1/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.150 2015/06/22 23:42:16 djm Exp $ */
2/*
3 * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4 * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5 * All rights reserved.
6 *
7 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9 * are met:
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15 *
16 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
26 */
27
28#include "includes.h"
29
30#include <sys/types.h>
31#include <sys/socket.h>
32#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
33#include <sys/wait.h>
34
35#include <errno.h>
36#include <fcntl.h>
37#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
38#include <paths.h>
39#endif
40#include <pwd.h>
41#include <signal.h>
42#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
43#include <stdint.h>
44#endif
45#include <stdlib.h>
46#include <string.h>
47#include <stdarg.h>
48#include <stdio.h>
49#include <unistd.h>
50#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
51#include <poll.h>
52#else
53# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
54#  include <sys/poll.h>
55# endif
56#endif
57
58#ifdef SKEY
59#include <skey.h>
60#endif
61
62#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
63#include <openssl/dh.h>
64#endif
65
66#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
67#include "atomicio.h"
68#include "xmalloc.h"
69#include "ssh.h"
70#include "key.h"
71#include "buffer.h"
72#include "hostfile.h"
73#include "auth.h"
74#include "cipher.h"
75#include "kex.h"
76#include "dh.h"
77#ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC	/* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */
78#undef TARGET_OS_MAC
79#include "zlib.h"
80#define TARGET_OS_MAC 1
81#else
82#include "zlib.h"
83#endif
84#include "packet.h"
85#include "auth-options.h"
86#include "sshpty.h"
87#include "channels.h"
88#include "session.h"
89#include "sshlogin.h"
90#include "canohost.h"
91#include "log.h"
92#include "misc.h"
93#include "servconf.h"
94#include "monitor.h"
95#include "monitor_mm.h"
96#ifdef GSSAPI
97#include "ssh-gss.h"
98#endif
99#include "monitor_wrap.h"
100#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
101#include "compat.h"
102#include "ssh2.h"
103#include "roaming.h"
104#include "authfd.h"
105#include "match.h"
106#include "ssherr.h"
107
108#ifdef GSSAPI
109static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
110#endif
111
112/* Imports */
113extern ServerOptions options;
114extern u_int utmp_len;
115extern u_char session_id[];
116extern Buffer auth_debug;
117extern int auth_debug_init;
118extern Buffer loginmsg;
119
120/* State exported from the child */
121static struct sshbuf *child_state;
122
123/* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
124
125int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
126int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
127int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
128int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
129int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
130int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
131int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
132int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
133int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
134int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
135int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
136int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
137int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
138int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
139int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
140int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
141int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
142int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
143int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
144int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
145
146#ifdef USE_PAM
147int mm_answer_pam_start(int, Buffer *);
148int mm_answer_pam_account(int, Buffer *);
149int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int, Buffer *);
150int mm_answer_pam_query(int, Buffer *);
151int mm_answer_pam_respond(int, Buffer *);
152int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int, Buffer *);
153#endif
154
155#ifdef GSSAPI
156int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
157int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
158int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
159int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
160#endif
161
162#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
163int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
164int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
165#endif
166
167static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
168
169static Authctxt *authctxt;
170
171#ifdef WITH_SSH1
172static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL;	/* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
173#endif
174
175/* local state for key verify */
176static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
177static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
178static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
179static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
180static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
181static char *auth_method = "unknown";
182static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
183static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
184static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
185static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
186
187struct mon_table {
188	enum monitor_reqtype type;
189	int flags;
190	int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
191};
192
193#define MON_ISAUTH	0x0004	/* Required for Authentication */
194#define MON_AUTHDECIDE	0x0008	/* Decides Authentication */
195#define MON_ONCE	0x0010	/* Disable after calling */
196#define MON_ALOG	0x0020	/* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
197
198#define MON_AUTH	(MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
199
200#define MON_PERMIT	0x1000	/* Request is permitted */
201
202struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
203#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
204    {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
205#endif
206    {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
207    {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
208    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
209    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
210    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
211#ifdef USE_PAM
212    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
213    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
214    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
215    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
216    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
217    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
218#endif
219#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
220    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
221#endif
222#ifdef BSD_AUTH
223    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
224    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
225#endif
226#ifdef SKEY
227    {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
228    {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
229#endif
230    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
231    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
232#ifdef GSSAPI
233    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
234    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
235    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
236    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
237#endif
238    {0, 0, NULL}
239};
240
241struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
242#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
243    {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
244#endif
245    {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
246    {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
247    {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
248    {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
249#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
250    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
251    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
252#endif
253    {0, 0, NULL}
254};
255
256struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
257#ifdef WITH_SSH1
258    {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
259    {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
260    {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
261    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
262    {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
263    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
264    {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
265    {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
266#ifdef BSD_AUTH
267    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
268    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
269#endif
270#ifdef SKEY
271    {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
272    {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
273#endif
274#ifdef USE_PAM
275    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
276    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
277    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
278    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
