| 67899de5ade4bc2a6ffae54f2e66cd5d99b67029 |
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21-Apr-2017 |
Rubin Xu <rubinxu@google.com> |
Introduce KEYSTORE_FLAG_CRITICAL_TO_DEVICE_ENCRYPTION
This flag is used by system server to mark keys used during the
synthetic password auth flow. keys marked with this flag will not
be super encrypted because super encryption requires knowledge of
the synthetic password, causing a chicken-and-egg problem.
Bug: 35849499
Bug: 34600579
Test: cts-tradefed run cts-dev -m CtsDevicePolicyManagerTestCases -t com.android.cts.devicepolicy.MixedProfileOwnerTest#testResetPasswordWithToken
Change-Id: Ibd900e3ede1f51c476d462085caaf216d911d693
/system/security/keystore/include/keystore/keystore.h
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| d5a24e6745eb552c137cfdbb49e09e3db5701ad1 |
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28-Feb-2017 |
Shawn Willden <swillden@google.com> |
Superencrypt authentication-bound keys.
This CL causes keystore to automatically encrypt all newly-created
keymaster key blobs which are authentication-bound. This appears on its
face to be pointless, since the sensitive key material in the key blobs
is already encrypted by the Trusted Execution Environment. It's not
pointless because this adds a cryptographic dependency on the user's
password, including any strengthening performed by
LockSettingService... which may include the use of a separate hardware
trusted module, separate from (and presumably more secure than) the TEE.
A better solution is planned for the next release, but that requires
changes to Gatekeeper and Keymaster. This superencryption will be
removed when that work is done.
Note that the encryption method used by keystore is weak. A separate CL will
replace the weak method with a proper authenticated encryption.
(cherry picked from commit 07aebe73053df12c21c7481a93146bd76add7fbd)
Test: Manual testing.
Bug: 35849499
Change-Id: I0c4910ea24b97bc8046f3d114bfb336670d03321
/system/security/keystore/include/keystore/keystore.h
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| c7a9fa29c185a8c1889486d4acf00fd59c513870 |
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13-Oct-2016 |
Janis Danisevskis <jdanis@google.com> |
Port to binderized keymaster HAL
This patch ports keystore to the HIDL based binderized keymaster HAL.
Keystore has no more dependencies on legacy keymaster headers, and
therefore data structures, constant declarations, or enums. All
keymaster related data structures and enums used by keystore are the
once defined by the HIDL based keymaster HAL definition. In the process
of porting, keystore underwent some changes:
* Keystore got a new implementation of AuthorizationSet that is fully
based on the new HIDL data structures. Key parameters are now either
organised as AuthorizationSets or hidl_vec<KeyParameter>. (Formerly,
this was a mixture of keymaster's AuthorizationSet,
std::vec<keymaster_key_param_t>, and keymaster_key_param_set_t.) The
former is used for memory management and provides algorithms for
assembling, joining, and subtracting sets of parameters. The latter
is used as wire format for the HAL IPC; it can wrap the memory owned
by an AuthorizationSet for this purpose. The AuthorizationSet is
accompanied by a new implementation of type safe functions for
creating and accessing tagged key parameters,
Authorizations (keystore/keymaster_tags.h).
* A new type (KSSReturnCode) was introduced that wraps keystore service
response codes. Keystore has two sets of error codes. ErrorCode
errors are less than 0 and use 0 as success value. ResponseCode
errors are greater than zero and use 1 as success value. This patch
changes ResponseCode to be an enum class so that is no longer
assignable to int without a cast. The new return type can only be
initialized by ResponseCode or ErrorCode and when accessed as int32_t,
which happens on serialization when the response is send to a client,
the success values are coalesced onto 1 as expected by the
clients. KSSreturnCode is also comparable to ResponseCode and
ErrorCode, and the predicate isOk() returns true if it was initialized
with either ErrorCode::OK (0) or ReponseCode::NO_ERROR (1).
* A bug was fixed, that caused the keystore verify function to return
success, regardless of the input, internal errors, or lack of
permissions.
* The marshalling code in IKeystoreService.cpp was rewritten. For data
structures that are known to keymaster, the client facing side of
keystore uses HIDL based data structures as (target) source
for (un)marshaling to avoid further conversion. hidl_vecs are used to
wrap parcel memory without copying and taking ownership where
possible.
* Explicit use of malloc is reduced (malloc was required by the C nature
of the old HAL). The new implementations avoid explicit use of
malloc/new and waive the use of pointers for return values. Instead,
functions return by value objects that take ownership of secondary
memory allocations where required.
Test: runtest --path=cts/tests/tests/keystore/src/android/keystore/cts
Bug: 32020919
Change-Id: I59d3a0f4a6bdf6bb3bbf791ad8827c463effa286
/system/security/keystore/include/keystore/keystore.h
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| aebbfc2ba548064e4f537154bab6ec60dfe4115e |
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23-Apr-2015 |
Chad Brubaker <cbrubaker@google.com> |
Move auth token checking to begin
Auth tokens will now be checked on begin and then used for all
subsequent calls for that operation, this means that things like
auth timeouts will only be checked on begin, and operation that starts
at timeout - .00001 will now be able to be used to completion.
One exception to this is keys that use per operation authorization.
Begin for these operations must succeed so that the application gets a
handle to authorize. For those keys if the application calls update
before authorizing the operation the call will fail. For these keys
begin will return OP_AUTH_NEEDED so let the caller know more work is
needed before using the operation.
Change-Id: I5dda40803e7b2aecac27defc64d6d3f630d3f0d0
/system/security/keystore/include/keystore/keystore.h
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| 17208e0de5a42722901d803118745cca25fd10c1 |
|
04-Sep-2013 |
Kenny Root <kroot@google.com> |
Provide fallback for keymaster implementations
Some implementations won't support ECDSA or DSA, so provide a fallback
for them by using the softkeymaster implementation. This will allow us
to universally support ECDSA and DSA on all platforms regardless of HAL
version.
Bug: 10600582
Change-Id: Ib842816cc1415ec00abb7d22c8e9b6bbe58f6a86
/system/security/keystore/include/keystore/keystore.h
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| 0c540aad5915e6aa34345049be96f28b64d0e84c |
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03-Apr-2013 |
Kenny Root <kroot@google.com> |
keystore: Add flag for blobs to be unencrypted
In order to let apps use keystore more productively, make the blob
encryption optional. As more hardware-assisted keystores (i.e., hardware
that has a Keymaster HAL) come around, encrypting blobs start to make
less sense since the thing it's encrypting is usually a token and not
any raw key material.
Bug: 8122243
Change-Id: I7d70122beb32b59f06a923ade93234393b75a2cd
/system/security/keystore/include/keystore/keystore.h
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| 07438c8d7256d3788dac323b4d0055f201e0bec9 |
|
02-Nov-2012 |
Kenny Root <kroot@google.com> |
Switch keystore to binder
Change-Id: I6dacdc43bcc1a56e47655e37e825ee6a205eb56b
/system/security/keystore/include/keystore/keystore.h
|