| ba733f9857b966459316d0cd33b8da2e22f62d7d |
|
08-Apr-2015 |
Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> |
SELinux: per-command whitelisting of ioctls
Extend the generic ioctl permission check with support for per-command
filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may
additionally include a set of commands. Example:
allow <source> <target>:<class> { 0x8910-0x8926 0x892A-0x8935 }
auditallow <source> <target>:<class> 0x892A
When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This
feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl
permission which may be too imprecise in some circumstances. For
example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and
benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as
dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute
to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering
provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and
limit applications to the subset of commands required.
The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl
commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to
POLICYDB_VERSION_IOCTL_OPERATIONS=30 to account for the format change.
Bug: 18087110
Change-Id: Ibf0e36728f6f3f0d5af56ccdeddee40800af689d
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
|
| 4093a8443941d7021c7f747474a87a56cf666270 |
|
19-Sep-2014 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
selinux: normalize audit log formatting
Restructure to keyword=value pairs without spaces. Drop superfluous words in
text. Make invalid_context a keyword. Change result= keyword to seresult=.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[Minor rewrite to the patch subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
|
| f31e799459659ae88c341aeac16a8a5efb1271d4 |
|
23-Jun-2014 |
Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> |
selinux: no recursive read_lock of policy_rwlock in security_genfs_sid()
With the introduction of fair queued rwlock, recursive read_lock()
may hang the offending process if there is a write_lock() somewhere
in between.
With recursive read_lock checking enabled, the following error was
reported:
=============================================
[ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
3.16.0-rc1 #2 Tainted: G E
---------------------------------------------
load_policy/708 is trying to acquire lock:
(policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b32a>]
security_genfs_sid+0x3a/0x170
but task is already holding lock:
(policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b48c>]
security_fs_use+0x2c/0x110
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(policy_rwlock);
lock(policy_rwlock);
This patch fixes the occurrence of recursive read_lock() of
policy_rwlock by adding a helper function __security_genfs_sid()
which requires caller to take the lock before calling it. The
security_fs_use() was then modified to call the new helper function.
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
|
| 52a4c6404f91f2d2c5592ee6365a8418c4565f53 |
|
07-Mar-2014 |
Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com> |
selinux: add gfp argument to security_xfrm_policy_alloc and fix callers
security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the
allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the
callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument
needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct
security_operations and to the internal function
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic
callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest.
The path that needed the gfp argument addition is:
security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security ->
all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) ->
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only)
Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also
add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this
patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to
security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well.
CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
|
| 2172fa709ab32ca60e86179dc67d0857be8e2c98 |
|
30-Jan-2014 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
|
| 9ad42a79247d5e16d26f7d1531a68f20a889c5af |
|
21-Nov-2013 |
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> |
selinux: call WARN_ONCE() instead of calling audit_log_start()
Two of the conditions in selinux_audit_rule_match() should never happen and
the third indicates a race that should be retried. Remove the calls to
audit_log() (which call audit_log_start()) and deal with the errors in the
caller, logging only once if the condition is met. Calling audit_log_start()
in this location makes buffer allocation and locking more complicated in the
calling tree (audit_filter_user()).
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
| 29b1deb2a48a9dd02b93597aa4c055a24c0e989f |
|
15-Dec-2013 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
Revert "selinux: consider filesystem subtype in policies"
This reverts commit 102aefdda4d8275ce7d7100bc16c88c74272b260.
Tom London reports that it causes sync() to hang on Fedora rawhide:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1033965
and Josh Boyer bisected it down to this commit. Reverting the commit in
the rawhide kernel fixes the problem.
Eric Paris root-caused it to incorrect subtype matching in that commit
breaking fuse, and has a tentative patch, but by now we're better off
retrying this in 3.14 rather than playing with it any more.
Reported-by: Tom London <selinux@gmail.com>
Bisected-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Anand Avati <avati@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
| 4d546f81717d253ab67643bf072c6d8821a9249c |
|
13-Dec-2013 |
Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> |
selinux: revert 102aefdda4d8275ce7d7100bc16c88c74272b260
Revert "selinux: consider filesystem subtype in policies"
This reverts commit 102aefdda4d8275ce7d7100bc16c88c74272b260.
Explanation from Eric Paris:
SELinux policy can specify if it should use a filesystem's
xattrs or not. In current policy we have a specification that
fuse should not use xattrs but fuse.glusterfs should use
xattrs. This patch has a bug in which non-glusterfs
filesystems would match the rule saying fuse.glusterfs should
use xattrs. If both fuse and the particular filesystem in
question are not written to handle xattr calls during the mount
command, they will deadlock.
I have fixed the bug to do proper matching, however I believe a
revert is still the correct solution. The reason I believe
that is because the code still does not work. The s_subtype is
not set until after the SELinux hook which attempts to match on
the ".gluster" portion of the rule. So we cannot match on the
rule in question. The code is useless.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
|
| b5495b4217d3fa64deac479db83dbede149af7d8 |
|
14-Nov-2013 |
Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com> |
SELinux: security_load_policy: Silence frame-larger-than warning
Dynamically allocate a couple of the larger stack variables in order to
reduce the stack footprint below 1024. gcc-4.8
security/selinux/ss/services.c: In function 'security_load_policy':
security/selinux/ss/services.c:1964:1: warning: the frame size of 1104 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=]
}
Also silence a couple of checkpatch warnings at the same time.
WARNING: sizeof policydb should be sizeof(policydb)
+ memcpy(oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof policydb);
WARNING: sizeof policydb should be sizeof(policydb)
+ memcpy(&policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof policydb);
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
|
| 102aefdda4d8275ce7d7100bc16c88c74272b260 |
|
17-Apr-2013 |
Anand Avati <avati@redhat.com> |
selinux: consider filesystem subtype in policies
Not considering sub filesystem has the following limitation. Support
for SELinux in FUSE is dependent on the particular userspace
filesystem, which is identified by the subtype. For e.g, GlusterFS,
a FUSE based filesystem supports SELinux (by mounting and processing
FUSE requests in different threads, avoiding the mount time
deadlock), whereas other FUSE based filesystems (identified by a
different subtype) have the mount time deadlock.
By considering the subtype of the filesytem in the SELinux policies,
allows us to specify a filesystem subtype, in the following way:
fs_use_xattr fuse.glusterfs gen_context(system_u:object_r:fs_t,s0);
This way not all FUSE filesystems are put in the same bucket and
subjected to the limitations of the other subtypes.
Signed-off-by: Anand Avati <avati@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
| 2be4d74f2fd45460d70d4fe65cc1972ef45bf849 |
|
03-May-2013 |
Chris PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com> |
Add SELinux policy capability for always checking packet and peer classes.
Currently the packet class in SELinux is not checked if there are no
SECMARK rules in the security or mangle netfilter tables. Some systems
prefer that packets are always checked, for example, to protect the system
should the netfilter rules fail to load or if the nefilter rules
were maliciously flushed.
Add the always_check_network policy capability which, when enabled, treats
SECMARK as enabled, even if there are no netfilter SECMARK rules and
treats peer labeling as enabled, even if there is no Netlabel or
labeled IPSEC configuration.
Includes definition of "redhat1" SELinux policy capability, which
exists in the SELinux userpace library, to keep ordering correct.
The SELinux userpace portion of this was merged last year, but this kernel
change fell on the floor.
Signed-off-by: Chris PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
| a64c54cf0811b8032fdab8c9d52576f0370837fa |
|
24-Aug-2012 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: pass a superblock to security_fs_use
Rather than passing pointers to memory locations, strings, and other
stuff just give up on the separation and give security_fs_use the
superblock. It just makes the code easier to read (even if not easier to
reuse on some other OS)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
| f936c6e502d3bc21b87c9830b3a24d1e07e6b6e1 |
|
10-Oct-2012 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: change sbsec->behavior to short
We only have 6 options, so char is good enough, but use a short as that
packs nicely. This shrinks the superblock_security_struct just a little
bit.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
| 581abc09c2205e05256d7f75410345d5392d5098 |
|
20-Aug-2012 |
Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> |
userns: Convert selinux to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
| 562c99f20d989f222138dddfd71e275bfb3665de |
|
07-Mar-2012 |
Wanlong Gao <gaowanlong@cn.fujitsu.com> |
SELinux: avc: remove the useless fields in avc_add_callback
avc_add_callback now just used for registering reset functions
in initcalls, and the callback functions just did reset operations.
So, reducing the arguments to only one event is enough now.
Signed-off-by: Wanlong Gao <gaowanlong@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
| bb7081ab93582fd2557160549854200a5fc7b42a |
|
04-Apr-2012 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: possible NULL deref in context_struct_to_string
It's possible that the caller passed a NULL for scontext. However if this
is a defered mapping we might still attempt to call *scontext=kstrdup().