279    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
280    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
281#endif
282#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
283    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
284#endif
285#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
286    {0, 0, NULL}
287};
288
289struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
290#ifdef WITH_SSH1
291    {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
292    {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
293    {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
294#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
295    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
296    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
297#endif
298#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
299    {0, 0, NULL}
300};
301
302struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
303
304/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
305
306static void
307monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
308{
309	while (ent->f != NULL) {
310		if (ent->type == type) {
311			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
312			ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
313			return;
314		}
315		ent++;
316	}
317}
318
319static void
320monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
321{
322	struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
323
324	while (ent->f != NULL) {
325		if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
326			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
327			ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
328		}
329		ent++;
330	}
331}
332
333void
334monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
335{
336	struct mon_table *ent;
337	int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
338
339	debug3("preauth child monitor started");
340
341	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
342	close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
343	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
344
345	authctxt = _authctxt;
346	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
347
348	authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
349
350	if (compat20) {
351		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
352
353		/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
354		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
355		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
356	} else {
357		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
358
359		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
360	}
361
362	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
363	while (!authenticated) {
364		partial = 0;
365		auth_method = "unknown";
366		auth_submethod = NULL;
367		authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
368
369		/* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
370		if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
371			if (!compat20)
372				fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
373				    "with SSH protocol 1");
374			if (authenticated &&
375			    !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
376			    auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
377				debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
378				    auth_method);
379				authenticated = 0;
380				partial = 1;
381			}
382		}
383
384		if (authenticated) {
385			if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
386				fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
387				    __func__, ent->type);
388			if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
389			    !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
390				authenticated = 0;
391#ifdef USE_PAM
392			/* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */
393			if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
394				Buffer m;
395
396				buffer_init(&m);
397				mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
398				    MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
399				authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
400				buffer_free(&m);
401			}
402#endif
403		}
404		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
405			auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
406			    auth_method, auth_submethod);
407			if (!partial && !authenticated)
408				authctxt->failures++;
409		}
410	}
411
412	if (!authctxt->valid)
413		fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
414	if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
415		fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
416
417	debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
418	    __func__, authctxt->user);
419
420	mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
421
422	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
423	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
424		;
425
426	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
427	close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
428	pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
429}
430
431static void
432monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
433{
434	monitor_child_pid = pid;
435}
436
437static void
438monitor_child_handler(int sig)
439{
440	kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
441}
442
443void
444monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
445{
446	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
447	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
448
449	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
450	signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
451	signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
452	signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
453#ifdef SIGXFSZ
454	signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN);
455#endif
456
457	if (compat20) {
458		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
459
460		/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
461		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
462		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
463		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
464	} else {
465		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
466		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
467	}
468	if (!no_pty_flag) {
469		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
470		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
471	}
472
473	for (;;)
474		monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
475}
476
477void
478monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
479{
480	if (options.compression) {
481		/* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
482		mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
483	}
484}
485
486/* Allocation functions for zlib */
487static void *
488mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
489{
490	size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
491	void *address;
492
493	if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_MAX / size)
494		fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
495
496	address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
497
498	return (address);
499}
500
501static void
502mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
503{
504	mm_free(mm, address);
505}
506
507static int
508monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
509{
510	Buffer logmsg;
511	u_int len, level;
512	char *msg;
513
514	buffer_init(&logmsg);
515
516	/* Read length */
517	buffer_append_space(&logmsg, 4);
518	if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
519	    buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) {
520		if (errno == EPIPE) {
521			buffer_free(&logmsg);
522			debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
523			close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
524			pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
525			return -1;
526		}
527		fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
528	}
529	len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
530	if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
531		fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
532
533	/* Read severity, message */
534	buffer_clear(&logmsg);
535	buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len);
536	if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
537	    buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg))
538		fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
539
540	/* Log it */
541	level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
542	msg = buffer_get_string(&logmsg, NULL);
543	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
544		fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
545		    __func__, level);
546	do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
547
548	buffer_free(&logmsg);
549	free(msg);
550
551	return 0;
552}
553
554int
555monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
556    struct mon_table **pent)
557{
558	Buffer m;
559	int ret;
560	u_char type;
561	struct pollfd pfd[2];
562
563	for (;;) {
564		memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
565		pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
566		pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
567		pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
568		pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
569		if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
570			if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
571				continue;
572			fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
573		}
574		if (pfd[1].revents) {
575			/*
576			 * Drain all log messages before processing next
577			 * monitor request.
