99fc177b5af4e1e8855d42d2d01cb93ac7f9d14b |
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18-Sep-2015 |
Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> |
Add neverallow support for ioctl extended permissions Neverallow rules for ioctl extended permissions will pass in two cases: 1. If extended permissions exist for the source-target-class set the test will pass if the neverallow values are excluded. 2. If extended permissions do not exist for the source-target-class set the test will pass if the ioctl permission is not granted. Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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915fa8f08f4f9a4c437ee8280a4e641872ea59dd |
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12-Jun-2015 |
Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> |
checkpolicy: switch operations to extended perms The ioctl operations code is being renamed to the more generic "extended permissions." This commit brings the policy compiler up to date with the kernel patch. Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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80bc7ee8faaddfa7a650994fa82a57f41a9e7475 |
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22-Apr-2015 |
Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> |
Add support for ioctl command whitelisting Adds support for new policy statements whitelisting individual ioctl commands. Ioctls provide many of the operations necessary for driver control. The typical driver supports a device specific set of operations accessible by the ioctl system call and specified by the command argument. SELinux provides per operation access control to many system operations e.g. chown, kill, setuid, ipc_lock, etc. Ioclts on the other hand are granted on a per file descriptor basis using the ioctl permission, meaning that the set of operations provided by the driver are granted on an all-or-nothing basis. In some cases this may be acceptable, but often the same driver provides a large and diverse set of operations such as benign and necessary functionality as well as dangerous capabilities or access to system information that should be restricted. Example policy: allow <source> <target>:<class> { 0x8900-0x8905 0x8910 } auditallow <source> <target>:<class> 0x8901 The ioctl permission is still required in order to make an ioctl call. If no individual ioctl commands are specified, only the ioctl permission is checked by the kernel - i.e. status quo. This allows ioctl whitelisting to done in a targeted manner, protecting desired drivers without requiring every ioctl command to be known and specified before use and otherwise allowing existing policy to be used as-is. This only implements ioctl whitelisting support for monolithic kernel policies built via checkpolicy. Support for modules and CIL remains to be done. Bug: 19419509 Change-Id: I198e8c9279b94d8ce4ae5625018daa99577ee970 Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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f0290677091e7eee4a3724a2a86ede9e11f93802 |
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17-Mar-2015 |
Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> |
libsepol, checkpolicy: add device tree ocontext nodes to Xen policy In Xen on ARM, device tree nodes identified by a path (string) need to be labeled by the security policy. Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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82030de5dc8d08a9417842156293c65fef9dc70c |
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17-Mar-2015 |
Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> |
libsepol, checkpolicy: widen Xen IOMEM ocontext entries This expands IOMEMCON device context entries to 64 bits. This change is required to support static I/O memory range labeling for systems with over 16TB of physical address space. The policy version number change is shared with the next patch. While this makes no changes to SELinux policy, a new SELinux policy compatibility entry was added in order to avoid breaking compilation of an SELinux policy without explicitly specifying the policy version. Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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aab2d9f904bf34fdeb6037a76083ce79392c9a82 |
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17-Mar-2015 |
Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> |
checkpolicy: Expand allowed character set in paths In order to support paths containing spaces or other characters, allow a quoted string with these characters to be parsed as a path in addition to the existing unquoted string. Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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387dc6342e72c63817695bfc3324173b28f9ca78 |
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18-Sep-2014 |
Scapelli <steven.capelli@hotmail.it> |
Add missing semicolon to parser rule "cond_else" Acked-by: Steve Lawrence <slawrence@tresys.com>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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c4a4a1a7ed42c167a7d4bae06a1fffa8c6c9cb8d |
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14-Sep-2014 |
Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org> |
Fix gcc -Wstrict-prototypes warnings In C, defining a function with () means "any number of parameters", not "no parameter". Use (void) instead where applicable and add unused parameters when needed. Acked-by: Steve Lawrence <slawrence@tresys.com>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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832e7017f881f0a66e24170b7a2ff1cd9b113239 |
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14-Sep-2014 |
Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@m4x.org> |