This is bad. Instead just return the len.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
| eed7795d0a2c9b2e934afc088e903fa2c17b7958 |
|
20-Mar-2012 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: add default_type statements
Because Fedora shipped userspace based on my development tree we now
have policy version 27 in the wild defining only default user, role, and
range. Thus to add default_type we need a policy.28.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
| aa893269de6277b44be88e25dcd5331c934c29c4 |
|
20-Mar-2012 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: allow default source/target selectors for user/role/range
When new objects are created we have great and flexible rules to
determine the type of the new object. We aren't quite as flexible or
mature when it comes to determining the user, role, and range. This
patch adds a new ability to specify the place a new objects user, role,
and range should come from. For users and roles it can come from either
the source or the target of the operation. aka for files the user can
either come from the source (the running process and todays default) or
it can come from the target (aka the parent directory of the new file)
examples always are done with
directory context: system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512
process context: unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
[no rule]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_none
[default user source]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_source
[default user target]
system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_target
[default role source]
unconfined_u:unconfined_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_source
[default role target]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_target
[default range source low]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_source_low
[default range source high]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_high
[default range source low-high]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_low-high
[default range target low]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_target_low
[default range target high]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_high
[default range target low-high]
unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_low-high
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
| 02f5daa563456c1ff3c3422aa3ec00e67460f762 |
|
30-Aug-2011 |
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code
Fix sparse warnings in SELinux Netlink code.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
| 5c884c1d4ac955987e84acf2d36c0f160536aca4 |
|
30-Aug-2011 |
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init
Sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
| 6a3fbe81179c85eb53054a0f4c8423ffec0276a7 |
|
29-Aug-2011 |
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code
Fix sparse warnings in SELinux Netlink code.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| cc59a582d6081b296e481b8bc9676b5c2faad818 |
|
17-Aug-2011 |
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init
Sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 8959deef0fafeb6e5ede7efd237f74a5a6c9b472 |
|
01-Aug-2011 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
doc: Update the email address for Paul Moore in various source files
My @hp.com will no longer be valid starting August 5, 2011 so an update is
necessary. My new email address is employer independent so we don't have
to worry about doing this again any time soon.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 82c21bfab41a77bc01affe21bea9727d776774a7 |
|
01-Aug-2011 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
doc: Update the email address for Paul Moore in various source files
My @hp.com will no longer be valid starting August 5, 2011 so an update is
necessary. My new email address is employer independent so we don't have
to worry about doing this again any time soon.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
| f01e1af445fac107e91d62a2d59dd535f633810b |
|
24-May-2011 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
selinux: don't pass in NULL avd to avc_has_perm_noaudit
Right now security_get_user_sids() will pass in a NULL avd pointer to
avc_has_perm_noaudit(), which then forces that function to have a dummy
entry for that case and just generally test it.
Don't do it. The normal callers all pass a real avd pointer, and this
helper function is incredibly hot. So don't make avc_has_perm_noaudit()
do conditional stuff that isn't needed for the common case.
This also avoids some duplicated stack space.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
| 2463c26d50adc282d19317013ba0ff473823ca47 |
|
28-Apr-2011 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: put name based create rules in a hashtable
To shorten the list we need to run if filename trans rules exist for the type
of the given parent directory I put them in a hashtable. Given the policy we
are expecting to use in Fedora this takes the worst case list run from about
5,000 entries to 17.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 03a4c0182a156547edd5f2717c1702590fe36bbf |
|
28-Apr-2011 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: skip filename trans rules if ttype does not match parent dir
Right now we walk to filename trans rule list for every inode that is
created. First passes at policy using this facility creates around 5000
filename trans rules. Running a list of 5000 entries every time is a bad
idea. This patch adds a new ebitmap to policy which has a bit set for each
ttype that has at least 1 filename trans rule. Thus when an inode is
created we can quickly determine if any rules exist for this parent
directory type and can skip the list if we know there is definitely no
relevant entry.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 2667991f60e67d28c495b8967aaabf84b4ccd560 |
|
28-Apr-2011 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: rename filename_compute_type argument to *type instead of *con
filename_compute_type() takes as arguments the numeric value of the type of
the subject and target. It does not take a context. Thus the names are
misleading. Fix the argument names.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 4742600cf536c0c115b6f769eda82ee377d199c9 |
|
28-Apr-2011 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: fix comment to state filename_compute_type takes an objname not a qstr
filename_compute_type used to take a qstr, but it now takes just a name.
Fix the comments to indicate it is an objname, not a qstr.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
| 6b697323a78bed254ee372f71b1a6a2901bb4b7a |
|
20-Apr-2011 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: security_read_policy should take a size_t not ssize_t
The len should be an size_t but is a ssize_t. Easy enough fix to silence
build warnings. We have no need for signed-ness.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| eba71de2cb7c02c5ae4f2ad3656343da71bc4661 |
|
25-Mar-2011 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
selinux: Fix regression for Xorg
Commit 6f5317e730505d5cbc851c435a2dfe3d5a21d343 introduced a bug in the
handling of userspace object classes that is causing breakage for Xorg
when XSELinux is enabled. Fix the bug by changing map_class() to return
SECCLASS_NULL when the class cannot be mapped to a kernel object class.
Reported-by: "Justin P. Mattock" <justinmattock@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| f50a3ec961f90e38c0311411179d5dfee1412192 |
|
01-Apr-2011 |
Kohei Kaigai <Kohei.Kaigai@eu.nec.com> |
selinux: add type_transition with name extension support for selinuxfs
The attached patch allows /selinux/create takes optional 4th argument
to support TYPE_TRANSITION with name extension for userspace object
managers.
If 4th argument is not supplied, it shall perform as existing kernel.
In fact, the regression test of SE-PostgreSQL works well on the patched
kernel.
Thanks,
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kohei.kaigai@eu.nec.com>
[manually verify fuzz was not an issue, and it wasn't: eparis]
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
| 25985edcedea6396277003854657b5f3cb31a628 |
|
31-Mar-2011 |
Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi> |
Fix common misspellings
Fixes generated by 'codespell' and manually reviewed.
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>
|
| 85cd6da53a8073d3f4503f56e4ea6cddccbb1c7f |
|
25-Mar-2011 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
selinux: Fix regression for Xorg
Commit 6f5317e730505d5cbc851c435a2dfe3d5a21d343 introduced a bug in the
handling of userspace object classes that is causing breakage for Xorg
when XSELinux is enabled. Fix the bug by changing map_class() to return
SECCLASS_NULL when the class cannot be mapped to a kernel object class.
Reported-by: "Justin P. Mattock" <justinmattock@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 63a312ca55d09a3f6526919df495fff1073c88f4 |
|
25-Mar-2011 |
Harry Ciao <harrytaurus200@hotmail.com> |
SELinux: Compute role in newcontext for all classes
Apply role_transition rules for all kinds of classes.
Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
| 6f5317e730505d5cbc851c435a2dfe3d5a21d343 |
|
02-Mar-2011 |
Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com> |
SELinux: Socket retains creator role and MLS attribute
The socket SID would be computed on creation and no longer inherit
its creator's SID by default. Socket may have a different type but
needs to retain the creator's role and MLS attribute in order not
to break labeled networking and network access control.
The kernel value for a class would be used to determine if the class
if one of socket classes. If security_compute_sid is called from
userspace the policy value for a class would be mapped to the relevant
kernel value first.
Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao <qingtao.cao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
|
| 652bb9b0d6ce007f37c098947b2cc0c45efa3f66 |
|
01-Feb-2011 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: Use dentry name in new object labeling
Currently SELinux has rules which label new objects according to 3 criteria.
The label of the process creating the object, the label of the parent
directory, and the type of object (reg, dir, char, block, etc.) This patch
adds a 4th criteria, the dentry name, thus we can distinguish between
creating a file in an etc_t directory called shadow and one called motd.
There is no file globbing, regex parsing, or anything mystical. Either the
policy exactly (strcmp) matches the dentry name of the object or it doesn't.
This patch has no changes from today if policy does not implement the new
rules.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
| ac76c05becb6beedbb458d0827d3deaa6f479a72 |
|
29-Nov-2010 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
selinux: convert part of the sym_val_to_name array to use flex_array
The sym_val_to_name type array can be quite large as it grows linearly with
the number of types. With known policies having over 5k types these
allocations are growing large enough that they are likely to fail. Convert
those to flex_array so no allocation is larger than PAGE_SIZE
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
| 23bdecb000c806cf4ec52764499a600f7200d7a9 |
|
29-Nov-2010 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
selinux: convert type_val_to_struct to flex_array
In rawhide type_val_to_struct will allocate 26848 bytes, an order 3
allocations. While this hasn't been seen to fail it isn't outside the
realm of possibiliy on systems with severe memory fragmentation. Convert
to flex_array so no allocation will ever be bigger than PAGE_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
| 7ae9f23cbd3ef9daff7f768da4bfd4c56b19300d |
|
23-Nov-2010 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
selinux: rework security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid
security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid is difficult to follow, especially the
return codes. Try to make the function obvious.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
| 4b02b524487622ce1cf472123899520b583f47dc |
|
23-Nov-2010 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: standardize return code handling in selinuxfs.c
selinuxfs.c has lots of different standards on how to handle return paths on
error. For the most part transition to
rc=errno
if (failure)
goto out;
[...]
out:
cleanup()
return rc;
Instead of doing cleanup mid function, or having multiple returns or other
options. This doesn't do that for every function, but most of the complex
functions which have cleanup routines on error.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
| f0d3d9894e43fc68d47948e2c6f03e32da88b799 |
|
20-Oct-2010 |
Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> |
selinux: include vmalloc.h for vmalloc_user
Include vmalloc.h for vmalloc_user (fixes ppc build warning).
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 845ca30fe9691f1bab7cfbf30b6d11c944eb4abd |
|
13-Oct-2010 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
selinux: implement mmap on /selinux/policy
/selinux/policy allows a user to copy the policy back out of the kernel.