578			 */
579			monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
580			continue;
581		}
582		if (pfd[0].revents)
583			break;  /* Continues below */
584	}
585
586	buffer_init(&m);
587
588	mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
589	type = buffer_get_char(&m);
590
591	debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
592
593	while (ent->f != NULL) {
594		if (ent->type == type)
595			break;
596		ent++;
597	}
598
599	if (ent->f != NULL) {
600		if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
601			fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
602			    type);
603		ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
604		buffer_free(&m);
605
606		/* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
607		if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
608			debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
609			    type);
610			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
611		}
612
613		if (pent != NULL)
614			*pent = ent;
615
616		return ret;
617	}
618
619	fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
620
621	/* NOTREACHED */
622	return (-1);
623}
624
625/* allowed key state */
626static int
627monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
628{
629	/* make sure key is allowed */
630	if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
631	    timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
632		return (0);
633	return (1);
634}
635
636static void
637monitor_reset_key_state(void)
638{
639	/* reset state */
640	free(key_blob);
641	free(hostbased_cuser);
642	free(hostbased_chost);
643	key_blob = NULL;
644	key_bloblen = 0;
645	key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
646	hostbased_cuser = NULL;
647	hostbased_chost = NULL;
648}
649
650#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
651int
652mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
653{
654	DH *dh;
655	int min, want, max;
656
657	min = buffer_get_int(m);
658	want = buffer_get_int(m);
659	max = buffer_get_int(m);
660
661	debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
662	    __func__, min, want, max);
663	/* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
664	if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
665		fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
666		    __func__, min, want, max);
667
668	buffer_clear(m);
669
670	dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
671	if (dh == NULL) {
672		buffer_put_char(m, 0);
673		return (0);
674	} else {
675		/* Send first bignum */
676		buffer_put_char(m, 1);
677		buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
678		buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
679
680		DH_free(dh);
681	}
682	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
683	return (0);
684}
685#endif
686
687int
688mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
689{
690	struct ssh *ssh = active_state; 	/* XXX */
691	extern int auth_sock;			/* XXX move to state struct? */
692	struct sshkey *key;
693	struct sshbuf *sigbuf;
694	u_char *p;
695	u_char *signature;
696	size_t datlen, siglen;
697	int r, keyid, is_proof = 0;
698	const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
699
700	debug3("%s", __func__);
701
702	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
703	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0)
704		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
705
706	/*
707	 * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
708	 * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
709	 *
710	 * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey
711	 * proof.
712	 *
713	 * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too?
714	 * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather
715	 * than the full kex structure...
716	 */
717	if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) {
718		/*
719		 * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what
720		 * the client sent us.
721		 */
722		if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
723			fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen);
724		if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
725			fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid);
726		if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
727			fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
728		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
729		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
730		    session_id2_len) != 0) ||
731		    (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
732			fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key "
733			    "proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
734		if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
735		    memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
736			fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
737			    __func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
738		sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
739		is_proof = 1;
740	}
741
742	/* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
743	if (session_id2_len == 0) {
744		session_id2_len = datlen;
745		session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
746		memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
747	}
748
749	if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
750		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen,
751		    datafellows)) != 0)
752			fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s",
753			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
754	} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
755	    auth_sock > 0) {
756		if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
757		    p, datlen, datafellows)) != 0) {
758			fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
759			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
760		}
761	} else
762		fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
763
764	debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__,
765	    is_proof ? "KEX" : "hostkey proof", signature, siglen);
766
767	sshbuf_reset(m);
768	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
769		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
770
771	free(p);
772	free(signature);
773
774	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
775
776	/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
777	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
778
779	return (0);
780}
781
782/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
783
784int
785mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
786{
787	char *username;
788	struct passwd *pwent;
789	int allowed = 0;
790	u_int i;
791
792	debug3("%s", __func__);
793
794	if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
795		fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
796
797	username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
798
799	pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
800
801	authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
802	setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
803	free(username);
804
805	buffer_clear(m);
806
807	if (pwent == NULL) {
808		buffer_put_char(m, 0);
809		authctxt->pw = fakepw();
810		goto out;
811	}
812
813	allowed = 1;
814	authctxt->pw = pwent;
815	authctxt->valid = 1;
816
817	buffer_put_char(m, 1);
818	buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
819	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
820	buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
821#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
822	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
823#endif
824#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
825	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
826#endif
827	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
828	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
829
830 out:
831	buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
832
833#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
834		if (options.x != NULL) \
835			buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x); \
836	} while (0)
837#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
838		for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \
839			buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \
840	} while (0)
841	/* See comment in servconf.h */
842	COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
843#undef M_CP_STROPT
844#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
845
846	/* Create valid auth method lists */
847	if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
848		/*
849		 * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
850		 * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
851		 * authentication to succeed.
