1/* DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
2 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. */
3/* ====================================================================
4 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
8 * are met:
9 *
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12 *
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
15 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
16 *    distribution.
17 *
18 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
19 *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
20 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
21 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
22 *
23 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
24 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
25 *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
26 *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
27 *
28 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
29 *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
30 *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
31 *
32 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
33 *    acknowledgment:
34 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
35 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
36 *
37 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
38 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
39 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
40 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
41 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
42 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
43 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
44 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
45 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
46 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
47 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
48 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
49 * ====================================================================
50 *
51 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
52 * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
53 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
54 *
55 */
56/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
57 * All rights reserved.
58 *
59 * This package is an SSL implementation written
60 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
61 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
62 *
63 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
64 * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
65 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
66 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
67 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
68 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
69 *
70 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
71 * the code are not to be removed.
72 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
73 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
74 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
75 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
76 *
77 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
78 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
79 * are met:
80 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
81 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
82 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
83 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
84 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
85 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
86 *    must display the following acknowledgement:
87 *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
88 *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
89 *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
90 *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
91 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
92 *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
93 *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
94 *
95 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
96 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
97 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
98 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
99 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
100 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
101 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
102 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
103 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
104 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
105 * SUCH DAMAGE.
106 *
107 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
108 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
109 * copied and put under another distribution licence
110 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
111
112#include <openssl/ssl.h>
113
114#include <assert.h>
115#include <string.h>
116
117#include <openssl/bio.h>
118#include <openssl/buf.h>
119#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
120#include <openssl/mem.h>
121#include <openssl/evp.h>
122#include <openssl/err.h>
123#include <openssl/rand.h>
124
125#include "../crypto/internal.h"
126#include "internal.h"
127
128
129int dtls1_get_record(SSL *ssl) {
130again:
131  switch (ssl->s3->recv_shutdown) {
132    case ssl_shutdown_none:
133      break;
134    case ssl_shutdown_fatal_alert:
135      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
136      return -1;
137    case ssl_shutdown_close_notify:
138      return 0;
139  }
140
141  /* Read a new packet if there is no unconsumed one. */
142  if (ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) == 0) {
143    int read_ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, 0 /* unused */);
144    if (read_ret < 0 && dtls1_is_timer_expired(ssl)) {
145      /* Historically, timeouts were handled implicitly if the caller did not
146       * handle them.
147       *
148       * TODO(davidben): This was to support blocking sockets but affected
149       * non-blocking sockets. Can it be removed? */
150      int timeout_ret = DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl);
151      if (timeout_ret <= 0) {
152        return timeout_ret;
153      }
154      goto again;
155    }
156    if (read_ret <= 0) {
157      return read_ret;
158    }
159  }
160  assert(ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) > 0);
161
162  CBS body;
163  uint8_t type, alert;
164  size_t consumed;
165  enum ssl_open_record_t open_ret =
166      dtls_open_record(ssl, &type, &body, &consumed, &alert,
167                       ssl_read_buffer(ssl), ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl));
168  ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, consumed);
169  switch (open_ret) {
170    case ssl_open_record_partial:
171      /* Impossible in DTLS. */
172      break;
173
174    case ssl_open_record_success:
175      if (CBS_len(&body) > 0xffff) {
176        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
177        return -1;
178      }
179
180      SSL3_RECORD *rr = &ssl->s3->rrec;
181      rr->type = type;
182      rr->length = (uint16_t)CBS_len(&body);
183      rr->data = (uint8_t *)CBS_data(&body);
184      return 1;
185
186    case ssl_open_record_discard:
187      goto again;
188
189    case ssl_open_record_close_notify:
190      return 0;
191
192    case ssl_open_record_fatal_alert:
193      return -1;
194
195    case ssl_open_record_error:
196      ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
197      return -1;
198  }
199
200  assert(0);
201  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
202  return -1;
203}
204
205int dtls1_read_app_data(SSL *ssl, int *out_got_handshake, uint8_t *buf, int len,
206                        int peek) {
207  assert(!SSL_in_init(ssl));
208
209  *out_got_handshake = 0;
210  SSL3_RECORD *rr = &ssl->s3->rrec;
211
212again:
213  if (rr->length == 0) {
214    int ret = dtls1_get_record(ssl);
215    if (ret <= 0) {
216      return ret;
217    }
218  }
219
220  if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
221    /* Parse the first fragment header to determine if this is a pre-CCS or
222     * post-CCS handshake record. DTLS resets handshake message numbers on each
223     * handshake, so renegotiations and retransmissions are ambiguous. */
224    CBS cbs, body;
225    struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
226    CBS_init(&cbs, rr->data, rr->length);
227    if (!dtls1_parse_fragment(&cbs, &msg_hdr, &body)) {
228      ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
229      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_RECORD);
230      return -1;
231    }
232
233    if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED &&
234        msg_hdr.seq == ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq - 1) {
235      if (msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) {
236        /* Retransmit our last flight of messages. If the peer sends the second
237         * Finished, they may not have received ours. Only do this for the
238         * first fragment, in case the Finished was fragmented. */
239        if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(ssl) < 0) {
240          return -1;
241        }
242
243        dtls1_retransmit_outgoing_messages(ssl);
244      }
245
246      rr->length = 0;
247      goto again;
248    }
249
250    /* Otherwise, this is a pre-CCS handshake message from an unsupported
251     * renegotiation attempt. Fall through to the error path. */
252  }
253
254  if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
255    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
256    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
257    return -1;
258  }
259
260  /* Discard empty records. */
261  if (rr->length == 0) {
262    goto again;
263  }
264
265  if (len <= 0) {
266    return len;
267  }
268
269  if ((unsigned)len > rr->length) {
270    len = rr->length;
271  }
272
273  OPENSSL_memcpy(buf, rr->data, len);
274  if (!peek) {
275    /* TODO(davidben): Should the record be truncated instead? This is a
276     * datagram transport. See https://crbug.com/boringssl/65. */
277    rr->length -= len;
278    rr->data += len;
279    if (rr->length == 0) {
280      /* The record has been consumed, so we may now clear the buffer. */
281      ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
282    }
283  }
284
285  return len;
286}
287
288int dtls1_read_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
289  SSL3_RECORD *rr = &ssl->s3->rrec;
290
291again:
292  if (rr->length == 0) {
293    int ret = dtls1_get_record(ssl);
294    if (ret <= 0) {
295      return ret;
296    }
297  }
298
299  /* Drop handshake records silently. The epochs match, so this must be a
300   * retransmit of a message we already received. */
301  if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
302    rr->length = 0;
303    goto again;
304  }
305
306  /* Other record types are illegal in this epoch. Note all application data
307   * records come in the encrypted epoch. */
308  if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
309    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
310    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
311    return -1;
312  }
313
314  if (rr->length != 1 || rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
315    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
316    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
317    return -1;
318  }
319
320  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data,
321                      rr->length);
322
323  rr->length = 0;
324  ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
325  return 1;
326}
327
328void dtls1_read_close_notify(SSL *ssl) {
329  /* Bidirectional shutdown doesn't make sense for an unordered transport. DTLS
330   * alerts also aren't delivered reliably, so we may even time out because the
331   * peer never received our close_notify. Report to the caller that the channel
332   * has fully shut down. */
333  if (ssl->s3->recv_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_none) {
334    ssl->s3->recv_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
335  }
336}
337
338int dtls1_write_app_data(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *buf, int len) {
339  assert(!SSL_in_init(ssl));
340
341  if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
342    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
343    return -1;
344  }
345
346  if (len < 0) {
347    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
348    return -1;
349  }
350
351  if (len == 0) {
352    return 0;
353  }
354
355  int ret = dtls1_write_record(ssl, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, (size_t)len,
356                               dtls1_use_current_epoch);
357  if (ret <= 0) {
358    return ret;
359  }
360  return len;
361}
362
363int dtls1_write_record(SSL *ssl, int type, const uint8_t *buf, size_t len,
364                       enum dtls1_use_epoch_t use_epoch) {
365  assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
366  /* There should never be a pending write buffer in DTLS. One can't write half
367   * a datagram, so the write buffer is always dropped in
368   * |ssl_write_buffer_flush|. */
369  assert(!ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(ssl));
370
371  if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
372    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
373    return -1;
374  }
375
376  size_t max_out = len + SSL_max_seal_overhead(ssl);
377  uint8_t *out;
378  size_t ciphertext_len;
379  if (!ssl_write_buffer_init(ssl, &out, max_out) ||
380      !dtls_seal_record(ssl, out, &ciphertext_len, max_out, type, buf, len,
381                        use_epoch)) {
382    ssl_write_buffer_clear(ssl);
383    return -1;
384  }
385  ssl_write_buffer_set_len(ssl, ciphertext_len);
386
387  int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
388  if (ret <= 0) {
389    return ret;
390  }
391  return 1;
392}
393
394int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *ssl) {
395  int ret = dtls1_write_record(ssl, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &ssl->s3->send_alert[0], 2,
396                               dtls1_use_current_epoch);
397  if (ret <= 0) {
398    return ret;
399  }
400  ssl->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
401
402  /* If the alert is fatal, flush the BIO now. */
403  if (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
404    BIO_flush(ssl->wbio);
405  }
406
407  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_ALERT, ssl->s3->send_alert,
408                      2);
409
410  int alert = (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | ssl->s3->send_alert[1];
411  ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, alert);
412
413  return 1;
414}
415