This patch allows userspace to actually mmap that file and use it directly.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| cee74f47a6baba0ac457e87687fdcf0abd599f0a |
|
13-Oct-2010 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: allow userspace to read policy back out of the kernel
There is interest in being able to see what the actual policy is that was
loaded into the kernel. The patch creates a new selinuxfs file
/selinux/policy which can be read by userspace. The actual policy that is
loaded into the kernel will be written back out to userspace.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| d5630b9d276bd389299ffea620b7c340ab19bcf5 |
|
13-Oct-2010 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
security: secid_to_secctx returns len when data is NULL
With the (long ago) interface change to have the secid_to_secctx functions
do the string allocation instead of having the caller do the allocation we
lost the ability to query the security server for the length of the
upcoming string. The SECMARK code would like to allocate a netlink skb
with enough length to hold the string but it is just too unclean to do the
string allocation twice or to do the allocation the first time and hold
onto the string and slen. This patch adds the ability to call
security_secid_to_secctx() with a NULL data pointer and it will just set
the slen pointer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 119041672592d1890d89dd8f194bd0919d801dc8 |
|
14-Sep-2010 |
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> |
selinux: fast status update interface (/selinux/status)
This patch provides a new /selinux/status entry which allows applications
read-only mmap(2).
This region reflects selinux_kernel_status structure in kernel space.
struct selinux_kernel_status
{
u32 length; /* length of this structure */
u32 sequence; /* sequence number of seqlock logic */
u32 enforcing; /* current setting of enforcing mode */
u32 policyload; /* times of policy reloaded */
u32 deny_unknown; /* current setting of deny_unknown */
};
When userspace object manager caches access control decisions provided
by SELinux, it needs to invalidate the cache on policy reload and setenforce
to keep consistency.
However, the applications need to check the kernel state for each accesses
on userspace avc, or launch a background worker process.
In heuristic, frequency of invalidation is much less than frequency of
making access control decision, so it is annoying to invoke a system call
to check we don't need to invalidate the userspace cache.
If we can use a background worker thread, it allows to receive invalidation
messages from the kernel. But it requires us an invasive coding toward the
base application in some cases; E.g, when we provide a feature performing
with SELinux as a plugin module, it is unwelcome manner to launch its own
worker thread from the module.
If we could map /selinux/status to process memory space, application can
know updates of selinux status; policy reload or setenforce.
A typical application checks selinux_kernel_status::sequence when it tries
to reference userspace avc. If it was changed from the last time when it
checked userspace avc, it means something was updated in the kernel space.
Then, the application can reset userspace avc or update current enforcing
mode, without any system call invocations.
This sequence number is updated according to the seqlock logic, so we need
to wait for a while if it is odd number.
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
--
security/selinux/include/security.h | 21 ++++++
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 56 +++++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/Makefile | 2 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 +
security/selinux/ss/status.c | 129 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 6371dcd36f649d9d07823f31400618155a20dde1 |
|
30-Jul-2010 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
selinux: convert the policy type_attr_map to flex_array
Current selinux policy can have over 3000 types. The type_attr_map in
policy is an array sized by the number of types times sizeof(struct ebitmap)
(12 on x86_64). Basic math tells us the array is going to be of length
3000 x 12 = 36,000 bytes. The largest 'safe' allocation on a long running
system is 16k. Most of the time a 32k allocation will work. But on long
running systems a 64k allocation (what we need) can fail quite regularly.
In order to deal with this I am converting the type_attr_map to use
flex_arrays. Let the library code deal with breaking this into PAGE_SIZE
pieces.
-v2
rework some of the if(!obj) BUG() to be BUG_ON(!obj)
drop flex_array_put() calls and just use a _get() object directly
-v3
make apply to James' tree (drop the policydb_write changes)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| a200005038955057063fc8ea82129ebc785df41c |
|
20-Apr-2010 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: return error codes on policy load failure
policy load failure always return EINVAL even if the failure was for some
other reason (usually ENOMEM). This patch passes error codes back up the
stack where they will make their way to userspace. This might help in
debugging future problems with policy load.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| c1a7368a6f0b18b10fdec87972da680ebdf03794 |
|
09-Apr-2010 |
wzt.wzt@gmail.com <wzt.wzt@gmail.com> |
Security: Fix coding style in security/
Fix coding style in security/
Signed-off-by: Zhitong Wang <zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 2ae3ba39389b51d8502123de0a59374bec899c4d |
|
17-Feb-2010 |
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> |
selinux: libsepol: remove dead code in check_avtab_hierarchy_callback()
This patch revert the commit of 7d52a155e38d5a165759dbbee656455861bf7801
which removed a part of type_attribute_bounds_av as a dead code.
However, at that time, we didn't find out the target side boundary allows
to handle some of pseudo /proc/<pid>/* entries with its process's security
context well.
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
--
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 2da5d31bc72d0a36dc16af7f5d5baa4f86df9c76 |
|
16-Feb-2010 |
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
security: fix a couple of sparse warnings
Fix a couple of sparse warnings for callers of
context_struct_to_string, which takes a *u32, not an *int.
These cases are harmless as the values are not used.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
|
| 0719aaf5ead7555b7b7a4a080ebf2826a871384e |
|
03-Feb-2010 |
Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com> |
selinux: allow MLS->non-MLS and vice versa upon policy reload
Allow runtime switching between different policy types (e.g. from a MLS/MCS
policy to a non-MLS/non-MCS policy or viceversa).
Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 42596eafdd75257a640f64701b9b07090bcd84b0 |
|
03-Feb-2010 |
Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com> |
selinux: load the initial SIDs upon every policy load
Always load the initial SIDs, even in the case of a policy
reload and not just at the initial policy load. This comes
particularly handy after the introduction of a recent
patch for enabling runtime switching between different
policy types, although this patch is in theory independent
from that feature.
Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 7d52a155e38d5a165759dbbee656455861bf7801 |
|
21-Jan-2010 |
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> |
selinux: remove dead code in type_attribute_bounds_av()
This patch removes dead code in type_attribute_bounds_av().
Due to the historical reason, the type boundary feature is delivered
from hierarchical types in libsepol, it has supported boundary features
both of subject type (domain; in most cases) and target type.
However, we don't have any actual use cases in bounded target types,
and it tended to make conceptual confusion.
So, this patch removes the dead code to apply boundary checks on the
target types. I makes clear the TYPEBOUNDS restricts privileges of
a certain domain bounded to any other domain.
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
--
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 43 +++------------------------------------
1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 19439d05b88dafc4e55d9ffce84ccc27cf8b2bcc |
|
14-Jan-2010 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
selinux: change the handling of unknown classes
If allow_unknown==deny, SELinux treats an undefined kernel security
class as an error condition rather than as a typical permission denial
and thus does not allow permissions on undefined classes even when in
permissive mode. Change the SELinux logic so that this case is handled
as a typical permission denial, subject to the usual permissive mode and
permissive domain handling.
Also drop the 'requested' argument from security_compute_av() and
helpers as it is a legacy of the original security server interface and
is unused.
Changes:
- Handle permissive domains consistently by moving up the test for a
permissive domain.
- Make security_compute_av_user() consistent with security_compute_av();
the only difference now is that security_compute_av() performs mapping
between the kernel-private class and permission indices and the policy
values. In the userspace case, this mapping is handled by libselinux.
- Moved avd_init inside the policy lock.
Based in part on a patch by Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>.
Reported-by: Andrew Worsley <amworsley@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 9f59f90bf57cff8be07faddc608c400b6e7c5d05 |
|
06-Dec-2009 |
Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk> |
security/selinux/ss: correct size computation
The size argument to kcalloc should be the size of desired structure,
not the pointer to it.
The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)
// <smpl>
@expression@
expression *x;
@@
x =
<+...
-sizeof(x)
+sizeof(*x)
...+>// </smpl>
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| af901ca181d92aac3a7dc265144a9081a86d8f39 |
|
14-Nov-2009 |
André Goddard Rosa <andre.goddard@gmail.com> |
tree-wide: fix assorted typos all over the place
That is "success", "unknown", "through", "performance", "[re|un]mapping"
, "access", "default", "reasonable", "[con]currently", "temperature"
, "channel", "[un]used", "application", "example","hierarchy", "therefore"
, "[over|under]flow", "contiguous", "threshold", "enough" and others.
Signed-off-by: André Goddard Rosa <andre.goddard@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
|
| 0bce95279909aa4cc401a2e3140b4295ca22e72a |
|
23-Nov-2009 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: print denials for buggy kernel with unknown perms
Historically we've seen cases where permissions are requested for classes
where they do not exist. In particular we have seen CIFS forget to set
i_mode to indicate it is a directory so when we later check something like
remove_name we have problems since it wasn't defined in tclass file. This
used to result in a avc which included the permission 0x2000 or something.
Currently the kernel will deny the operations (good thing) but will not
print ANY information (bad thing). First the auditdeny field is no
extended to include unknown permissions. After that is fixed the logic in
avc_dump_query to output this information isn't right since it will remove
the permission from the av and print the phrase "<NULL>". This takes us
back to the behavior before the classmap rewrite.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| b7f3008ad1d795935551e4dd810b0255a7bfa3c9 |
|
19-Oct-2009 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
SELinux: fix locking issue introduced with c6d3aaa4e35c71a3
Ensure that we release the policy read lock on all exit paths from
security_compute_av.
Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 941fc5b2bf8f7dd1d0a9c502e152fa719ff6578e |
|
01-Oct-2009 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
selinux: drop remapping of netlink classes
Drop remapping of netlink classes and bypass of permission checking
based on netlink message type for policy version < 18. This removes
compatibility code introduced when the original single netlink
security class used for all netlink sockets was split into
finer-grained netlink classes based on netlink protocol and when
permission checking was added based on netlink message type in Linux
2.6.8. The only known distribution that shipped with SELinux and
policy < 18 was Fedora Core 2, which was EOL'd on 2005-04-11.