checkpolicy: constify the message written by yyerror and yywarn Acked-by: Steve Lawrence <slawrence@tresys.com>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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693f5241fdd5ae7e89d4312b85443c0fc1b1a57d |
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18-Dec-2012 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
checkpolicy: libsepol: implement default type policy syntax We currently have a mechanism in which the default user, role, and range can be picked up from the source or the target object. This implements the same thing for types. The kernel will override this with type transition rules and similar. This is just the default if nothing specific is given. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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09c783c9a36cd47216df827c5d2c21ec8cd613e2 |
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05-Dec-2011 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
libsepol: checkpolicy: implement new default labeling behaviors We would like to be able to say that the user, role, or range of a newly created object should be based on the user, role, or range of either the source or the target of the creation operation. aka, for a new file this could be the user of the creating process or the user or the parent directory. This patch implements the new language and the policydb support to give this information to the kernel. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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fdeeccaa0ec11a5a549c60fc2da1f4dcd8eb5c65 |
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02-Nov-2011 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
Revert "checkpolicy: Redo filename/filesystem syntax to support filename trans rules" This reverts commit d72a9ec825ef2a8723510f62292cf2adfd4a2a6c. It should never have been added. It breaks the correct wrapping of filenames in "
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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80f26c5ee865993264ef638480c6a05ab574f7c0 |
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01-Sep-2011 |
Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> |
checkpolicy: Separate tunable from boolean during compile. Both boolean and tunable keywords are processed by define_bool_tunable(), argument 0 and 1 would be passed for boolean and tunable respectively. For tunable, a TUNABLE flag would be set in cond_bool_datum_t.flags. Note, when creating an if-else conditional we can not know if the tunable identifier is indeed a tunable(for example, a boolean may be misused in tunable_policy() or vice versa), thus the TUNABLE flag for cond_node_t would be calculated and used in expansion when all booleans/tunables copied during link. Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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5619635063741e1c8c9cf53a8746dd29be0cda79 |
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09-Aug-2011 |
Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> |
checkpolicy: add missing ; to attribute_role_def The commit to add role attributes forgot a ; in policy_parse.y for attribute_role_def. Add the missing ; Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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d72a9ec825ef2a8723510f62292cf2adfd4a2a6c |
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12-Apr-2011 |
Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> |
checkpolicy: Redo filename/filesystem syntax to support filename trans rules In order to support filenames, which might start with "." or filesystems that start with a number we need to rework the matching rules a little bit. Since the new filename rule is so permissive it must be moved to the bottom of the matching list to not cover other definitions. Signed-of-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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16675b7f96b7a61ac64180b1824ec04984b72b3b |
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25-Jul-2011 |
Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> |
Add role attribute support when compiling modules. 1. Add a uint32_t "flavor" field and an ebitmap "roles" to the role_datum_t structure; 2. Add a new "attribute_role" statement and its handler to declare a role attribute; 3. Modify declare_role() to setup role_datum_t.flavor according to the isattr argument; 4. Add a new "roleattribute" rule and its handler, which will record the regular role's (policy value - 1) into the role attribute's role_datum_t.roles ebitmap; 5. Modify the syntax for the role-types rule only to define the role-type associations; 6. Add a new role-attr rule to support the declaration of a single role, and optionally the role attribute that the role belongs to; 7. Check if the new_role used in role-transition rule is a regular role; 8. Support to require a role attribute; 9. Modify symtab_insert() to allow multiple declarations only for the regular role, while a role attribute can't be declared more than once and can't share a same name with another regular role. Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Lawrence <slawrence@tresys.com>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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17ac87ce8374ee635062ee0d9c4176231d3a87bc |
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12-Jan-2011 |
James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov> |
checkpolicy: Allow filesystem names to start with a digit The patch below allows filesystem names in fs_use_* and genfscon statements to start with a digit, but still requires at least one character to be a letter. A new token type for filesystem names is created since these names having nothing to do with SELinux. This patch is needed because some filesystem names (such as 9p) start with a digit. Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Steve Lawrence <slawrence@tresys.com>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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b42e15ffd5163effe3b2cb910685a5956a00defc |
