1/*
2 * Copyright (C) 2014 The Android Open Source Project
3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
5 * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
6 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
7 *
8 *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
9 *
10 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
11 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
12 * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
13 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
14 * limitations under the License.
15 */
16
17#define LOG_TAG "keystore"
18
19#include "keymaster_enforcement.h"
20
21#include <assert.h>
22#include <inttypes.h>
23#include <limits.h>
24#include <string.h>
25
26#include <openssl/evp.h>
27
28#include <cutils/log.h>
29#include <hardware/hw_auth_token.h>
30#include <list>
31
32namespace keystore {
33
34class AccessTimeMap {
35  public:
36    explicit AccessTimeMap(uint32_t max_size) : max_size_(max_size) {}
37
38    /* If the key is found, returns true and fills \p last_access_time.  If not found returns
39     * false. */
40    bool LastKeyAccessTime(km_id_t keyid, uint32_t* last_access_time) const;
41
42    /* Updates the last key access time with the currentTime parameter.  Adds the key if
43     * needed, returning false if key cannot be added because list is full. */
44    bool UpdateKeyAccessTime(km_id_t keyid, uint32_t current_time, uint32_t timeout);
45
46  private:
47    struct AccessTime {
48        km_id_t keyid;
49        uint32_t access_time;
50        uint32_t timeout;
51    };
52    std::list<AccessTime> last_access_list_;
53    const uint32_t max_size_;
54};
55
56class AccessCountMap {
57  public:
58    explicit AccessCountMap(uint32_t max_size) : max_size_(max_size) {}
59
60    /* If the key is found, returns true and fills \p count.  If not found returns
61     * false. */
62    bool KeyAccessCount(km_id_t keyid, uint32_t* count) const;
63
64    /* Increments key access count, adding an entry if the key has never been used.  Returns
65     * false if the list has reached maximum size. */
66    bool IncrementKeyAccessCount(km_id_t keyid);
67
68  private:
69    struct AccessCount {
70        km_id_t keyid;
71        uint64_t access_count;
72    };
73    std::list<AccessCount> access_count_list_;
74    const uint32_t max_size_;
75};
76
77bool is_public_key_algorithm(const AuthorizationSet& auth_set) {
78    auto algorithm = auth_set.GetTagValue(TAG_ALGORITHM);
79    return algorithm.isOk() &&
80           (algorithm.value() == Algorithm::RSA || algorithm.value() == Algorithm::EC);
81}
82
83static ErrorCode authorized_purpose(const KeyPurpose purpose, const AuthorizationSet& auth_set) {
84    switch (purpose) {
85    case KeyPurpose::VERIFY:
86    case KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT:
87    case KeyPurpose::SIGN:
88    case KeyPurpose::DECRYPT:
89        if (auth_set.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, purpose)) return ErrorCode::OK;
90        return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE;
91
92    default:
93        return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE;
94    }
95}
96
97inline bool is_origination_purpose(KeyPurpose purpose) {
98    return purpose == KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT || purpose == KeyPurpose::SIGN;
99}
100
101inline bool is_usage_purpose(KeyPurpose purpose) {
102    return purpose == KeyPurpose::DECRYPT || purpose == KeyPurpose::VERIFY;
103}
104
105KeymasterEnforcement::KeymasterEnforcement(uint32_t max_access_time_map_size,
106                                           uint32_t max_access_count_map_size)
107    : access_time_map_(new (std::nothrow) AccessTimeMap(max_access_time_map_size)),
108      access_count_map_(new (std::nothrow) AccessCountMap(max_access_count_map_size)) {}
109
110KeymasterEnforcement::~KeymasterEnforcement() {
111    delete access_time_map_;
112    delete access_count_map_;
113}
114
115ErrorCode KeymasterEnforcement::AuthorizeOperation(const KeyPurpose purpose, const km_id_t keyid,
116                                                   const AuthorizationSet& auth_set,
117                                                   const AuthorizationSet& operation_params,
118                                                   uint64_t op_handle, bool is_begin_operation) {
119    if (is_public_key_algorithm(auth_set)) {
120        switch (purpose) {
121        case KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT:
122        case KeyPurpose::VERIFY:
123            /* Public key operations are always authorized. */
124            return ErrorCode::OK;
125
126        case KeyPurpose::DECRYPT:
127        case KeyPurpose::SIGN:
128        case KeyPurpose::DERIVE_KEY:
129            break;
130        case KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY:
131            return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE;
132        };
133    };
134
135    if (is_begin_operation)
136        return AuthorizeBegin(purpose, keyid, auth_set, operation_params);
137    else
138        return AuthorizeUpdateOrFinish(auth_set, operation_params, op_handle);
139}
140
141// For update and finish the only thing to check is user authentication, and then only if it's not
142// timeout-based.
