| 11ae768cf1b8348e761ad9c09e98788da1e591b1 |
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25-Mar-2015 |
Christopher Tate <ctate@google.com> |
Add payload-size preflight stage to full transport backup
We now peform a total-size preflight pass before committing data to the
wire. This is to eliminate the large superfluous network traffic that
would otherwise happen if the transport enforces internal quotas: we
now instead ask the transport up front whether it's prepared to accept
a given payload size for the package.
From the app's perspective this preflight operation is indistinguishable
from a full-data backup pass. If the app has provided its own full-data
handling in a subclassed backup agent, their usual file-providing code
path will be executed. However, the files named for backup during this
pass are not opened and read; just measured for their total size. As
far as component lifecycles, this measurement pass is simply another
call to the agent, immediately after it is bound, with identical
timeout semantics to the existing full-data backup invocation.
Once the app's file set has been measured the preflight operation
invokes a new method on BackupTransport, called checkFullBackupSize().
This method is called after performFullBackup() (which applies any
overall whitelist/blacklist policy) but before any data is delivered
to the transport via sendBackupData(). The return code from
checkFullBackupSize() is similar to the other transport methods:
TRANSPORT_OK to permit the full backup to proceed; or
TRANSPORT_REJECT_PACKAGE to indicate that the requested payload is
unacceptable; or TRANSPORT_ERROR to report a more serious overall
transport-level problem that prevents a full-data backup operation
from occurring right now.
The estimated payload currently does not include the size of the
source-package metadata (technically, the manifest entry in its
archive payload) or the size of any widget metadata associated with
the package's install. In practice this means the preflighted size
underestimates by 3 to 5 KB. In addition, the preflight API currently
cannot distinguish between payload sizes larger than 2 gigabytes;
any payload estimate larger than that is passed as Integer.MAX_VALUE
to the checkFullBackupSize() query.
Bug 19846750
Change-Id: I44498201e2d4b07482dcb3ca8fa6935dddc467ca
/frameworks/base/packages/SharedStorageBackup/src/com/android/sharedstoragebackup/ObbBackupService.java
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| 7f392defccfae54dc8169e5ad82c2616e0713c8e |
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12-Aug-2013 |
Jeff Sharkey <jsharkey@android.com> |
Catch a few extra users of UserEnvironment.
Change-Id: I3112773b72c329893e4118ef1c4f4087d899139e
/frameworks/base/packages/SharedStorageBackup/src/com/android/sharedstoragebackup/ObbBackupService.java
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| 46cc43c6fa7623820d4ae9149496cf96bb15f8a3 |
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19-Feb-2013 |
Christopher Tate <ctate@google.com> |
Full backup/restore now handles OBBs sensibly
OBB backup/ restore is no longer handled within the target app
process. This is done to avoid having to require that OBB-using
apps have full read/write permission for external storage.
The new OBB backup service is a new component running in the
same app as the already-existing shared storage backup agent.
The backup infrastructure delegates backup/restore of apps'
OBB contents to this component (because the system process
may not itself read/write external storage).
From the command line, OBB backup is enabled by using new
-obb / -noobb flags with adb backup. The default is noobb.
Finally, a couple of nit fixes:
- buffer-size mismatch between the writer and reader of chunked
file data has been corrected; now the reading side won't be
issuing an extra pipe read per chunk.
- bu now explicitly closes the transport socket fd after
adopting it. This was benign but triggered a logged
warning about leaked fds.
Bug: 6718844
Change-Id: Ie252494e2327e9ab97cf9ed87c298410a8618492
/frameworks/base/packages/SharedStorageBackup/src/com/android/sharedstoragebackup/ObbBackupService.java
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