priv_app.te revision 7aed1b253f53705c7e9d16657199cdfac9463a17 
1###
2### A domain for further sandboxing privileged apps.
3###
4type priv_app, domain, domain_deprecated;
5app_domain(priv_app)
6# Access the network.
7net_domain(priv_app)
8# Access bluetooth.
9bluetooth_domain(priv_app)
10
11# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out
12# to their sandbox directory and then execute.
13allow priv_app app_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
14
15# android.process.media uses /dev/mtp_usb
16allow priv_app mtp_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
17
18# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
19# Used by: https://play.privileged.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
20create_pty(priv_app)
21
22allow priv_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
23allow priv_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
24allow priv_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
25allow priv_app mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
26allow priv_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
27allow priv_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
28allow priv_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
29allow priv_app nfc_service:service_manager find;
30allow priv_app radio_service:service_manager find;
31allow priv_app surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
32allow priv_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
33allow priv_app system_api_service:service_manager find;
34allow priv_app persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find;
35allow priv_app recovery_service:service_manager find;
36
37# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon
38# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider
39allow priv_app mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
40
41# Write to /cache.
42allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
43allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file create_file_perms;
44
45# Access to /data/media.
46allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
47allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
48
49# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
50# running "adb install foo.apk".
51allow priv_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
52allow priv_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
53
54# Allow verifier to access staged apks.
55allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
56allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file r_file_perms;
57
58# b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt
59allow priv_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
60
61# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored
62# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all
63# data stored in that directory to process them one by one.
64userdebug_or_eng(`
65  allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms;
66  allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
67')
68
69# Allow GMS core to stat files and executables on
70# the system partition
71allow priv_app exec_type:file getattr;
72
73# For AppFuse.
74allow priv_app vold:fd use;
75allow priv_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write };
76allow priv_app app_fuse_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
77allow priv_app app_fuse_file:file rw_file_perms;
78
79# /sys access
80allow priv_app sysfs_zram:dir search;
81allow priv_app sysfs_zram:file r_file_perms;
82
83# access the mac address
84allowxperm priv_app self:udp_socket ioctl SIOCGIFHWADDR;
85
86# Allow GMS core to communicate with update_engine for A/B update.
87binder_call(priv_app, update_engine)
88allow priv_app update_engine_service:service_manager find;
89
90# Allow Phone to read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
91allow priv_app ringtone_file:file { getattr read write };
92
93###
94### neverallow rules
95###
96
97# Receive or send uevent messages.
98neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
99
100# Receive or send generic netlink messages
101neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_socket *;
102
103# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
104# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
105neverallow priv_app debugfs:file read;
106
107# Do not allow privileged apps to register services.
108# Only trusted components of Android should be registering
109# services.
110neverallow priv_app service_manager_type:service_manager add;
111
112# Do not allow privileged apps to connect to the property service
113# or set properties. b/10243159
114neverallow priv_app property_socket:sock_file write;
115neverallow priv_app init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
116neverallow priv_app property_type:property_service set;
117
118# Do not allow priv_app to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
119# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
120# enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls
121# constraints.  As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow
122# on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork
123# permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
124# never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
125# and priv_app is allowed fork permission to itself.
126neverallow priv_app mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
127
128# Do not allow priv_app to hard link to any files.
129# In particular, if priv_app links to other app data
130# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
131# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
132# bugs, so we want to ensure priv_app never has this
133# capability.
134neverallow priv_app file_type:file link;
135