143ErrorCode KeymasterEnforcement::AuthorizeUpdateOrFinish(const AuthorizationSet& auth_set,
144                                                        const AuthorizationSet& operation_params,
145                                                        uint64_t op_handle) {
146    int auth_type_index = -1;
147    for (size_t pos = 0; pos < auth_set.size(); ++pos) {
148        switch (auth_set[pos].tag) {
149        case Tag::NO_AUTH_REQUIRED:
150        case Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT:
151            // If no auth is required or if auth is timeout-based, we have nothing to check.
152            return ErrorCode::OK;
153
154        case Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE:
155            auth_type_index = pos;
156            break;
157
158        default:
159            break;
160        }
161    }
162
163    // Note that at this point we should be able to assume that authentication is required, because
164    // authentication is required if KM_TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED is absent.  However, there are legacy
165    // keys which have no authentication-related tags, so we assume that absence is equivalent to
166    // presence of KM_TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED.
167    //
168    // So, if we found KM_TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE or if we find KM_TAG_USER_SECURE_ID then authentication
169    // is required.  If we find neither, then we assume authentication is not required and return
170    // success.
171    bool authentication_required = (auth_type_index != -1);
172    for (auto& param : auth_set) {
173        auto user_secure_id = authorizationValue(TAG_USER_SECURE_ID, param);
174        if (user_secure_id.isOk()) {
175            authentication_required = true;
176            int auth_timeout_index = -1;
177            if (AuthTokenMatches(auth_set, operation_params, user_secure_id.value(),
178                                 auth_type_index, auth_timeout_index, op_handle,
179                                 false /* is_begin_operation */))
180                return ErrorCode::OK;
181        }
182    }
183
184    if (authentication_required) return ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED;
185
186    return ErrorCode::OK;
187}
188
189ErrorCode KeymasterEnforcement::AuthorizeBegin(const KeyPurpose purpose, const km_id_t keyid,
190                                               const AuthorizationSet& auth_set,
191                                               const AuthorizationSet& operation_params) {
192    // Find some entries that may be needed to handle KM_TAG_USER_SECURE_ID
193    int auth_timeout_index = -1;
194    int auth_type_index = -1;
195    int no_auth_required_index = -1;
196    for (size_t pos = 0; pos < auth_set.size(); ++pos) {
197        switch (auth_set[pos].tag) {
198        case Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT:
199            auth_timeout_index = pos;
200            break;
201        case Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE:
202            auth_type_index = pos;
203            break;
204        case Tag::NO_AUTH_REQUIRED:
205            no_auth_required_index = pos;
206            break;
207        default:
208            break;
209        }
210    }
211
212    ErrorCode error = authorized_purpose(purpose, auth_set);
213    if (error != ErrorCode::OK) return error;
214
215    // If successful, and if key has a min time between ops, this will be set to the time limit
216    uint32_t min_ops_timeout = UINT32_MAX;
217
218    bool update_access_count = false;
219    bool caller_nonce_authorized_by_key = false;
220    bool authentication_required = false;
221    bool auth_token_matched = false;
222
223    for (auto& param : auth_set) {
224
225        // KM_TAG_PADDING_OLD and KM_TAG_DIGEST_OLD aren't actually members of the enum, so we can't
226        // switch on them.  There's nothing to validate for them, though, so just ignore them.
