pax_initial_key_derivation(u8 mac_id, const u8 *ak, const u8 *e, u8 *mk, u8 *ck, u8 *ick) argument
|
H A D | eap_gpsk_common.c | 124 u8 mk[32], *pos, *data; local 165 if (gkdf(psk, data, data_len, mk, mk_len) < 0) { 170 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-GPSK: MK", mk, mk_len); 172 if (gkdf(mk, seed, seed_len, kdf_out, kdf_out_len) < 0)
|
/external/wpa_supplicant_8/hostapd/src/eap_common/ |
H A D | eap_pax_common.c | 121 * @mk: Buffer for the derived Master Key 127 u8 *mk, u8 *ck, u8 *ick) 131 e, 2 * EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN, mk) || 132 eap_pax_kdf(mac_id, mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN, "Confirmation Key", 134 eap_pax_kdf(mac_id, mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN, "Integrity Check Key", 139 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PAX: MK", mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN); 126 eap_pax_initial_key_derivation(u8 mac_id, const u8 *ak, const u8 *e, u8 *mk, u8 *ck, u8 *ick) argument
|
H A D | eap_gpsk_common.c | 115 u8 mk[32], *pos, *data; local 156 if (gkdf(psk, data, data_len, mk, mk_len) < 0) { 161 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-GPSK: MK", mk, mk_len); 163 if (gkdf(mk, seed, seed_len, kdf_out, kdf_out_len) < 0)
|
H A D | eap_pwd_common.c | 290 u8 mk[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft; local 332 eap_pwd_h_final(hash, mk); 334 /* stretch the mk with the session-id to get MSK | EMSK */ 335 if (eap_pwd_kdf(mk, SHA256_MAC_LEN,
|
/external/wpa_supplicant_8/src/eap_common/ |
H A D | eap_pax_common.c | 121 * @mk: Buffer for the derived Master Key 127 u8 *mk, u8 *ck, u8 *ick) 131 e, 2 * EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN, mk) || 132 eap_pax_kdf(mac_id, mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN, "Confirmation Key", 134 eap_pax_kdf(mac_id, mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN, "Integrity Check Key", 139 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PAX: MK", mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN); 126 eap_pax_initial_key_derivation(u8 mac_id, const u8 *ak, const u8 *e, u8 *mk, u8 *ck, u8 *ick) argument
|
H A D | eap_gpsk_common.c | 115 u8 mk[32], *pos, *data; local 156 if (gkdf(psk, data, data_len, mk, mk_len) < 0) { 161 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-GPSK: MK", mk, mk_len); 163 if (gkdf(mk, seed, seed_len, kdf_out, kdf_out_len) < 0)
|
H A D | eap_pwd_common.c | 290 u8 mk[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft; local 332 eap_pwd_h_final(hash, mk); 334 /* stretch the mk with the session-id to get MSK | EMSK */ 335 if (eap_pwd_kdf(mk, SHA256_MAC_LEN,
|
/external/wpa_supplicant_8/wpa_supplicant/src/eap_common/ |
H A D | eap_pax_common.c | 121 * @mk: Buffer for the derived Master Key 127 u8 *mk, u8 *ck, u8 *ick) 131 e, 2 * EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN, mk) || 132 eap_pax_kdf(mac_id, mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN, "Confirmation Key", 134 eap_pax_kdf(mac_id, mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN, "Integrity Check Key", 139 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PAX: MK", mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN); 126 eap_pax_initial_key_derivation(u8 mac_id, const u8 *ak, const u8 *e, u8 *mk, u8 *ck, u8 *ick) argument
|
H A D | eap_gpsk_common.c | 115 u8 mk[32], *pos, *data; local 156 if (gkdf(psk, data, data_len, mk, mk_len) < 0) { 161 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-GPSK: MK", mk, mk_len); 163 if (gkdf(mk, seed, seed_len, kdf_out, kdf_out_len) < 0)
|
H A D | eap_pwd_common.c | 290 u8 mk[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft; local 332 eap_pwd_h_final(hash, mk); 334 /* stretch the mk with the session-id to get MSK | EMSK */ 335 if (eap_pwd_kdf(mk, SHA256_MAC_LEN,
|
/external/v8/src/ |
H A D | fast-dtoa.cc | 613 int mk; // -k local 621 &ten_mk, &mk); 647 // v == (double) (scaled_w * 10^-mk). 648 // Set decimal_exponent == -mk and pass it to DigitGen. If scaled_w is not an 655 *decimal_exponent = -mk + kappa; 672 int mk; // -k local 680 &ten_mk, &mk); 696 // We now have (double) (scaled_w * 10^-mk). 704 *decimal_exponent = -mk + kappa;
|
/external/wpa_supplicant_6/wpa_supplicant/src/eap_peer/ |
H A D | eap_pax.c | 45 u8 mk[EAP_PAX_MK_LEN]; member in struct:eap_pax_data 188 data->mk, data->ck, data->ick) < 0) 481 eap_pax_kdf(data->mac_id, data->mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN, 502 eap_pax_kdf(data->mac_id, data->mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN,
|
/external/wpa_supplicant_8/hostapd/src/eap_peer/ |
H A D | eap_pax.c | 38 u8 mk[EAP_PAX_MK_LEN]; member in struct:eap_pax_data 181 data->mk, data->ck, data->ick) < 0) 474 eap_pax_kdf(data->mac_id, data->mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN, 495 eap_pax_kdf(data->mac_id, data->mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN,
|
/external/wpa_supplicant_8/src/eap_peer/ |
H A D | eap_pax.c | 38 u8 mk[EAP_PAX_MK_LEN]; member in struct:eap_pax_data 181 data->mk, data->ck, data->ick) < 0) 474 eap_pax_kdf(data->mac_id, data->mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN, 495 eap_pax_kdf(data->mac_id, data->mk, EAP_PAX_MK_LEN,
|