| 1654a04cd702fd19c297c36300a6ab834cf8c072 |
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04-Jan-2014 |
Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> |
sunrpc: don't wait for write before allowing reads from use-gss-proxy file
It doesn't make much sense to make reads from this procfile hang. As
far as I can tell, only gssproxy itself will open this file and it
never reads from it. Change it to just give the present setting of
sn->use_gss_proxy without waiting for anything.
Note that we do not want to call use_gss_proxy() in this codepath
since an inopportune read of this file could cause it to be disabled
prematurely.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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| c66080ad0a9295eaf0246a46949619f92c75faaa |
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08-Oct-2013 |
J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> |
svcrpc: fix gss-proxy NULL dereference in some error cases
We depend on the xdr decoder to set this pointer, but if we error out
before we decode this piece it could be left NULL.
I think this is probably tough to hit without a buggy gss-proxy.
Reported-by: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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| d4a516560fc96a9d486a9939bcb567e3fdce8f49 |
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23-Aug-2013 |
J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> |
rpc: let xdr layer allocate gssproxy receieve pages
In theory the linux cred in a gssproxy reply can include up to
NGROUPS_MAX data, 256K of data. In the common case we expect it to be
shorter. So do as the nfsv3 ACL code does and let the xdr code allocate
the pages as they come in, instead of allocating a lot of pages that
won't typically be used.
Tested-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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| 9dfd87da1aeb0fd364167ad199f40fe96a6a87be |
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21-Aug-2013 |
J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> |
rpc: fix huge kmalloc's in gss-proxy
The reply to a gssproxy can include up to NGROUPS_MAX gid's, which will
take up more than a page. We therefore need to allocate an array of
pages to hold the reply instead of trying to allocate a single huge
buffer.
Tested-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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| 743e217129f69aab074abe520a464fd0c6b1cca1 |
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31-Jul-2013 |
J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> |
svcrpc: fix kfree oops in gss-proxy code
mech_oid.data is an array, not kmalloc()'d memory.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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| 9f96392b0ae6aefc02a9b900c3f4889dfafc8402 |
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10-Jun-2013 |
J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> |
svcrpc: fix gss_rpc_upcall create error
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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| 6278b62aa8f90c668a4e4b94ad9d3952cf4331b7 |
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29-Apr-2013 |
Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> |
SUNRPC: gssp_procedures[] can be static
Cc: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
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| 030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b |
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26-May-2012 |
Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> |
SUNRPC: Use gssproxy upcall for server RPCGSS authentication.
The main advantge of this new upcall mechanism is that it can handle
big tickets as seen in Kerberos implementations where tickets carry
authorization data like the MS-PAC buffer with AD or the Posix Authorization
Data being discussed in IETF on the krbwg working group.
The Gssproxy program is used to perform the accept_sec_context call on the
kernel's behalf. The code is changed to also pass the input buffer straight
to upcall mechanism to avoid allocating and copying many pages as tokens can
be as big (potentially more in future) as 64KiB.
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
[bfields: containerization, negotiation api]
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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| 1d658336b05f8697d6445834f8867f8ad5e4f735 |
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26-May-2012 |
Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> |
SUNRPC: Add RPC based upcall mechanism for RPCGSS auth
This patch implements a sunrpc client to use the services of the gssproxy
userspace daemon.
In particular it allows to perform calls in user space using an RPC
call instead of custom hand-coded upcall/downcall messages.
Currently only accept_sec_context is implemented as that is all is needed for
the server case.
File server modules like NFS and CIFS can use full gssapi services this way,
once init_sec_context is also implemented.
For the NFS server case this code allow to lift the limit of max 2k krb5
tickets. This limit is prevents legitimate kerberos deployments from using krb5
authentication with the Linux NFS server as they have normally ticket that are
many kilobytes large.
It will also allow to lift the limitation on the size of the credential set
(uid,gid,gids) passed down from user space for users that have very many groups
associated. Currently the downcall mechanism used by rpc.svcgssd is limited
to around 2k secondary groups of the 65k allowed by kernel structures.
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
[bfields: containerization, concurrent upcalls, misc. fixes and cleanup]
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
|