227        if (int32_t(param.tag) == KM_TAG_PADDING_OLD || int32_t(param.tag) == KM_TAG_DIGEST_OLD)
228            continue;
229
230        switch (param.tag) {
231
232        case Tag::ACTIVE_DATETIME: {
233            auto date = authorizationValue(TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, param);
234            if (date.isOk() && !activation_date_valid(date.value()))
235                return ErrorCode::KEY_NOT_YET_VALID;
236            break;
237        }
238        case Tag::ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME: {
239            auto date = authorizationValue(TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, param);
240            if (is_origination_purpose(purpose) && date.isOk() &&
241                expiration_date_passed(date.value()))
242                return ErrorCode::KEY_EXPIRED;
243            break;
244        }
245        case Tag::USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME: {
246            auto date = authorizationValue(TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, param);
247            if (is_usage_purpose(purpose) && date.isOk() && expiration_date_passed(date.value()))
248                return ErrorCode::KEY_EXPIRED;
249            break;
250        }
251        case Tag::MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS: {
252            auto min_ops_timeout = authorizationValue(TAG_MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS, param);
253            if (min_ops_timeout.isOk() && !MinTimeBetweenOpsPassed(min_ops_timeout.value(), keyid))
254                return ErrorCode::KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
255            break;
256        }
257        case Tag::MAX_USES_PER_BOOT: {
258            auto max_users = authorizationValue(TAG_MAX_USES_PER_BOOT, param);
259            update_access_count = true;
260            if (max_users.isOk() && !MaxUsesPerBootNotExceeded(keyid, max_users.value()))
261                return ErrorCode::KEY_MAX_OPS_EXCEEDED;
262            break;
263        }
264        case Tag::USER_SECURE_ID:
265            if (no_auth_required_index != -1) {
266                // Key has both KM_TAG_USER_SECURE_ID and KM_TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED
267                return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB;
268            }
269
270            if (auth_timeout_index != -1) {
271                auto secure_id = authorizationValue(TAG_USER_SECURE_ID, param);
272                authentication_required = true;
273                if (secure_id.isOk() &&
274                    AuthTokenMatches(auth_set, operation_params, secure_id.value(), auth_type_index,
275                                     auth_timeout_index, 0 /* op_handle */,
276                                     true /* is_begin_operation */))
277                    auth_token_matched = true;
278            }
279            break;
280
281        case Tag::CALLER_NONCE:
282            caller_nonce_authorized_by_key = true;
283            break;
284
285        /* Tags should never be in key auths. */
286        case Tag::INVALID:
287        case Tag::AUTH_TOKEN:
288        case Tag::ROOT_OF_TRUST:
289        case Tag::APPLICATION_DATA:
290        case Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE:
291        case Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID:
292        case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND:
293        case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE:
294        case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT:
295        case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL:
296        case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI:
297        case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID:
298        case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER:
299        case Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL:
300            return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB;
301
302        /* Tags used for cryptographic parameters in keygen.  Nothing to enforce. */
303        case Tag::PURPOSE:
304        case Tag::ALGORITHM:
305        case Tag::KEY_SIZE:
306        case Tag::BLOCK_MODE:
307        case Tag::DIGEST:
308        case Tag::MAC_LENGTH:
309        case Tag::PADDING:
310        case Tag::NONCE:
311        case Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH:
312        case Tag::KDF:
313        case Tag::EC_CURVE:
314
315        /* Tags not used for operations. */
316        case Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS:
317        case Tag::EXPORTABLE:
318
319        /* Algorithm specific parameters not used for access control. */
320        case Tag::RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT:
321        case Tag::ECIES_SINGLE_HASH_MODE:
322
323        /* Informational tags. */
324        case Tag::CREATION_DATETIME:
325        case Tag::ORIGIN:
326        case Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANT:
327
328        /* Tags handled when KM_TAG_USER_SECURE_ID is handled */
329        case Tag::NO_AUTH_REQUIRED:
330        case Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE:
331        case Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT:
332
333        /* Tag to provide data to operations. */
334        case Tag::ASSOCIATED_DATA:
335
336        /* Tags that are implicitly verified by secure side */
337        case Tag::ALL_APPLICATIONS:
338        case Tag::APPLICATION_ID:
339        case Tag::OS_VERSION:
340        case Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL:
