1###
2### Untrusted_app_all.
3###
4### This file defines the rules shared by all untrusted app domains except
5### apps which target the v2 security sandbox (ephemeral_app for instant apps,
6### untrusted_v2_app for fully installed v2 apps).
7### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
8### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
9### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
10### directory).  The untrusted_app_all attribute is assigned to all default
11### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000)
12### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo
13### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml.  In current AOSP, this
14### attribute is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps
15### that are not signed by the platform key.  To move
16### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to
17### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values
18### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and
19### seapp_contexts.
20###
21### Note that rules that should apply to all untrusted apps must be in app.te or also
22### added to untrusted_v2_app.te and ephemeral_app.te.
23
24# Legacy text relocations
25allow untrusted_app_all apk_data_file:file execmod;
26
27# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out
28# to their sandbox directory and then execute.
29allow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:file { rx_file_perms execmod };
30
31# ASEC
32allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms;
33allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:dir r_dir_perms;
34# Execute libs in asec containers.
35allow untrusted_app_all asec_public_file:file { execute execmod };
36
37# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
38# running "adb install foo.apk".
39# TODO: Long term, we don't want apps probing into shell data files.
40# Figure out a way to remove these rules.
41allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
42allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
43
44# Read and write system app data files passed over Binder.
45# Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for
46# cropping or taking user photos.
47allow untrusted_app_all system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr };
48
49#
50# Rules migrated from old app domains coalesced into untrusted_app.
51# This includes what used to be media_app, shared_app, and release_app.
52#
53
54# Access to /data/media.
55allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
56allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
57
58# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon
59# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider
60allow untrusted_app_all mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
61
62# allow cts to query all services
63allow untrusted_app_all servicemanager:service_manager list;
64
65allow untrusted_app_all audioserver_service:service_manager find;
66allow untrusted_app_all cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
67allow untrusted_app_all drmserver_service:service_manager find;
68allow untrusted_app_all mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
69allow untrusted_app_all mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
70allow untrusted_app_all mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
71allow untrusted_app_all mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
72allow untrusted_app_all mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
73allow untrusted_app_all mediacasserver_service:service_manager find;
74allow untrusted_app_all nfc_service:service_manager find;
75allow untrusted_app_all radio_service:service_manager find;
76allow untrusted_app_all surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
77allow untrusted_app_all app_api_service:service_manager find;
78allow untrusted_app_all vr_manager_service:service_manager find;
79
80# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored
81# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all
82# data stored in that directory to process them one by one.
83userdebug_or_eng(`
84  allow untrusted_app_all perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms;
85  allow untrusted_app_all perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
86')
87
88# gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process.
89allow untrusted_app_all self:process ptrace;
90
91# Cts: HwRngTest
92allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:dir search;
93allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:file r_file_perms;
94
95# Allow apps to view preloaded media content
96allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms;
97allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms;
98allow untrusted_app_all preloads_data_file:dir search;
99
100# Allow untrusted apps read / execute access to /vendor/app for there can
101# be pre-installed vendor apps that package a library within themselves.
102# TODO (b/37784178) Consider creating  a special type for /vendor/app installed
103# apps.
104allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:dir { open getattr read search };
105allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:file { open getattr read execute };
106allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:lnk_file { open getattr read };
107