852		 */
853		debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
854	}
855
856	debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
857	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
858
859	/* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
860	if (!compat20)
861		monitor_permit_authentications(1);
862	else {
863		/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
864		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
865		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
866	}
867#ifdef USE_PAM
868	if (options.use_pam)
869		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
870#endif
871
872	return (0);
873}
874
875int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
876{
877	char *banner;
878
879	buffer_clear(m);
880	banner = auth2_read_banner();
881	buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
882	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
883	free(banner);
884
885	return (0);
886}
887
888int
889mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
890{
891	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
892
893	authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
894	authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
895	debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
896	    __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
897
898	if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
899		free(authctxt->style);
900		authctxt->style = NULL;
901	}
902
903	return (0);
904}
905
906int
907mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
908{
909	static int call_count;
910	char *passwd;
911	int authenticated;
912	u_int plen;
913
914	passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
915#if !defined(ANDROID)
916	/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
917	authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
918	    auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
919#else
920	/* no password authentication in Android. */
921	authenticated = 0;
922#endif
923	explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
924	free(passwd);
925
926	buffer_clear(m);
927	buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
928
929	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
930	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
931
932	call_count++;
933	if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
934		auth_method = "none";
935	else
936		auth_method = "password";
937
938	/* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
939	return (authenticated);
940}
941
942#ifdef BSD_AUTH
943int
944mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
945{
946	char *name, *infotxt;
947	u_int numprompts;
948	u_int *echo_on;
949	char **prompts;
950	u_int success;
951
952	success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
953	    &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
954
955	buffer_clear(m);
956	buffer_put_int(m, success);
957	if (success)
958		buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
959
960	debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
961	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
962
963	if (success) {
964		free(name);
965		free(infotxt);
966		free(prompts);
967		free(echo_on);
968	}
969
970	return (0);
971}
972
973int
974mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
975{
976	char *response;
977	int authok;
978
979	if (authctxt->as == 0)
980		fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
981
982	response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
983	authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
984	    auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
985	authctxt->as = NULL;
986	debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
987	free(response);
988
989	buffer_clear(m);
990	buffer_put_int(m, authok);
991
992	debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
993	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
994
995	if (compat20) {
996		auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
997		auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
998	} else
999		auth_method = "bsdauth";
1000
1001	return (authok != 0);
1002}
1003#endif
1004
1005#ifdef SKEY
1006int
1007mm_answer_skeyquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
1008{
1009	struct skey skey;
1010	char challenge[1024];
1011	u_int success;
1012
1013	success = _compat_skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge,
1014	    sizeof(challenge)) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
1015
1016	buffer_clear(m);
1017	buffer_put_int(m, success);
1018	if (success)
1019		buffer_put_cstring(m, challenge);
1020
1021	debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
1022	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, m);
1023
1024	return (0);
1025}
1026
1027int
1028mm_answer_skeyrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
1029{
1030	char *response;
1031	int authok;
1032
1033	response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1034
1035	authok = (options.challenge_response_authentication &&
1036	    authctxt->valid &&
1037	    skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
1038	    skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, response) != -1);
1039
1040	free(response);
1041
1042	buffer_clear(m);
1043	buffer_put_int(m, authok);
1044
1045	debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
1046	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, m);
1047
1048	auth_method = "skey";
1049
1050	return (authok != 0);
1051}
1052#endif
1053
1054#ifdef USE_PAM
1055int
1056mm_answer_pam_start(int sock, Buffer *m)
1057{
1058	if (!options.use_pam)
1059		fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
1060
1061	start_pam(authctxt);
1062
1063	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1);
1064
1065	return (0);
1066}
1067
1068int
1069mm_answer_pam_account(int sock, Buffer *m)
1070{
1071	u_int ret;
1072
1073	if (!options.use_pam)
1074		fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
1075
1076	ret = do_pam_account();
1077
1078	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1079	buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
1080
1081	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
1082
1083	return (ret);
1084}
1085
1086static void *sshpam_ctxt, *sshpam_authok;
1087extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
1088
1089int
1090mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1091{
1092	debug3("%s", __func__);
1093	sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
1094	sshpam_authok = NULL;
1095	buffer_clear(m);
1096	if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) {
1097		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1);
1098		buffer_put_int(m, 1);
1099	} else {
1100		buffer_put_int(m, 0);
1101	}
1102	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
1103	return (0);
1104}
1105
1106int
1107mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m)
1108{
1109	char *name = NULL, *info = NULL, **prompts = NULL;
1110	u_int i, num = 0, *echo_on = 0;
1111	int ret;
1112
1113	debug3("%s", __func__);
1114	sshpam_authok = NULL;
1115	ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info, &num, &prompts, &echo_on);
1116	if (ret == 0 && num == 0)
1117		sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
1118	if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL)
1119		ret = -1;
1120	buffer_clear(m);
1121	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1122	buffer_put_cstring(m, name);
1123	free(name);
1124	buffer_put_cstring(m, info);
1125	free(info);
1126	buffer_put_int(m, num);
1127	for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