Given that the remapping code was never updated to address the
addition of newer netlink classes, that the corresponding userland
support was dropped in 2005, and that the assumptions made by the
remapping code about the fixed ordering among netlink classes in the
policy may be violated in the future due to the dynamic class/perm
discovery support, we should drop this compatibility code now.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| c6d3aaa4e35c71a32a86ececacd4eea7ecfc316c |
|
30-Sep-2009 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
selinux: dynamic class/perm discovery
Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values
upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery
logic from libselinux. A mapping is created between kernel-private
class and permission indices used outside the security server and the
policy values used within the security server.
The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations;
similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers
is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC. The
interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel
vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user
suffix.
The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy
values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes;
thus the kernel class index values are compressed. The flask.h
definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from
refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers. Going
forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and
classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer
tied to the policy values. The next patch introduces a utility to
automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the
classmap.h definitions.
The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and
replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at
policy load to generate the mapping. The old kernel class validation
logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic.
The handle unknown logic is reworked. reject_unknown=1 is handled
when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old
handling by the class validation logic. allow_unknown=1 is handled
when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able
to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is
automatically added to the allowed vector. If the class was not able
to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions
are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1.
avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the
class and permission names from the kernel-private indices.
The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the
class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the
kernel. It should be noted that this policy will not include any
userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel
classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match
the kernel-private indices).
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 44c2d9bdd7022ca7d240d5adc009296fc1c6ce08 |
|
18-Jun-2009 |
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> |
Add audit messages on type boundary violations
The attached patch adds support to generate audit messages on two cases.
The first one is a case when a multi-thread process tries to switch its
performing security context using setcon(3), but new security context is
not bounded by the old one.
type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1245311998.599:17): \
op=security_bounded_transition result=denied \
oldcontext=system_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 \
newcontext=system_u:system_r:guest_webapp_t:s0
The other one is a case when security_compute_av() masked any permissions
due to the type boundary violation.
type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1245312836.035:32): \
op=security_compute_av reason=bounds \
scontext=system_u:object_r:user_webapp_t:s0 \
tcontext=system_u:object_r:shadow_t:s0:c0 \
tclass=file perms=getattr,open
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| caabbdc07df4249f2ed516b2c3e2d6b0973bcbb3 |
|
18-Jun-2009 |
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> |
cleanup in ss/services.c
It is a cleanup patch to cut down a line within 80 columns.
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
--
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 6 +++---
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 8a6f83afd0c5355db6d11394a798e94950306239 |
|
01-Apr-2009 |
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> |
Permissive domain in userspace object manager
This patch enables applications to handle permissive domain correctly.
Since the v2.6.26 kernel, SELinux has supported an idea of permissive
domain which allows certain processes to work as if permissive mode,
even if the global setting is enforcing mode.
However, we don't have an application program interface to inform
what domains are permissive one, and what domains are not.
It means applications focuses on SELinux (XACE/SELinux, SE-PostgreSQL
and so on) cannot handle permissive domain correctly.
This patch add the sixth field (flags) on the reply of the /selinux/access
interface which is used to make an access control decision from userspace.
If the first bit of the flags field is positive, it means the required
access control decision is on permissive domain, so application should
allow any required actions, as the kernel doing.
This patch also has a side benefit. The av_decision.flags is set at
context_struct_compute_av(). It enables to check required permissions
without read_lock(&policy_rwlock).
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
--
security/selinux/avc.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/include/security.h | 4 +++-
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 4 ++--
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 30 +++++-------------------------
4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| f1c6381a6e337adcecf84be2a838bd9e610e2365 |
|
12-Feb-2009 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: remove unused av.decided field
It appears there was an intention to have the security server only decide
certain permissions and leave other for later as some sort of a portential
performance win. We are currently always deciding all 32 bits of
permissions and this is a useless couple of branches and wasted space.
This patch completely drops the av.decided concept.
This in a 17% reduction in the time spent in avc_has_perm_noaudit
based on oprofile sampling of a tbench benchmark.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 5af75d8d58d0f9f7b7c0515b35786b22892d5f12 |
|
16-Dec-2008 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
audit: validate comparison operations, store them in sane form
Don't store the field->op in the messy (and very inconvenient for e.g.
audit_comparator()) form; translate to dense set of values and do full
validation of userland-submitted value while we are at it.
->audit_init_rule() and ->audit_match_rule() get new values now; in-tree
instances updated.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
| 8d75899d033617316e06296b7c0729612f56aba0 |
|
10-Oct-2008 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
netlabel: Changes to the NetLabel security attributes to allow LSMs to pass full contexts
This patch provides support for including the LSM's secid in addition to
the LSM's MLS information in the NetLabel security attributes structure.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 99d854d231ce141850b988bdc7e2e7c78f49b03a |
|
10-Oct-2008 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
selinux: Fix a problem in security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr()
Currently when SELinux fails to allocate memory in
security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr() the NetLabel LSM domain field is set to
NULL which triggers the default NetLabel LSM domain mapping which may not
always be the desired mapping. This patch fixes this by returning an error
when the kernel is unable to allocate memory. This could result in more
failures on a system with heavy memory pressure but it is the "correct"
thing to do.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 3040a6d5a2655c7967bd42b5fb4903d48daa747f |
|
03-Oct-2008 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
selinux: Fix an uninitialized variable BUG/panic in selinux_secattr_to_sid()
At some point during the 2.6.27 development cycle two new fields were added
to the SELinux context structure, a string pointer and a length field. The
code in selinux_secattr_to_sid() was not modified and as a result these two
fields were left uninitialized which could result in erratic behavior,
including kernel panics, when NetLabel is used. This patch fixes the
problem by fully initializing the context in selinux_secattr_to_sid() before
use and reducing the level of direct context manipulation done to help
prevent future problems.
Please apply this to the 2.6.27-rcX release stream.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 81990fbdd18b9cfdc93dc221ff3250f81468aed8 |
|
03-Oct-2008 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
selinux: Fix an uninitialized variable BUG/panic in selinux_secattr_to_sid()
At some point during the 2.6.27 development cycle two new fields were added
to the SELinux context structure, a string pointer and a length field. The
code in selinux_secattr_to_sid() was not modified and as a result these two
fields were left uninitialized which could result in erratic behavior,
including kernel panics, when NetLabel is used. This patch fixes the
problem by fully initializing the context in selinux_secattr_to_sid() before
use and reducing the level of direct context manipulation done to help
prevent future problems.
Please apply this to the 2.6.27-rcX release stream.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 8e531af90f3940615623dc0aa6c94866a6773601 |
|
03-Sep-2008 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: memory leak in security_context_to_sid_core
Fix a bug and a philosophical decision about who handles errors.
security_context_to_sid_core() was leaking a context in the common case.
This was causing problems on fedora systems which recently have started
making extensive use of this function.
In discussion it was decided that if string_to_context_struct() had an
error it was its own responsibility to clean up any mess it created
along the way.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| d9250dea3f89fe808a525f08888016b495240ed4 |
|
28-Aug-2008 |
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> |
SELinux: add boundary support and thread context assignment
The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context
under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application
to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and
helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request.
When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider
permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process
shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context
also means another thread can easily refer violated information.
The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain
has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign
a per-thread security context.
Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can
never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two
explicit or implicit ways.
The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define
a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of
existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated
name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t".
This feature requires a new policy version.
The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into
kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it.
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| dbc74c65b3fd841985935f676388c82d6b85c485 |
|
07-Aug-2008 |
Vesa-Matti Kari <vmkari@cc.helsinki.fi> |
selinux: Unify for- and while-loop style
Replace "thing != NULL" comparisons with just "thing" to make
the code look more uniform (mixed styles were used even in the
same source file).
Signed-off-by: Vesa-Matti Kari <vmkari@cc.helsinki.fi>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 089be43e403a78cd6889cde2fba164fefe9dfd89 |
|
15-Jul-2008 |
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
Revert "SELinux: allow fstype unknown to policy to use xattrs if present"
This reverts commit 811f3799279e567aa354c649ce22688d949ac7a9.
From Eric Paris:
"Please drop this patch for now. It deadlocks on ntfs-3g. I need to
rework it to handle fuse filesystems better. (casey was right)"
|
| 811f3799279e567aa354c649ce22688d949ac7a9 |
|
18-Jun-2008 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: allow fstype unknown to policy to use xattrs if present
Currently if a FS is mounted for which SELinux policy does not define an
fs_use_* that FS will either be genfs labeled or not labeled at all.
This decision is based on the existence of a genfscon rule in policy and
is irrespective of the capabilities of the filesystem itself. This
patch allows the kernel to check if the filesystem supports security
xattrs and if so will use those if there is no fs_use_* rule in policy.
An fstype with a no fs_use_* rule but with a genfs rule will use xattrs
if available and will follow the genfs rule.
This can be particularly interesting for things like ecryptfs which
actually overlays a real underlying FS. If we define excryptfs in
policy to use xattrs we will likely get this wrong at times, so with
this path we just don't need to define it!
