/security/apparmor/ |
H A D | ipc.c | 28 audit_log_format(ab, " target="); 29 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->target); 35 * @target: profile being traced (NOT NULL) 41 struct aa_profile *target, int error) 48 aad.target = target; 40 aa_audit_ptrace(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_profile *target, int error) argument
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H A D | domain.c | 291 * x_to_profile - get target profile for a given xindex 349 const char *name = NULL, *target = NULL, *info = NULL; local 452 target = new_profile->base.hname; 503 target = new_profile->base.hname; 517 name, target, cond.uid, info, error); 616 const char *target = NULL, *info = NULL; local 673 target = name; 683 target = hat->base.hname; 685 info = "target not hat"; 711 target 751 struct aa_profile *profile, *target = NULL; local [all...] |
H A D | file.c | 85 if (sa->aad->fs.target) { 86 audit_log_format(ab, " target="); 87 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->fs.target); 99 * @target: name of target (MAYBE NULL) 108 const char *target, kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error) 118 aad.fs.target = target; 313 * @target: target permissio 106 aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms, gfp_t gfp, int op, u32 request, const char *name, const char *target, kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error) argument 321 xindex_is_subset(u32 link, u32 target) argument 352 struct path target = { new_dir->mnt, old_dentry }; local [all...] |
H A D | policy_unpack.c | 73 if (sa->aad->iface.target) { 74 struct aa_profile *name = sa->aad->iface.target; 102 aad.iface.target = new;
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H A D | apparmorfs.c | 36 * @target: buffer to store mangled name, same length as @name (MAYBE NULL) 40 static int mangle_name(char *name, char *target) argument 42 char *t = target; 47 if (target) { 69 return t - target;
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H A D | lsm.c | 116 static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, argument 123 cred = __task_cred(target);
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/security/apparmor/include/ |
H A D | audit.h | 113 void *target; member in union:apparmor_audit_data::__anon3 116 void *target; member in struct:apparmor_audit_data::__anon3::__anon4 123 const char *target; member in struct:apparmor_audit_data::__anon3::__anon6
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H A D | file.h | 149 const char *target, kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error);
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/security/keys/ |
H A D | request_key_auth.c | 147 struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info, argument 156 kenter("%d,", target->serial); 194 rka->target_key = key_get(target); 200 sprintf(desc, "%x", target->serial);
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H A D | internal.h | 197 extern struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target,
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/security/ |
H A D | commoncap.c | 92 /* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace 93 * by examining the target user namespace and all of the target 143 * If we are in the same or an ancestor user_ns and have all the target 145 * If we have the ptrace capability to the target user_ns, then ptrace 205 * @target: The task from which to retrieve the capability sets 213 int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, argument 220 cred = __task_cred(target); 275 /* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */ 781 * So we check for increased caps on the target proces [all...] |
H A D | security.c | 180 int security_capget(struct task_struct *target, argument 185 return security_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); 1032 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) 1034 return security_ops->msg_queue_msgrcv(msq, msg, target, type, mode); 1031 security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) argument
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H A D | capability.c | 540 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) 539 cap_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) argument
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/security/selinux/ss/ |
H A D | services.c | 263 * when it is applied to the specified source and target 549 struct type_datum *target; local 556 target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array, 558 BUG_ON(!target); 576 if (target->bounds) { 580 lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds; 592 if (source->bounds && target->bounds) { 743 * If the given source and target types have boundary 1065 * @tsid: target security identifier 1066 * @tclass: target securit [all...] |
/security/tomoyo/ |
H A D | file.c | 780 * @target: Symlink's target if @operation is TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK, 785 int tomoyo_path_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path, const char *target) argument 813 symlink_target.name = tomoyo_encode(target);
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H A D | common.h | 982 const char *target);
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/security/selinux/ |
H A D | hooks.c | 1497 const struct cred *target, 1500 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target); 1508 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target 1528 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target 2018 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, argument 2023 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP); 2027 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); 5359 struct task_struct *target, 5365 u32 sid = task_sid(target); 1496 cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor, const struct cred *target, u32 perms) argument 5358 selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) argument
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/security/smack/ |
H A D | smack_lsm.c | 1582 * @tsk: The target task 2940 * @target: unused 2947 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) 2946 smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) argument
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