1128		buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[i]);
1129		free(prompts[i]);
1130		buffer_put_int(m, echo_on[i]);
1131	}
1132	free(prompts);
1133	free(echo_on);
1134	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
1135	auth_submethod = "pam";
1136	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
1137	return (0);
1138}
1139
1140int
1141mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
1142{
1143	char **resp;
1144	u_int i, num;
1145	int ret;
1146
1147	debug3("%s", __func__);
1148	sshpam_authok = NULL;
1149	num = buffer_get_int(m);
1150	if (num > 0) {
1151		resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *));
1152		for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
1153			resp[i] = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1154		ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp);
1155		for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
1156			free(resp[i]);
1157		free(resp);
1158	} else {
1159		ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL);
1160	}
1161	buffer_clear(m);
1162	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1163	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
1164	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
1165	auth_submethod = "pam";
1166	if (ret == 0)
1167		sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
1168	return (0);
1169}
1170
1171int
1172mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1173{
1174	int r = sshpam_authok != NULL && sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt;
1175
1176	debug3("%s", __func__);
1177	(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
1178	sshpam_ctxt = sshpam_authok = NULL;
1179	buffer_clear(m);
1180	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
1181	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
1182	auth_submethod = "pam";
1183	return r;
1184}
1185#endif
1186
1187int
1188mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1189{
1190	Key *key;
1191	char *cuser, *chost;
1192	u_char *blob;
1193	u_int bloblen, pubkey_auth_attempt;
1194	enum mm_keytype type = 0;
1195	int allowed = 0;
1196
1197	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1198
1199	type = buffer_get_int(m);
1200	cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1201	chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1202	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1203	pubkey_auth_attempt = buffer_get_int(m);
1204
1205	key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1206
1207	if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
1208	    (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
1209		fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
1210
1211	debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
1212
1213	if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
1214		/* These should not make it past the privsep child */
1215		if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
1216		    (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
1217			fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__);
1218
1219		switch (type) {
1220		case MM_USERKEY:
1221			allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
1222			    !auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key) &&
1223			    match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
1224			    options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
1225			    user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key,
1226			    pubkey_auth_attempt);
1227			pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
1228			auth_method = "publickey";
1229			if (options.pubkey_authentication &&
1230			    (!pubkey_auth_attempt || allowed != 1))
1231				auth_clear_options();
1232			break;
1233		case MM_HOSTKEY:
1234			allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
1235			    match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
1236			    options.hostbased_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
1237			    hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1238			    cuser, chost, key);
1239			pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
1240			    "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
1241			    cuser, chost);
1242			auth_method = "hostbased";
1243			break;
1244#ifdef WITH_SSH1
1245		case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
1246			key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
1247			allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
1248			    auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1249			    cuser, chost, key);
1250			if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
1251				auth_clear_options();
1252			auth_method = "rsa";
1253			break;
1254#endif
1255		default:
1256			fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
1257			break;
1258		}
1259	}
1260	if (key != NULL)
1261		key_free(key);
1262
1263	/* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
1264	monitor_reset_key_state();
1265
1266	if (allowed) {
1267		/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1268		key_blob = blob;
1269		key_bloblen = bloblen;
1270		key_blobtype = type;
1271		hostbased_cuser = cuser;
1272		hostbased_chost = chost;
1273	} else {
1274		/* Log failed attempt */
1275		auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
1276		free(blob);
1277		free(cuser);
1278		free(chost);
1279	}
1280
1281	debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
1282	    __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
1283
1284	buffer_clear(m);
1285	buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1286	buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1287
1288	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
1289
1290	if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1291		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1292
1293	return (0);
1294}
1295
1296static int
1297monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
1298{
1299	Buffer b;
1300	char *p, *userstyle;
1301	u_int len;
1302	int fail = 0;
1303
1304	buffer_init(&b);
1305	buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1306
1307	if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
1308		p = buffer_ptr(&b);
1309		len = buffer_len(&b);
1310		if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1311		    (len < session_id2_len) ||
1312		    (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1313			fail++;
1314		buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
1315	} else {
1316		p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1317		if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1318		    (len != session_id2_len) ||
1319		    (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1320			fail++;
1321		free(p);
1322	}
1323	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1324		fail++;
1325	p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1326	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1327	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1328	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1329	if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1330		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1331		    userstyle, p);
1332		fail++;
1333	}
1334	free(userstyle);
1335	free(p);
1336	buffer_skip_string(&b);
1337	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
1338		if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1339			fail++;
1340	} else {
1341		p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1342		if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
1343			fail++;
1344		free(p);