Overlay ecryptfs on top of NFS with no xattr support:
SELinux: initialized (dev ecryptfs, type ecryptfs), uses genfs_contexts
Overlay ecryptfs on top of ext4 with xattr support:
SELinux: initialized (dev ecryptfs, type ecryptfs), uses xattr
It is also useful as the kernel adds new FS we don't need to add them in
policy if they support xattrs and that is how we want to handle them.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 6cbe27061a69ab89d25dbe42d1a4f33a8425fe88 |
|
09-Jun-2008 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: more user friendly unknown handling printk
I've gotten complaints and reports about people not understanding the
meaning of the current unknown class/perm handling the kernel emits on
every policy load. Hopefully this will make make it clear to everyone
the meaning of the message and won't waste a printk the user won't care
about anyway on systems where the kernel and the policy agree on
everything.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 22df4adb049a5cbb340dd935f5bbfa1ab3947562 |
|
09-Jun-2008 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
selinux: change handling of invalid classes (Was: Re: 2.6.26-rc5-mm1 selinux whine)
On Mon, 2008-06-09 at 01:24 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> Getting a few of these with FC5:
>
> SELinux: context_struct_compute_av: unrecognized class 69
> SELinux: context_struct_compute_av: unrecognized class 69
>
> one came out when I logged in.
>
> No other symptoms, yet.
Change handling of invalid classes by SELinux, reporting class values
unknown to the kernel as errors (w/ ratelimit applied) and handling
class values unknown to policy as normal denials.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 89abd0acf0335f3f760a3c0698d43bb1eaa83e44 |
|
09-Jun-2008 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: drop load_mutex in security_load_policy
We used to protect against races of policy load in security_load_policy
by using the load_mutex. Since then we have added a new mutex,
sel_mutex, in sel_write_load() which is always held across all calls to
security_load_policy we are covered and can safely just drop this one.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| cea78dc4ca044e9666e8f5d797ec50ab85253e49 |
|
09-Jun-2008 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: fix off by 1 reference of class_to_string in context_struct_compute_av
The class_to_string array is referenced by tclass. My code mistakenly
was using tclass - 1. If the proceeding class is a userspace class
rather than kernel class this may cause a denial/EINVAL even if unknown
handling is set to allow. The bug shouldn't be allowing excess
privileges since those are given based on the contents of another array
which should be correctly referenced.
At this point in time its pretty unlikely this is going to cause
problems. The most recently added kernel classes which could be
affected are association, dccp_socket, and peer. Its pretty unlikely
any policy with handle_unknown=allow doesn't have association and
dccp_socket undefined (they've been around longer than unknown handling)
and peer is conditionalized on a policy cap which should only be defined
if that class exists in policy.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 972ccac2b237967ed7e56a50eb181b5a0a484b79 |
|
06-Jun-2008 |
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
SELinux: open code load_mutex
Open code load_mutex as suggested by Andrew Morton.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 0804d1133c02cbdfba0055de774f2c21a8b777dc |
|
06-Jun-2008 |
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
SELinux: open code policy_rwlock
Open code policy_rwlock, as suggested by Andrew Morton.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
|
| f5269710789f666a65cf1132c4f1d14fbc8d3c29 |
|
14-May-2008 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: keep the code clean formating and syntax
Formatting and syntax changes
whitespace, tabs to spaces, trailing space
put open { on same line as struct def
remove unneeded {} after if statements
change printk("Lu") to printk("llu")
convert asm/uaccess.h to linux/uaacess.h includes
remove unnecessary asm/bug.h includes
convert all users of simple_strtol to strict_strtol
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 9a59daa03df72526d234b91dd3e32ded5aebd3ef |
|
14-May-2008 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
SELinux: fix sleeping allocation in security_context_to_sid
Fix a sleeping function called from invalid context bug by moving allocation
to the callers prior to taking the policy rdlock.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 12b29f34558b9b45a2c6eabd4f3c6be939a3980f |
|
07-May-2008 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
selinux: support deferred mapping of contexts
Introduce SELinux support for deferred mapping of security contexts in
the SID table upon policy reload, and use this support for inode
security contexts when the context is not yet valid under the current
policy. Only processes with CAP_MAC_ADMIN + mac_admin permission in
policy can set undefined security contexts on inodes. Inodes with
such undefined contexts are treated as having the unlabeled context
until the context becomes valid upon a policy reload that defines the
context. Context invalidation upon policy reload also uses this
support to save the context information in the SID table and later
recover it upon a subsequent policy reload that defines the context
again.
This support is to enable package managers and similar programs to set
down file contexts unknown to the system policy at the time the file
is created in order to better support placing loadable policy modules
in packages and to support build systems that need to create images of
different distro releases with different policies w/o requiring all of
the contexts to be defined or legal in the build host policy.
With this patch applied, the following sequence is possible, although
in practice it is recommended that this permission only be allowed to
specific program domains such as the package manager.
# rmdir baz
# rm bar
# touch bar
# chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined
chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument
# mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument
# cat setundefined.te
policy_module(setundefined, 1.0)
require {
type unconfined_t;
type unlabeled_t;
}
files_type(unlabeled_t)
allow unconfined_t self:capability2 mac_admin;
# make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile setundefined.pp
# semodule -i setundefined.pp
# chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined
# mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
# ls -Zd bar baz
-rw-r--r-- root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t bar
drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t baz
# cat foo.te
policy_module(foo, 1.0)
type foo_exec_t;
files_type(foo_exec_t)
# make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile foo.pp
# semodule -i foo.pp # defines foo_exec_t
# ls -Zd bar baz
-rw-r--r-- root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t bar
drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
# semodule -r foo
# ls -Zd bar baz
-rw-r--r-- root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t bar
drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t baz
# semodule -i foo.pp
# ls -Zd bar baz
-rw-r--r-- root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t bar
drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
# semodule -r setundefined foo
# chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # no longer defined and not allowed
chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument
# rmdir baz
# mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| e52c1764f18a62776a0f2bc6752fb76b6e345827 |
|
29-Apr-2008 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
Security: Make secctx_to_secid() take const secdata
Make secctx_to_secid() take constant secdata.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 7bf570dc8dcf76df2a9f583bef2da96d4289ed0d |
|
29-Apr-2008 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
Security: Make secctx_to_secid() take const secdata
Make secctx_to_secid() take constant secdata.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
| 8f0cfa52a1d4ffacd8e7de906d19662f5da58d58 |
|
29-Apr-2008 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
xattr: add missing consts to function arguments
Add missing consts to xattr function arguments.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
| 744ba35e455b0d5cf4f85208a8ca0edcc9976b95 |
|
17-Apr-2008 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: clean up printks
Make sure all printk start with KERN_*
Make sure all printk end with \n
Make sure all printk have the word 'selinux' in them
Change "function name" to "%s", __func__ (found 2 wrong)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 5d55a345c09ef1708bd341395792931a66306ba6 |
|
18-Apr-2008 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: services.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups
This patch changes services.c to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
locateion of { around struct and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 9d57a7f9e23dc30783d245280fc9907cf2c87837 |
|
01-Mar-2008 |
Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> |
SELinux: use new audit hooks, remove redundant exports
Setup the new Audit LSM hooks for SELinux.
Remove the now redundant exported SELinux Audit interface.
Audit: Export 'audit_krule' and 'audit_field' to the public
since their internals are needed by the implementation of the
new LSM hook 'audit_rule_known'.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 3e11217263d0521e212cb8a017fbc2a1514db78f |
|
10-Apr-2008 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
SELinux: Add network port SID cache
Much like we added a network node cache, this patch adds a network port
cache. The design is taken almost completely from the network node cache
which in turn was taken from the network interface cache. The basic idea is
to cache entries in a hash table based on protocol/port information. The
hash function only takes the port number into account since the number of
different protocols in use at any one time is expected to be relatively
small.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 0e55a004b58847c53e48d846b9a4570b1587c382 |
|
31-Mar-2008 |
Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> |
selinux/ss/services.c should #include <linux/selinux.h>
Every file should include the headers containing the externs for its global
code.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 64dbf07474d011540ca479a2e87fe998f570d6e3 |
|
30-Mar-2008 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
selinux: introduce permissive types
Introduce the concept of a permissive type. A new ebitmap is introduced to
the policy database which indicates if a given type has the permissive bit
set or not. This bit is tested for the scontext of any denial. The bit is
meaningless on types which only appear as the target of a decision and never
the source. A domain running with a permissive type will be allowed to
perform any action similarly to when the system is globally set permissive.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| dd6f953adb5c4deb9cd7b6a5054e7d5eafe4ed71 |
|
06-Mar-2008 |
Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com> |
security: replace remaining __FUNCTION__ occurrences
__FUNCTION__ is gcc-specific, use __func__
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| b0c636b99997c8594da6a46e166ce4fcf6956fda |
|
28-Feb-2008 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: create new open permission
Adds a new open permission inside SELinux when 'opening' a file. The idea
is that opening a file and reading/writing to that file are not the same
thing. Its different if a program had its stdout redirected to /tmp/output
than if the program tried to directly open /tmp/output. This should allow
policy writers to more liberally give read/write permissions across the
policy while still blocking many design and programing flaws SELinux is so
good at catching today.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 454d972c24e6efce3d7b07a97f1ad18b14845de9 |
|
26-Feb-2008 |
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
SELinux: unify printk messages
Replace "security:" prefixes in printk messages with "SELinux"
to help users identify the source of the messages. Also fix a
couple of minor formatting issues.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 00447872a643787411c2c0cb1df6169dda8b0c47 |
|
13-Apr-2008 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
NetLabel: Allow passing the LSM domain as a shared pointer
Smack doesn't have the need to create a private copy of the LSM "domain" when
setting NetLabel security attributes like SELinux, however, the current
NetLabel code requires a private copy of the LSM "domain". This patches fixes
that by letting the LSM determine how it wants to pass the domain value.
* NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY
The current behavior, NetLabel assumes that the domain value is a copy and
frees it when done
* NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN
New, Smack-friendly behavior, NetLabel assumes that the domain value is a
reference to a string managed by the LSM and does not free it when done
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
| 869ab5147e1eead890245cfd4f652ba282b6ac26 |
|
04-Apr-2008 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
SELinux: more GFP_NOFS fixups to prevent selinux from re-entering the fs code
More cases where SELinux must not re-enter the fs code. Called from the
d_instantiate security hook.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 394c6753978a75cab7558a377f2551a3c1101027 |
|
05-Feb-2008 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
SELinux: Remove security_get_policycaps()
The security_get_policycaps() functions has a couple of bugs in it and it
isn't currently used by any in-tree code, so get rid of it and all of it's
bugginess.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@localhost.localdomain>
|
| 4746ec5b01ed07205a91e4f7ed9de9d70f371407 |
|
08-Jan-2008 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
[AUDIT] add session id to audit messages
In order to correlate audit records to an individual login add a session
id. This is incremented every time a user logs in and is included in
almost all messages which currently output the auid. The field is
labeled ses= or oses=
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
|
| 0c11b9428f619ab377c92eff2f160a834a6585dd |
|
10-Jan-2008 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
[PATCH] switch audit_get_loginuid() to task_struct *
all callers pass something->audit_context
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
| e1770d97a730ff4c3aa1775d98f4d0558390607f |
|
29-Jan-2008 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
[SELinux]: Fix double free in selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid()
As pointed out by Adrian Bunk, commit
45c950e0f839fded922ebc0bfd59b1081cc71b70 ("fix memory leak in netlabel
code") caused a double-free when security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr()
fails. This patch fixes this by removing the netlbl_secattr_destroy()
call from that function since we are already releasing the secattr
memory in selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid().
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
| 5dbe1eb0cfc144a2b0cb1466e22bcb6fc34229a8 |
|
29-Jan-2008 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
SELinux: Allow NetLabel to directly cache SIDs
Now that the SELinux NetLabel "base SID" is always the netmsg initial SID we
can do a big optimization - caching the SID and not just the MLS attributes.
This not only saves a lot of per-packet memory allocations and copies but it
has a nice side effect of removing a chunk of code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 220deb966ea51e0dedb6a187c0763120809f3e64 |
|
29-Jan-2008 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
SELinux: Better integration between peer labeling subsystems
Rework the handling of network peer labels so that the different peer labeling
subsystems work better together. This includes moving both subsystems to a
single "peer" object class which involves not only changes to the permission
checks but an improved method of consolidating multiple packet peer labels.
As part of this work the inbound packet permission check code has been heavily
modified to handle both the old and new behavior in as sane a fashion as
possible.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 3bb56b25dbe0a4b44bd2ebceab6736d068e85068 |
|
29-Jan-2008 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
SELinux: Add a capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22
Add a new policy capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22. This bitmap
will enable the security server to query the policy to determine which features
it supports.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| e8bfdb9d0dfc1231a6a71e849dfbd4447acdfff6 |
|
29-Jan-2008 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
SELinux: Convert the netif code to use ifindex values
The current SELinux netif code requires the caller have a valid net_device
struct pointer to lookup network interface information. However, we don't
always have a valid net_device pointer so convert the netif code to use
the ifindex values we always have as part of the sk_buff. This patch also
removes the default message SID from the network interface record, it is
not being used and therefore is "dead code".
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 16efd45435fa695b501b7f73c3259bd7c77cc12c |
|
29-Jan-2008 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
NetLabel: Add secid token support to the NetLabel secattr struct
This patch adds support to the NetLabel LSM secattr struct for a secid token
and a type field, paving the way for full LSM/SELinux context support and
"static" or "fallback" labels. In addition, this patch adds a fair amount
of documentation to the core NetLabel structures used as part of the
NetLabel kernel API.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| b1aa5301b9f88a4891061650c591fb8fe1c1d1da |
|
25-Jan-2008 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
selinux: fix labeling of /proc/net inodes
The proc net rewrite had a side effect on selinux, leading it to mislabel
the /proc/net inodes, thereby leading to incorrect denials. Fix
security_genfs_sid to ignore extra leading / characters in the path supplied
by selinux_proc_get_sid since we now get "//net/..." rather than "/net/...".
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 45c950e0f839fded922ebc0bfd59b1081cc71b70 |
|
21-Jan-2008 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
selinux: fix memory leak in netlabel code
Fix a memory leak in security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr() as reported here:
* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=352281
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 9fe79ad1e43d236bbbb8edb3cf634356de714c79 |
|
28-Sep-2007 |
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> |
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses.
* We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on
any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance
using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h.
In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination
of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse
in performance aspect.
This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry,
so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen.
* struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get
suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of
shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated
from general purpose slab.
* Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation
in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are
changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous
version.
* The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars.
The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we
access many files which have different security context one after
another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so
any access always causes AVC misses.
selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap
AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s]
STD: 0.265 0.019
------------------------------------------
1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s]
2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s]
3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s]
4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s]
5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s]
6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s]
7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s]
8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s]
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 3f12070e27b4a213d62607d2bff139793089a77d |
|
21-Sep-2007 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
SELinux: policy selectable handling of unknown classes and perms
Allow policy to select, in much the same way as it selects MLS support, how
the kernel should handle access decisions which contain either unknown
classes or unknown permissions in known classes. The three choices for the
policy flags are
0 - Deny unknown security access. (default)
2 - reject loading policy if it does not contain all definitions
4 - allow unknown security access
The policy's choice is exported through 2 booleans in
selinuxfs. /selinux/deny_unknown and /selinux/reject_unknown.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 3ad40d647d5e7c320385649e5eb422a5e89e035d |
|
14-Aug-2007 |
Steve G <linux_4ever@yahoo.com> |
SELinux: correct error code in selinux_audit_rule_init
Corrects an error code so that it is valid to pass to userspace.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <linux_4ever@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@halo.namei>
|
| d133a9609ee6111c9718a4bbe559b84a399603e6 |
|
31-Jul-2007 |
Gabriel Craciunescu <nix.or.die@googlemail.com> |
Typo fixes errror -> error
Typo fixes errror -> error
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Craciunescu <nix.or.die@googlemail.com>
Cc: Jeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
| 0ec8abd7086ee4f760cb1b477fe376805b17558c |
|
21-Jul-2007 |
Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com> |
SELinux: fix memory leak in security_netlbl_cache_add()
Fix memory leak in security_netlbl_cache_add()
Note: The Coverity checker gets credit for spotting this one.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
|
| 2c3c05dbcbc7b9d71549fe0e2b249f10f5a66518 |
|
07-Jun-2007 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
SELinux: allow preemption between transition permission checks
In security_get_user_sids, move the transition permission checks
outside of the section holding the policy rdlock, and use the AVC to
perform the checks, calling cond_resched after each one. These
changes should allow preemption between the individual checks and
enable caching of the results. It may however increase the overall
time spent in the function in some cases, particularly in the cache
miss case.
The long term fix will be to take much of this logic to userspace by
exporting additional state via selinuxfs, and ultimately deprecating
and eliminating this interface from the kernel.
Tested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 55fcf09b3fe4325c9395ebbb0322a547a157ebc7 |
|
23-May-2007 |
Christopher J. PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com> |
selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy
Add support to the SELinux security server for obtaining a list of classes,
and for obtaining a list of permissions for a specified class.
Signed-off-by: Christopher J. PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| e900a7d90ae1486ac95c10e0b7337fc2c2eda529 |
|
19-Apr-2007 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
selinux: preserve boolean values across policy reloads
At present, the userland policy loading code has to go through contortions to preserve
boolean values across policy reloads, and cannot do so atomically.
As this is what we always want to do for reloads, let the kernel preserve them instead.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@mentalrootkit.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| f0ee2e467ffa68c3122128b704c1540ee294b748 |
|
04-Apr-2007 |
James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov> |
selinux: export initial SID contexts via selinuxfs
Make the initial SID contexts accessible to userspace via selinuxfs.
An initial use of this support will be to make the unlabeled context
available to libselinux for use for invalidated userspace SIDs.
Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| a764ae4b0781fac75f9657bc737c37ae59888389 |
|
26-Mar-2007 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
selinux: remove userland security class and permission definitions
Remove userland security class and permission definitions from the kernel
as the kernel only needs to use and validate its own class and permission
definitions and userland definitions may change.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 4f6a993f96a256e83b9be7612f958c7bc4ca9f00 |
|
01-Mar-2007 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
SELinux: move security_skb_extlbl_sid() out of the security server
As suggested, move the security_skb_extlbl_sid() function out of the security
server and into the SELinux hooks file.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| c60475bf35fc5fa10198df89187ab148527e72f7 |
|
28-Feb-2007 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
SELinux: rename selinux_netlabel.h to netlabel.h
In the beginning I named the file selinux_netlabel.h to avoid potential
namespace colisions. However, over time I have realized that there are several
other similar cases of multiple header files with the same name so I'm changing
the name to something which better fits with existing naming conventions.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 5778eabd9cdbf16ea3e40248c452b4fd25554d11 |
|
28-Feb-2007 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
SELinux: extract the NetLabel SELinux support from the security server
Up until this patch the functions which have provided NetLabel support to
SELinux have been integrated into the SELinux security server, which for
various reasons is not really ideal. This patch makes an effort to extract as
much of the NetLabel support from the security server as possibile and move it
into it's own file within the SELinux directory structure.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 4f4acf3a478d5cada688f336f2229ab580f56113 |
|
26-Feb-2007 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
Always initialize scontext and scontext_len
Always initialize *scontext and *scontext_len in security_sid_to_context.