341
342        /* Ignored pending removal */
343        case Tag::USER_ID:
344        case Tag::ALL_USERS:
345
346        /* TODO(swillden): Handle these */
347        case Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID:
348        case Tag::UNIQUE_ID:
349        case Tag::RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION:
350        case Tag::ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY:
351            break;
352
353        case Tag::BOOTLOADER_ONLY:
354            return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB;
355        }
356    }
357
358    if (authentication_required && !auth_token_matched) {
359        ALOGE("Auth required but no matching auth token found");
360        return ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED;
361    }
362
363    if (!caller_nonce_authorized_by_key && is_origination_purpose(purpose) &&
364        operation_params.Contains(Tag::NONCE))
365        return ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED;
366
367    if (min_ops_timeout != UINT32_MAX) {
368        if (!access_time_map_) {
369            ALOGE("Rate-limited keys table not allocated.  Rate-limited keys disabled");
370            return ErrorCode::MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
371        }
372
373        if (!access_time_map_->UpdateKeyAccessTime(keyid, get_current_time(), min_ops_timeout)) {
374            ALOGE("Rate-limited keys table full.  Entries will time out.");
375            return ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS;
376        }
377    }
378
379    if (update_access_count) {
380        if (!access_count_map_) {
381            ALOGE("Usage-count limited keys tabel not allocated.  Count-limited keys disabled");
382            return ErrorCode::MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
383        }
384
385        if (!access_count_map_->IncrementKeyAccessCount(keyid)) {
386            ALOGE("Usage count-limited keys table full, until reboot.");
387            return ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS;
388        }
389    }
390
391    return ErrorCode::OK;
392}
393
394class EvpMdCtx {
395  public:
396    EvpMdCtx() { EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_); }
397    ~EvpMdCtx() { EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_); }
398
399    EVP_MD_CTX* get() { return &ctx_; }
400
401  private:
402    EVP_MD_CTX ctx_;
403};
404
405/* static */
406bool KeymasterEnforcement::CreateKeyId(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& key_blob, km_id_t* keyid) {
407    EvpMdCtx ctx;
408
409    uint8_t hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
410    unsigned int hash_len;
411    if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx.get(), EVP_sha256(), nullptr /* ENGINE */) &&
412        EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), &key_blob[0], key_blob.size()) &&
413        EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx.get(), hash, &hash_len)) {
414        assert(hash_len >= sizeof(*keyid));
415        memcpy(keyid, hash, sizeof(*keyid));
416        return true;
417    }
418
419    return false;
420}
421
422bool KeymasterEnforcement::MinTimeBetweenOpsPassed(uint32_t min_time_between, const km_id_t keyid) {
423    if (!access_time_map_) return false;
424
425    uint32_t last_access_time;
426    if (!access_time_map_->LastKeyAccessTime(keyid, &last_access_time)) return true;
427    return min_time_between <= static_cast<int64_t>(get_current_time()) - last_access_time;
428}
429
430bool KeymasterEnforcement::MaxUsesPerBootNotExceeded(const km_id_t keyid, uint32_t max_uses) {
431    if (!access_count_map_) return false;
432
433    uint32_t key_access_count;
434    if (!access_count_map_->KeyAccessCount(keyid, &key_access_count)) return true;
435    return key_access_count < max_uses;
436}
437
438template <typename IntType, uint32_t byteOrder> struct choose_hton;
439
440template <typename IntType> struct choose_hton<IntType, __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__> {
441    inline static IntType hton(const IntType& value) {
442        IntType result = 0;
443        const unsigned char* inbytes = reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(&value);
444        unsigned char* outbytes = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(&result);
445        for (int i = sizeof(IntType) - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
446            *(outbytes++) = inbytes[i];
447        }
448        return result;
449    }
450};
451
452template <typename IntType> struct choose_hton<IntType, __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__> {
453    inline static IntType hton(const IntType& value) { return value; }
454};
455
456template <typename IntType> inline IntType hton(const IntType& value) {
457    return choose_hton<IntType, __BYTE_ORDER__>::hton(value);
458}
459
460template <typename IntType> inline IntType ntoh(const IntType& value) {
461    // same operation and hton
462    return choose_hton<IntType, __BYTE_ORDER__>::hton(value);
463}
464
465bool KeymasterEnforcement::AuthTokenMatches(const AuthorizationSet& auth_set,
466                                            const AuthorizationSet& operation_params,
467                                            const uint64_t user_secure_id,
468                                            const int auth_type_index, const int auth_timeout_index,
469                                            const uint64_t op_handle,
470                                            bool is_begin_operation) const {