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16-May-2011 |
Steve Lawrence <slawrence@tresys.com> |
checkpolicy: wrap file names in filename trans with quotes This wraps the filename token in quotes to make parsing easier and more clear. The quotes are stripped off before being passed to checkpolicy. The quote wrapping is only used by filename transitions. This changes the filename transition syntax to the following: type_transition source target : object default_type "filename"; Signed-off-by: Steve Lawrence <slawrence@tresys.com>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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cb271f7d4c1957950f4d1197b4973722705fb5b3 |
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16-May-2011 |
Steve Lawrence <slawrence@tresys.com> |
Revert "checkpolicy: use a better identifier for filenames" This reverts commit d4c230386653db49d8e8116b603efcce4423df70. Signed-off-by: Steve Lawrence <slawrence@tresys.com>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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c61b6934dd7b1c871001c049eddf4a4e57b604e8 |
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29-Apr-2011 |
Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> |
checkpolicy: allow version of single digit currently policy will not build if I define a module as 1 policy_module(dan,1) Fails policy_module(dan,1.0) works The attached patch makes the first one work. Signed-off-by: Steve Lawrence <slawrence@tresys.com>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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d4c230386653db49d8e8116b603efcce4423df70 |
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29-Apr-2011 |
Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> |
checkpolicy: use a better identifier for filenames Signed-off-by: Steve Lawrence <slawrence@tresys.com>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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516cb2a264448421bff692f47f61e8cf2a74237e |
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28-Mar-2011 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
checkpolicy: add support for using last path component in type transition rules This patch adds support for using the last path component as part of the information in making labeling decisions for new objects. A example rule looks like so: type_transition unconfined_t etc_t:file system_conf_t eric; This rule says if unconfined_t creates a file in a directory labeled etc_t and the last path component is "eric" (no globbing, no matching magic, just exact strcmp) it should be labeled system_conf_t. The kernel and policy representation does not have support for such rules in conditionals, and thus policy explicitly notes that fact if such a rule is added to a conditional. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Lawrence <slawrence@tresys.com>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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e95f358e3bbe850e5c99f56f8521abe1f5a6210b |
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25-Mar-2011 |
Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> |
Userspace: role_transition parser to handle class field Handle the class field in the role_transition rule. If no class is specified, then it would be set to the "process" class by default. Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Lawrence <slawrence@tresys.com>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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79d10a8f9889ce0458ff0592ccaf83b273608eb2 |
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29-Sep-2009 |
Paul Nuzzi <pjnuzzi@tycho.ncsc.mil> |
checkpolicy: Add support for multiple target OSes Updated patch of checkpolicy based on input. On Tue, 2009-09-15 at 12:37 -0400, pjnuzzi wrote: > Add support for multiple target OSes by adding the -t target option to > checkpolicy. Implemented the new Xen ocontext identifiers pirqcon, > pcidevicecon, iomemcon and ioportcon. > > Signed-off-by: Paul Nuzzi <pjnuzzi@tycho.ncsc.mil> > > --- checkpolicy/checkpolicy.c | 20 ++- checkpolicy/policy_define.c | 272 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ checkpolicy/policy_define.h | 4 checkpolicy/policy_parse.y | 29 ++++ checkpolicy/policy_scan.l | 10 + 5 files changed, 330 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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45728407d60a5297deac7aa65fd92adf2412d5f7 |
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08-Oct-2008 |
Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com> |
Author: KaiGai Kohei Email: kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com Subject: Thread/Child-Domain Assignment (rev.2) Date: Tue, 05 Aug 2008 14:55:52 +0900 [2/3] thread-context-checkpolicy.2.patch It enables to support TYPEBOUNDS statement and to expand existing hierarchies implicitly. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> -- module_compiler.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ policy_define.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- policy_define.h | 1 policy_parse.y | 5 ++ policy_scan.l | 2 + 5 files changed, 186 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) Signed-off-by: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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13cd4c8960688af11ad23b4c946149015c80d549 |
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19-Aug-2008 |
Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com> |
initial import from svn trunk revision 2950
/external/selinux/checkpolicy/policy_parse.y
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