1345		if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1346			fail++;
1347		buffer_skip_string(&b);
1348	}
1349	buffer_skip_string(&b);
1350	if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1351		fail++;
1352	buffer_free(&b);
1353	return (fail == 0);
1354}
1355
1356static int
1357monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
1358    char *chost)
1359{
1360	Buffer b;
1361	char *p, *userstyle;
1362	u_int len;
1363	int fail = 0;
1364
1365	buffer_init(&b);
1366	buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1367
1368	p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1369	if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1370	    (len != session_id2_len) ||
1371	    (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1372		fail++;
1373	free(p);
1374
1375	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1376		fail++;
1377	p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1378	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1379	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1380	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1381	if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1382		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1383		    userstyle, p);
1384		fail++;
1385	}
1386	free(userstyle);
1387	free(p);
1388	buffer_skip_string(&b);	/* service */
1389	p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1390	if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
1391		fail++;
1392	free(p);
1393	buffer_skip_string(&b);	/* pkalg */
1394	buffer_skip_string(&b);	/* pkblob */
1395
1396	/* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
1397	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1398	if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
1399		p[len - 1] = '\0';
1400	if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
1401		fail++;
1402	free(p);
1403
1404	/* verify client user */
1405	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1406	if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
1407		fail++;
1408	free(p);
1409
1410	if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1411		fail++;
1412	buffer_free(&b);
1413	return (fail == 0);
1414}
1415
1416int
1417mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
1418{
1419	Key *key;
1420	u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
1421	u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
1422	int verified = 0;
1423	int valid_data = 0;
1424
1425	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1426	signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
1427	data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
1428
1429	if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1430	  !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1431		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1432
1433	key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1434	if (key == NULL)
1435		fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
1436
1437	switch (key_blobtype) {
1438	case MM_USERKEY:
1439		valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
1440		break;
1441	case MM_HOSTKEY:
1442		valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
1443		    hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
1444		break;
1445	default:
1446		valid_data = 0;
1447		break;
1448	}
1449	if (!valid_data)
1450		fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
1451
1452	verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
1453	debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
1454	    __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
1455
1456	/* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */
1457	if (verified == 1)
1458		auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
1459	else
1460		key_free(key);
1461
1462	free(blob);
1463	free(signature);
1464	free(data);
1465
1466	auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
1467
1468	monitor_reset_key_state();
1469
1470	buffer_clear(m);
1471	buffer_put_int(m, verified);
1472	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1473
1474	return (verified == 1);
1475}
1476
1477static void
1478mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
1479{
1480	socklen_t fromlen;
1481	struct sockaddr_storage from;
1482
1483	if (options.use_login)
1484		return;
1485
1486	/*
1487	 * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1488	 * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1489	 */
1490	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1491	fromlen = sizeof(from);
1492	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
1493		if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
1494		    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
1495			debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1496			cleanup_exit(255);
1497		}
1498	}
1499	/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1500	record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1501	    get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1502	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1503}
1504
1505static void
1506mm_session_close(Session *s)
1507{
1508	debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
1509	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1510		debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1511		session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1512	}
1513	session_unused(s->self);
1514}
1515
1516int
1517mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
1518{
1519	extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1520	Session *s;
1521	int res, fd0;
1522
1523	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1524
1525	buffer_clear(m);
1526	s = session_new();
1527	if (s == NULL)
1528		goto error;
1529	s->authctxt = authctxt;
1530	s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1531	s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1532	res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1533	if (res == 0)
1534		goto error;
1535	pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1536
1537	buffer_put_int(m, 1);
1538	buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
1539
1540	/* We need to trick ttyslot */
1541	if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1542		fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
1543
1544	mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
1545
1546	/* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1547	close(0);
1548
1549	/* send messages generated by record_login */
1550	buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
1551	buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
1552
1553	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1554
1555	if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1556	    mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1557		fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
1558
1559	/* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1560	if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
1561		fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1562	if (fd0 != 0)
1563		error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
1564
1565	/* slave is not needed */
1566	close(s->ttyfd);
1567	s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1568	/* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1569	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1570
1571	debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1572
1573	return (0);
1574
1575 error:
1576	if (s != NULL)
1577		mm_session_close(s);
1578	buffer_put_int(m, 0);
1579	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1580	return (0);
1581}
1582
1583int