(via http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/2/23/135)
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 342a0cff0ad5fba6b591cfa37db3c65c4d9913f8 |
|
27-Jan-2007 |
Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> |
[SELINUX]: Fix 2.6.20-rc6 build when no xfrm
This patch is an incremental fix to the flow_cache_genid
patch for selinux that breaks the build of 2.6.20-rc6 when
xfrm is not configured.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
| 334c85569b8adeaa820c0f2fab3c8f0a9dc8b92e |
|
16-Jan-2007 |
Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> |
[SELINUX]: increment flow cache genid
Currently, old flow cache entries remain valid even after
a reload of SELinux policy.
This patch increments the flow cache generation id
on policy (re)loads so that flow cache entries are
revalidated as needed.
Thanks to Herbet Xu for pointing this out. See:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-netdev&m=116841378704536&w=2
There's also a general issue as well as a solution proposed
by David Miller for when flow_cache_genid wraps. I might be
submitting a separate patch for that later.
I request that this be applied to 2.6.20 since it's
a security relevant fix.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
| 797951200679f1d5ea12a2e58cc7bdbc2848764c |
|
05-Jan-2007 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
NetLabel: correct locking in selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid()
The spinlock protecting the update of the "sksec->nlbl_state" variable is not
currently softirq safe which can lead to problems. This patch fixes this by
changing the spin_{un}lock() functions into spin_{un}lock_bh() functions.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 0efc61eaee5471acd7399c8536feff280b4966dd |
|
12-Dec-2006 |
Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> |
selinux: Delete mls_copy_context
This deletes mls_copy_context() in favor of mls_context_cpy() and
replaces mls_scopy_context() with mls_context_cpy_low().
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 9883a13c72dbf8c518814b6091019643cdb34429 |
|
02-Jan-2007 |
Parag Warudkar <paragw@paragw.zapto.org> |
[PATCH] selinux: fix selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() locking
do not call a sleeping lock API in an RCU read section.
lock_sock_nested can sleep, its BH counterpart doesn't.
selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() needs to use the BH counterpart
unconditionally.
Compile tested.
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
added BH disabling, because this function can be called from non-atomic
contexts too, so a naked bh_lock_sock() would be deadlock-prone.
Boot-tested the resulting kernel.
Signed-off-by: Parag Warudkar <paragw@paragw.zapto.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
| 02752760359db6b00a3ffb1acfc13ef8d9eb1e3f |
|
29-Nov-2006 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
NetLabel: convert to an extensibile/sparse category bitmap
The original NetLabel category bitmap was a straight char bitmap which worked
fine for the initial release as it only supported 240 bits due to limitations
in the CIPSO restricted bitmap tag (tag type 0x01). This patch converts that
straight char bitmap into an extensibile/sparse bitmap in order to lay the
foundation for other CIPSO tag types and protocols.
This patch also has a nice side effect in that all of the security attributes
passed by NetLabel into the LSM are now in a format which is in the host's
native byte/bit ordering which makes the LSM specific code much simpler; look
at the changes in security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c as an example.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 3de4bab5b9f8848a0c16a4b1ffe0452f0d670237 |
|
17-Nov-2006 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
SELinux: peer secid consolidation for external network labeling
Now that labeled IPsec makes use of the peer_sid field in the
sk_security_struct we can remove a lot of the special cases between labeled
IPsec and NetLabel. In addition, create a new function,
security_skb_extlbl_sid(), which we can use in several places to get the
security context of the packet's external label which allows us to further
simplify the code in a few places.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 9f2ad66509b182b399a5b03de487f45bde623524 |
|
17-Nov-2006 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
NetLabel: SELinux cleanups
This patch does a lot of cleanup in the SELinux NetLabel support code. A
summary of the changes include:
* Use RCU locking for the NetLabel state variable in the skk_security_struct
instead of using the inode_security_struct mutex.
* Remove unnecessary parameters in selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create().
* Rename selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security() to
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone() to better fit the other NetLabel
sk_security functions.
* Improvements to selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() to help reduce the cost of
the common case.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 701a90bad99b8081a824cca52c178c8fc8f46bb2 |
|
17-Nov-2006 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
NetLabel: make netlbl_lsm_secattr struct easier/quicker to understand
The existing netlbl_lsm_secattr struct required the LSM to check all of the
fields to determine if any security attributes were present resulting in a lot
of work in the common case of no attributes. This patch adds a 'flags' field
which is used to indicate which attributes are present in the structure; this
should allow the LSM to do a quick comparison to determine if the structure
holds any security attributes.
Example:
if (netlbl_lsm_secattr->flags)
/* security attributes present */
else
/* NO security attributes present */
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| b94c7e677b9d28bd3f9ba4a70df6bfa7942867ca |
|
06-Nov-2006 |
Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com> |
SELinux: validate kernel object classes and permissions
This is a new object class and permission validation scheme that validates
against the defined kernel headers. This scheme allows extra classes
and permissions that do not conflict with the kernel definitions to be
added to the policy. This validation is now done for all policy loads,
not just subsequent loads after the first policy load.
The implementation walks the three structrures containing the defined
object class and permission values and ensures their values are the
same in the policy being loaded. This includes verifying the object
classes themselves, the permissions they contain, and the permissions
they inherit from commons. Classes or permissions that are present in the
kernel but missing from the policy cause a warning (printed to KERN_INFO)
to be printed, but do not stop the policy from loading, emulating current
behavior. Any other inconsistencies cause the load to fail.
Signed-off-by: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 5a64d4438ed1e759ccd30d9e90842bf360f19298 |
|
06-Nov-2006 |
Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com> |
SELinux: remove current object class and permission validation mechanism
Removes the current SELinux object class and permission validation code,
as the current code makes it impossible to change or remove object classes
and permissions on a running system. Additionally, the current code does
not actually validate that the classes and permissions are correct, but
instead merely validates that they do not change between policy reloads.
Signed-off-by: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| f8687afefcc821fc47c75775eec87731fe3de360 |
|
31-Oct-2006 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
[NetLabel]: protect the CIPSOv4 socket option from setsockopt()
This patch makes two changes to protect applications from either removing or
tampering with the CIPSOv4 IP option on a socket. The first is the requirement
that applications have the CAP_NET_RAW capability to set an IPOPT_CIPSO option
on a socket; this prevents untrusted applications from setting their own
CIPSOv4 security attributes on the packets they send. The second change is to
SELinux and it prevents applications from setting any IPv4 options when there
is an IPOPT_CIPSO option already present on the socket; this prevents
applications from removing CIPSOv4 security attributes from the packets they
send.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
| bf0edf39296097f20c5fcc4919ed7d339194bd75 |
|
12-Oct-2006 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
NetLabel: better error handling involving mls_export_cat()
Upon inspection it looked like the error handling for mls_export_cat() was
rather poor. This patch addresses this by NULL'ing out kfree()'d pointers
before returning and checking the return value of the function everywhere
it is called.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 388b24057f90ba109d4bf855006a8809c383eb76 |
|
06-Oct-2006 |
paul.moore@hp.com <paul.moore@hp.com> |
NetLabel: use SECINITSID_UNLABELED for a base SID
This patch changes NetLabel to use SECINITSID_UNLABLELED as it's source of
SELinux type information when generating a NetLabel context.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| ffb733c65000ee701294f7b80c4eca2a5f335637 |
|
04-Oct-2006 |
paul.moore@hp.com <paul.moore@hp.com> |
NetLabel: fix a cache race condition
Testing revealed a problem with the NetLabel cache where a cached entry could
be freed while in use by the LSM layer causing an oops and other problems.
This patch fixes that problem by introducing a reference counter to the cache
entry so that it is only freed when it is no longer in use.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| 23970741720360de9dd0a4e87fbeb1d5927aa474 |
|
26-Sep-2006 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
[PATCH] SELinux: change isec semaphore to a mutex
This patch converts the remaining isec->sem into a mutex. Very similar
locking is provided as before only in the faster smaller mutex rather than a
semaphore. An out_unlock path is introduced rather than the conditional
unlocking found in the original code.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
| 9a2f44f01a67a6ecca71515af999895b45a2aeb0 |
|
26-Sep-2006 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
[PATCH] selinux: replace ctxid with sid in selinux_audit_rule_match interface
Replace ctxid with sid in selinux_audit_rule_match interface for
consistency with other interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
| df2115c3134d0d1a18c1f37f5192394e7f64d1e0 |
|
26-Sep-2006 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
[NetLabel]: change the SELinux permissions
Change NetLabel to use the 'recvfrom' socket permission and the
SECINITSID_NETMSG SELinux SID as the NetLabel base SID for incoming packets.
This patch effectively makes the old, and currently unused, SELinux NETMSG
permissions NetLabel permissions.
Signed-of-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
| 14a72f53fb1bb5d5c2bdd8cf172219519664729a |
|
26-Sep-2006 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
[NetLabel]: correct improper handling of non-NetLabel peer contexts
Fix a problem where NetLabel would always set the value of
sk_security_struct->peer_sid in selinux_netlbl_sock_graft() to the context of
the socket, causing problems when users would query the context of the
connection. This patch fixes this so that the value in
sk_security_struct->peer_sid is only set when the connection is NetLabel based,
otherwise the value is untouched.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
| 4eb327b517cf85f6cb7dcd5691e7b748cbe8c343 |
|
19-Sep-2006 |
Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> |
[SELINUX]: Fix bug in security_sid_mls_copy
The following fixes a bug where random mem is being tampered with in the
non-mls case; encountered by Jashua Brindle on a gentoo box.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| e448e931309e703f51d71a557973c620ff12fbda |
|
30-Aug-2006 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
[NetLabel]: uninline selinux_netlbl_inode_permission()
Uninline the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() at the request of
Andrew Morton.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
| c1b14c0a46232246f61d3157bac1201e1e102227 |
|
30-Aug-2006 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
[NetLabel]: Comment corrections.