471    assert(auth_type_index < static_cast<int>(auth_set.size()));
472    assert(auth_timeout_index < static_cast<int>(auth_set.size()));
473
474    auto auth_token_blob = operation_params.GetTagValue(TAG_AUTH_TOKEN);
475    if (!auth_token_blob.isOk()) {
476        ALOGE("Authentication required, but auth token not provided");
477        return false;
478    }
479
480    if (auth_token_blob.value().size() != sizeof(hw_auth_token_t)) {
481        ALOGE("Bug: Auth token is the wrong size (%zu expected, %zu found)",
482              sizeof(hw_auth_token_t), auth_token_blob.value().size());
483        return false;
484    }
485
486    hw_auth_token_t auth_token;
487    memcpy(&auth_token, &auth_token_blob.value()[0], sizeof(hw_auth_token_t));
488    if (auth_token.version != HW_AUTH_TOKEN_VERSION) {
489        ALOGE("Bug: Auth token is the version %hhu (or is not an auth token). Expected %d",
490              auth_token.version, HW_AUTH_TOKEN_VERSION);
491        return false;
492    }
493
494    if (!ValidateTokenSignature(auth_token)) {
495        ALOGE("Auth token signature invalid");
496        return false;
497    }
498
499    if (auth_timeout_index == -1 && op_handle && op_handle != auth_token.challenge) {
500        ALOGE("Auth token has the challenge %" PRIu64 ", need %" PRIu64, auth_token.challenge,
501              op_handle);
502        return false;
503    }
504
505    if (user_secure_id != auth_token.user_id && user_secure_id != auth_token.authenticator_id) {
506        ALOGI("Auth token SIDs %" PRIu64 " and %" PRIu64 " do not match key SID %" PRIu64,
507              auth_token.user_id, auth_token.authenticator_id, user_secure_id);
508        return false;
509    }
510
511    if (auth_type_index < 0 || auth_type_index > static_cast<int>(auth_set.size())) {
512        ALOGE("Auth required but no auth type found");
513        return false;
514    }
515
516    assert(auth_set[auth_type_index].tag == KM_TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE);
517    auto key_auth_type_mask = authorizationValue(TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, auth_set[auth_type_index]);
518    if (!key_auth_type_mask.isOk()) return false;
519
520    uint32_t token_auth_type = ntoh(auth_token.authenticator_type);
521    if ((uint32_t(key_auth_type_mask.value()) & token_auth_type) == 0) {
522        ALOGE("Key requires match of auth type mask 0%uo, but token contained 0%uo",
523              key_auth_type_mask.value(), token_auth_type);
524        return false;
525    }
526
527    if (auth_timeout_index != -1 && is_begin_operation) {
528        assert(auth_set[auth_timeout_index].tag == KM_TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT);
529        auto auth_token_timeout =
530            authorizationValue(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, auth_set[auth_timeout_index]);
531        if (!auth_token_timeout.isOk()) return false;
532
533        if (auth_token_timed_out(auth_token, auth_token_timeout.value())) {
534            ALOGE("Auth token has timed out");
535            return false;
536        }
537    }
538
539    // Survived the whole gauntlet.  We have authentage!
540    return true;
541}
542
543bool AccessTimeMap::LastKeyAccessTime(km_id_t keyid, uint32_t* last_access_time) const {
544    for (auto& entry : last_access_list_)
545        if (entry.keyid == keyid) {
546            *last_access_time = entry.access_time;
547            return true;
548        }
549    return false;
550}
551
552bool AccessTimeMap::UpdateKeyAccessTime(km_id_t keyid, uint32_t current_time, uint32_t timeout) {
553    for (auto iter = last_access_list_.begin(); iter != last_access_list_.end();) {
554        if (iter->keyid == keyid) {
555            iter->access_time = current_time;
556            return true;
557        }
558
559        // Expire entry if possible.
560        assert(current_time >= iter->access_time);
561        if (current_time - iter->access_time >= iter->timeout)
562            iter = last_access_list_.erase(iter);
563        else
564            ++iter;
565    }
566
567    if (last_access_list_.size() >= max_size_) return false;
568
569    AccessTime new_entry;
570    new_entry.keyid = keyid;
571    new_entry.access_time = current_time;
572    new_entry.timeout = timeout;
573    last_access_list_.push_front(new_entry);
574    return true;
575}
576
577bool AccessCountMap::KeyAccessCount(km_id_t keyid, uint32_t* count) const {
578    for (auto& entry : access_count_list_)
579        if (entry.keyid == keyid) {
580            *count = entry.access_count;
581            return true;
582        }
583    return false;
584}
585
586bool AccessCountMap::IncrementKeyAccessCount(km_id_t keyid) {
587    for (auto& entry : access_count_list_)
588        if (entry.keyid == keyid) {
589            // Note that the 'if' below will always be true because KM_TAG_MAX_USES_PER_BOOT is a
590            // uint32_t, and as soon as entry.access_count reaches the specified maximum value
591            // operation requests will be rejected and access_count won't be incremented any more.
592            // And, besides, UINT64_MAX is huge.  But we ensure that it doesn't wrap anyway, out of
593            // an abundance of caution.
594            if (entry.access_count < UINT64_MAX) ++entry.access_count;
595            return true;
596        }
597
598    if (access_count_list_.size() >= max_size_) return false;
599
600    AccessCount new_entry;
601    new_entry.keyid = keyid;
602    new_entry.access_count = 1;
603    access_count_list_.push_front(new_entry);
604    return true;
605}
606}; /* namespace keystore */
607