1584mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
1585{
1586	Session *s;
1587	char *tty;
1588
1589	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1590
1591	tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1592	if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1593		mm_session_close(s);
1594	buffer_clear(m);
1595	free(tty);
1596	return (0);
1597}
1598
1599#ifdef WITH_SSH1
1600int
1601mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
1602{
1603	BIGNUM *p;
1604	int rsafail;
1605
1606	/* Turn off permissions */
1607	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
1608
1609	if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1610		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1611
1612	buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
1613
1614	rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
1615
1616	buffer_clear(m);
1617	buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
1618	buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
1619
1620	BN_clear_free(p);
1621
1622	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
1623
1624	/* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
1625	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
1626
1627	return (0);
1628}
1629
1630int
1631mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
1632{
1633	int i;
1634
1635	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1636
1637	if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
1638		fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
1639	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1640		session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
1641
1642	/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
1643	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
1644
1645	return (0);
1646}
1647
1648int
1649mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1650{
1651	BIGNUM *client_n;
1652	Key *key = NULL;
1653	u_char *blob = NULL;
1654	u_int blen = 0;
1655	int allowed = 0;
1656
1657	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1658
1659	auth_method = "rsa";
1660	if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
1661		if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
1662			fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1663		buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
1664		allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
1665		BN_clear_free(client_n);
1666	}
1667	buffer_clear(m);
1668	buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1669	buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1670
1671	/* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
1672	monitor_reset_key_state();
1673
1674	if (allowed && key != NULL) {
1675		key->type = KEY_RSA;	/* cheat for key_to_blob */
1676		if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
1677			fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
1678		buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
1679
1680		/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1681		key_blob = blob;
1682		key_bloblen = blen;
1683		key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
1684	}
1685	if (key != NULL)
1686		key_free(key);
1687
1688	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
1689
1690	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1691	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
1692	return (0);
1693}
1694
1695int
1696mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
1697{
1698	Key *key = NULL;
1699	u_char *blob;
1700	u_int blen;
1701
1702	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1703
1704	if (!authctxt->valid)
1705		fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1706	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1707	if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1708		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1709	if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1710		fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
1711	if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1712		fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1713	if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
1714		fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
1715	key->type = KEY_RSA1;
1716	if (ssh1_challenge)
1717		BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1718	ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
1719
1720	buffer_clear(m);
1721	buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
1722
1723	debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
1724	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
1725
1726	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
1727
1728	free(blob);
1729	key_free(key);
1730	return (0);
1731}
1732
1733int
1734mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
1735{
1736	Key *key = NULL;
1737	u_char *blob, *response;
1738	u_int blen, len;
1739	int success;
1740
1741	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1742
1743	if (!authctxt->valid)
1744		fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1745	if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
1746		fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
1747
1748	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1749	if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1750		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1751	if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1752		fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
1753	if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1754		fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1755	response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1756	if (len != 16)
1757		fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
1758	success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
1759
1760	free(blob);
1761	key_free(key);
1762	free(response);
1763
1764	auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
1765
1766	/* reset state */
1767	BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1768	ssh1_challenge = NULL;
1769	monitor_reset_key_state();
1770
1771	buffer_clear(m);
1772	buffer_put_int(m, success);
1773	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
1774
1775	return (success);
1776}
1777#endif
1778
1779int
1780mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
1781{
1782	extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1783	int res, status;
1784
1785	debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
1786
1787	/* The child is terminating */
1788	session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
1789
1790#ifdef USE_PAM
1791	if (options.use_pam)
1792		sshpam_cleanup();
1793#endif
1794
1795	while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1796		if (errno != EINTR)
1797			exit(1);
1798
1799	res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1800
1801	/* Terminate process */
1802	exit(res);
1803}
1804
1805#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
1806/* Report that an audit event occurred */
1807int
1808mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m)
1809{
1810	ssh_audit_event_t event;
1811
1812	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1813
1814	event = buffer_get_int(m);
1815	switch(event) {
1816	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
1817	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
1818	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
1819	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
1820	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
1821	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
1822	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