Fix some incorrect comments.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
| 99f59ed073d3c1b890690064ab285a201dea2e35 |
|
30-Aug-2006 |
Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> |
[NetLabel]: Correctly initialize the NetLabel fields.
Fix a problem where the NetLabel specific fields of the sk_security_struct
structure were not being initialized early enough in some cases.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
| 7420ed23a4f77480b5b7b3245e5da30dd24b7575 |
|
05-Aug-2006 |
Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> |
[NetLabel]: SELinux support
Add NetLabel support to the SELinux LSM and modify the
socket_post_create() LSM hook to return an error code. The most
significant part of this patch is the addition of NetLabel hooks into
the following SELinux LSM hooks:
* selinux_file_permission()
* selinux_socket_sendmsg()
* selinux_socket_post_create()
* selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb()
* selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream()
* selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram()
* selinux_sock_graft()
* selinux_inet_conn_request()
The basic reasoning behind this patch is that outgoing packets are
"NetLabel'd" by labeling their socket and the NetLabel security
attributes are checked via the additional hook in
selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(). NetLabel itself is only a labeling
mechanism, similar to filesystem extended attributes, it is up to the
SELinux enforcement mechanism to perform the actual access checks.
In addition to the changes outlined above this patch also includes
some changes to the extended bitmap (ebitmap) and multi-level security
(mls) code to import and export SELinux TE/MLS attributes into and out
of NetLabel.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
| 08554d6b33e60aa8ee40bbef94505941c0eefef2 |
|
25-Jul-2006 |
Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> |
[MLSXFRM]: Define new SELinux service routine
This defines a routine that combines the Type Enforcement portion of
one sid with the MLS portion from the other sid to arrive at a new
sid. This would be used to define a sid for a security association
that is to be negotiated by IKE as well as for determing the sid for
open requests and connection-oriented child sockets.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
| 851f8a6906b71f7a19043d4d722dd4ffab7aeafc |
|
30-Jul-2006 |
Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com> |
[PATCH] selinux: fix bug in security_compute_sid
Initializes newcontext sooner to allow for its destruction in all cases.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
| 6e5a2d1d32596850a0ebf7fb3e54c0d69901dabd |
|
29-Jun-2006 |
Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> |
[PATCH] audit: support for object context filters
This patch introduces object audit filters based on the elements
of the SELinux context.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
kernel/auditfilter.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/auditsc.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
| 3a6b9f85c641a3b89420b0c8150ed377526a1fe1 |
|
29-Jun-2006 |
Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> |
[PATCH] audit: rename AUDIT_SE_* constants
This patch renames some audit constant definitions and adds
additional definitions used by the following patch. The renaming
avoids ambiguity with respect to the new definitions.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
include/linux/audit.h | 15 ++++++++----
kernel/auditfilter.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
kernel/auditsc.c | 10 ++++----
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 32 +++++++++++++-------------
4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
| 8ba8e0fbe6321961f6ba04e2fd7215b37d935c83 |
|
24-May-2006 |
Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> |
[PATCH] fix se_sen audit filter
Fix a broken comparison that causes the process clearance to be checked for
both se_clr and se_sen audit filters.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
| 0cccca06f9870eb6daa89357b8a99ad041865553 |
|
15-May-2006 |
Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> |
[PATCH] selinux: check for failed kmalloc in security_sid_to_context()
Check for NULL kmalloc return value before writing to it.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
| 376bd9cb357ec945ac893feaeb63af7370a6e70b |
|
24-Feb-2006 |
Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> |
[PATCH] support for context based audit filtering
The following patch provides selinux interfaces that will allow the audit
system to perform filtering based on the process context (user, role, type,
sensitivity, and clearance). These interfaces will allow the selinux
module to perform efficient matches based on lower level selinux constructs,
rather than relying on context retrievals and string comparisons within
the audit module. It also allows for dominance checks on the mls portion
of the contexts that are impossible with only string comparisons.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
| bb0030797f55c9996ea1cebd16b65750ceb7e4fd |
|
22-Mar-2006 |
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> |
[PATCH] sem2mutex: security/
Semaphore to mutex conversion.
The conversion was generated via scripts, and the result was validated
automatically via a script as well.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
| af601e4623d0303bfafa54ec728b7ae8493a8e1b |
|
04-Jan-2006 |
Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> |
[PATCH] SE Linux audit events
Attached is a patch that hardwires important SE Linux events to the audit
system. Please Apply.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
|
| e0795cf46d174d4faab35d13d0a088b5bcb2752a |
|
10-Jan-2006 |
Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com> |
[PATCH] selinux: Remove unneeded k[cm]alloc() return value casts
Remove redundant casts of k*alloc() return values in
security/selinux/ss/services.c
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
| 89d155ef62e5e0c10e4b37aaa5056f0beafe10e6 |
|
30-Oct-2005 |
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
[PATCH] SELinux: convert to kzalloc
This patch converts SELinux code from kmalloc/memset to the new kazalloc
unction. On i386, this results in a text saving of over 1K.
Before:
text data bss dec hex filename
86319 4642 15236 106197 19ed5 security/selinux/built-in.o
After:
text data bss dec hex filename
85278 4642 15236 105156 19ac4 security/selinux/built-in.o
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
| 782ebb992ec20b5afdd5786ee8c2f1b58b631f24 |
|
04-Sep-2005 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
[PATCH] selinux: Reduce memory use by avtab
This patch improves memory use by SELinux by both reducing the avtab node
size and reducing the number of avtab nodes. The memory savings are
substantial, e.g. on a 64-bit system after boot, James Morris reported the
following data for the targeted and strict policies:
#objs objsize kernmem
Targeted:
Before: 237888 40 9.1MB
After: 19968 24 468KB
Strict:
Before: 571680 40 21.81MB
After: 221052 24 5.06MB
The improvement in memory use comes at a cost in the speed of security
server computations of access vectors, but these computations are only
required on AVC cache misses, and performance measurements by James Morris
using a number of benchmarks have shown that the change does not cause any
significant degradation.
Note that a rebuilt policy via an updated policy toolchain
(libsepol/checkpolicy) is required in order to gain the full benefits of
this patch, although some memory savings benefits are immediately applied
even to older policies (in particular, the reduction in avtab node size).
Sources for the updated toolchain are presently available from the
sourceforge CVS tree (http://sourceforge.net/cvs/?group_id=21266), and
tarballs are available from http://www.flux.utah.edu/~sds.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
| f5c1d5b2aaf9a98f15a6dcdfbba1f494d0aaae52 |
|
28-Jul-2005 |
James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> |
[PATCH] SELinux: default labeling of MLS field
Implement kernel labeling of the MLS (multilevel security) field of
security contexts for files which have no existing MLS field. This is to
enable upgrades of a system from non-MLS to MLS without performing a full
filesystem relabel including all of the mountpoints, which would be quite
painful for users.
With this patch, with MLS enabled, if a file has no MLS field, the kernel
internally adds an MLS field to the in-core inode (but not to the on-disk
file). This MLS field added is the default for the superblock, allowing
per-mountpoint control over the values via fixed policy or mount options.
This patch has been tested by enabling MLS without relabeling its
filesystem, and seems to be working correctly.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
| 9a5f04bf798254390f89445ecf0b6f4c70ddc1f8 |
|
25-Jun-2005 |
Jesper Juhl <juhl-lkml@dif.dk> |
[PATCH] selinux: kfree cleanup
kfree(NULL) is legal.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <juhl-lkml@dif.dk>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
|
| 9ad9ad385be27fcc7c16d290d972c6173e780a61 |
|
22-Jun-2005 |
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org> |
AUDIT: Wait for backlog to clear when generating messages.
Add a gfp_mask to audit_log_start() and audit_log(), to reduce the
amount of GFP_ATOMIC allocation -- most of it doesn't need to be
GFP_ATOMIC. Also if the mask includes __GFP_WAIT, then wait up to
60 seconds for the auditd backlog to clear instead of immediately
abandoning the message.
The timeout should probably be made configurable, but for now it'll
suffice that it only happens if auditd is actually running.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
|
| 4c443d1b558b21520bd8fd6140b85cee0756becd |
|
17-May-2005 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> |
[PATCH] selinux: fix avc_alloc_node() oom with no policy loaded
This patch should fix the avc_alloc_node() oom condition that Andrew
reported when no policy is loaded in SELinux.
Prior to this patch, when no policy was loaded, the SELinux "security
server" (policy engine) was only returning allowed decisions for the
requested permissions for each access check. This caused the cache to
thrash when trying to use SELinux for real work with no policy loaded
(typically, the no policy loaded state is only for bootstrapping to the
point where we can load an initial policy).
This patch changes the SELinux security server to return the complete
allowed access vector at once, and then to reset the cache after the
initial policy load to flush the initial cache state created during
bootstrapping.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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| c04049939f88b29e235d2da217bce6e8ead44f32 |
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13-May-2005 |
Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> |
AUDIT: Add message types to audit records
This patch adds more messages types to the audit subsystem so that audit
analysis is quicker, intuitive, and more useful.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
---
I forgot one type in the big patch. I need to add one for user space
originating SE Linux avc messages. This is used by dbus and nscd.
-Steve
---
Updated to 2.6.12-rc4-mm1.
-dwmw2
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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| 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 |
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17-Apr-2005 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org> |
Linux-2.6.12-rc2
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
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