1823		audit_event(event);
1824		break;
1825	default:
1826		fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event);
1827	}
1828
1829	return (0);
1830}
1831
1832int
1833mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
1834{
1835	u_int len;
1836	char *cmd;
1837
1838	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1839	cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1840	/* sanity check command, if so how? */
1841	audit_run_command(cmd);
1842	free(cmd);
1843	return (0);
1844}
1845#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
1846
1847void
1848monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1849{
1850	struct ssh *ssh = active_state;	/* XXX */
1851	struct kex *kex;
1852	int r;
1853
1854	debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__);
1855	if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
1856                fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1857	sshbuf_free(child_state);
1858	child_state = NULL;
1859
1860	if ((kex = ssh->kex) != 0) {
1861		/* XXX set callbacks */
1862#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1863		kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1864		kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1865		kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1866		kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1867# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
1868		kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
1869# endif
1870#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
1871		kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
1872		kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
1873		kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
1874		kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1875		kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
1876	}
1877
1878	/* Update with new address */
1879	if (options.compression) {
1880		ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, pmonitor->m_zlib,
1881		    (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
1882		    (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
1883	}
1884}
1885
1886/* This function requries careful sanity checking */
1887
1888void
1889mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1890{
1891	debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
1892
1893	if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1894		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
1895	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
1896	    child_state);
1897	debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__);
1898}
1899
1900
1901/* XXX */
1902
1903#define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1904	if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
1905		fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1906} while (0)
1907
1908static void
1909monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
1910{
1911	int pair[2];
1912
1913	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1914		fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1915	FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1916	FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1917	mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1918	mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1919
1920	if (do_logfds) {
1921		if (pipe(pair) == -1)
1922			fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1923		FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1924		FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1925		mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
1926		mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
1927	} else
1928		mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
1929}
1930
1931#define MM_MEMSIZE	65536
1932
1933struct monitor *
1934monitor_init(void)
1935{
1936	struct ssh *ssh = active_state;			/* XXX */
1937	struct monitor *mon;
1938
1939	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1940
1941	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
1942
1943	/* Used to share zlib space across processes */
1944	if (options.compression) {
1945		mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
1946		mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
1947
1948		/* Compression needs to share state across borders */
1949		ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, mon->m_zlib,
1950		    (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
1951		    (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
1952	}
1953
1954	return mon;
1955}
1956
1957void
1958monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1959{
1960	monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
1961}
1962
1963#ifdef GSSAPI
1964int
1965mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1966{
1967	gss_OID_desc goid;
1968	OM_uint32 major;
1969	u_int len;
1970
1971	goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1972	goid.length = len;
1973
1974	major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1975
1976	free(goid.elements);
1977
1978	buffer_clear(m);
1979	buffer_put_int(m, major);
1980
1981	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1982
1983	/* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1984	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1985
1986	return (0);
1987}
1988
1989int
1990mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1991{
1992	gss_buffer_desc in;
1993	gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1994	OM_uint32 major, minor;
1995	OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1996	u_int len;
1997
1998	in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1999	in.length = len;
2000	major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
2001	free(in.value);
2002
2003	buffer_clear(m);
2004	buffer_put_int(m, major);
2005	buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
2006	buffer_put_int(m, flags);
2007	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
2008
2009	gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
2010
2011	if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
2012		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
2013		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
2014		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
2015	}
2016	return (0);
2017}
2018
2019int
2020mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
2021{
2022	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
2023	OM_uint32 ret;
2024	u_int len;
2025
2026	gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2027	gssbuf.length = len;
2028	mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2029	mic.length = len;
2030
2031	ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
2032
2033	free(gssbuf.value);
2034	free(mic.value);
2035
2036	buffer_clear(m);
2037	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
2038
2039	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
2040
2041	if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
2042		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
2043
2044	return (0);
2045}
2046
2047int
2048mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
2049{
2050	int authenticated;
2051
2052	authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
2053
2054	buffer_clear(m);
2055	buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
2056
2057	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
2058	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
2059
2060	auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
2061
2062	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
2063	return (authenticated);
2064}
2065#endif /* GSSAPI */
2066
2067